


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POLITICS  
AND CROWD-MORALITY



# POLITICS AND CROWD-MORALITY.

A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF POLITICS

BY

ARTHUR CHRISTENSEN

TRANSLATED FROM THE DANISH

BY

A. CECIL CURTIS

"Politics is like the sphinx in the fable: it destroys all those  
who cannot solve its riddles."—RIVAROL.

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THE translation of this work was completed and revised by Mr Curtis before his death in April 1915, but he was unable to finally pass the proofs for press.

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## PREFACE

THE whole world nowadays takes an interest in politics. And yet it is but seldom that we come across an understanding of the essence of politics, of its connection with the life of the mind, and of its significance in development. The political interests of most people are absorbed by concern for the fate of this or that bill, and by the question what this or that politician is doing or intends to do. In face of the great political and social problems, men are satisfied with certain universal tendencies, backed by arguments evolved in the party press and at political meetings. Even people whose interests are not so narrowly confined, find it difficult to take a sober view of their surroundings, because we live in the midst of the hubbub of political life, which allows us no leisure to take a broader view of things, beyond the petty quarrels of the day.

But our epoch is not only the epoch of politics, but also that of anti-politics. A wave of disgust with politics has swept over the world. Men see that popular government has not kept its promises of mountains of gold, that the new



rulers have inherited the traditions of abuse of power with the furniture of the government offices. They are beginning to realise that the fault lies not so much with forms of government and constitutional systems as with human nature itself, and are tempted to give the whole thing up in despair. This standpoint is intelligible; but it is naturally unprofitable. The thought of the possibility of improvement is the only stimulus of human activity, and so long as it is not proved incontrovertibly that human society is *not* capable of improvement, the instinct of social self-preservation bids us start from perfectibility as a fundamental hypothesis.

The first great question, then, is: Why has political morality, within the individual states as much as in the relations of states with one another, remained at so low a level? It is only through the understanding of the phenomena pertinent to this question that we can expect to find the paths which may possibly lead to improvement. In my opinion, the reason for the backward state of political morality is to be found in the fact that politics under absolutist, no less than under aristocratic and under popular forms of government, is founded on the crowds, and the ethical development of the crowds must, in consequence of their peculiar psychical conformation, proceed ever so much more slowly than that of individuals.

The effort to raise the standard of political



morality must therefore be a work of culture whose fruits will ripen but slowly. We must be on our guard against two things in particular—dogmas and illusions. It is true that politics can be constructed out of dogmas and illusions; these, however, do not help to the understanding of the relations of political life. Alert criticism and healthy scepticism—these are what are wanted. Mistrust, not trust, is the prime necessity in politics. The realities in which politics deals are everywhere and at all times veiled. There is a diplomacy of home as well as of foreign politics.

It is easy enough to form a mature opinion about actual problems such as equal manhood suffrage, women's suffrage, national defence, the peace movement, etc.; but it is much more difficult to probe these problems to their depths, to weigh the arguments pro and con and to adopt a standpoint accordingly. I have tried, therefore, in this book to give a lead to those who are trying to contract a habit of independent thought in relation to political problems. I am in hopes that my subjective treatment of what might be called the "Philosophy of Politics" will present itself to my readers as the result of objective observations which are free from party colour.

The possibility of discussing a "Philosophy of Politics" ought by now to have been established, since the much-discussed science of sociology has been supplemented by a succession of investigations

into the psychology of crowds. The French are the pioneers in this province. G. le Bon and G. Tarde, in the nineties of the last century, were the first to introduce by their writings the rational investigation of a question which is the very foundation of an understanding of political phenomena, namely, the interaction between individual and crowd. The psychology of crowds, however, has not been by any means exhaustively handled as yet, and my book will, I hope, succeed in presenting some new ideas on the subject.

The first chapter of the book was published in *Ugens Tilskuer* (11th November 1910). Two essays in *Gads danske Magasin* (October 1908 and July 1910) may be considered studies for the section of the book dealing with "Home Politics." The first chapter, as well as the passage dealing with the formation of political parties, touches closely at several points on an article by F. Hagerup in *Samtiden* for January 1910, an article which did not come to my notice till I had completed the present work.

ARTHUR CHRISTENSEN.

CHARLOTTENLUND.

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# POLITICS AND CROWD-MORALITY

## CHAPTER I

### WORLD-VIEW AND POLITICAL CONVICTION

“Nous ne trouvons guère de gens de bon sens que ceux qui sont de notre avis.”—LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

WHEN we say that we are in search of a theory of life, a “world-view,” we mean that we are in search of a common denominator, in which, if not all the phenomena of life, at least those which have significance for the individual are merged. We are never unbiassed in this search. In the first place we are exposed to all manner of suggestions from outside. But an infinitesimal number of individuals contrive to surmount this obstacle, only to suffer hopeless shipwreck on the second, impassable rock of suggestions from within. The fact of the matter is that we do not begin our search with an open mind. Every man is affected by the tendency of his individual nature, which, unknown to himself, guides him in a definite direction. Temperament comes first and foremost; it directs our search, and sees to it that we end in a world-view which suits our temperament. We



are under a delusion if we think that we have formed our outlook on life by objective, abstract speculation. We have searched for the truth, but our temperament has seen to it that we should end in *that particular* form of truth to which it was most convenient that we should adjust ourselves, by providing the right soil for the fruitful elements in our individuality, and, where possible, by furnishing us with the means of justifying our shortcomings. It is certain that, if there is an absolute truth, men can never attain to it, because they can never escape from their subjective limitations. So the search for a world-view may be more accurately defined as the search after a *modus vivendi* between the ego and the world around.

For this reason one individual will never succeed in "converting" (in the strictest sense of the word) another. It is possible to corrupt the judgment of weak intellects, and to induce them to echo certain dogmas: dogmas, however, cannot alter human nature. For instance, a common enough phenomenon is the man who always has Christianity at the end of his tongue, and is at the same time extremely unchristian in disposition and action. Such people are called hypocrites, usually unjustly; for hypocrisy presupposes a self-knowledge which cannot exist apart from a certain degree of intelligence. They are simply people who have by mistake adopted a world-view which does not suit them. Other people are always

better judges of the fit of a man's clothes than the wearer himself.

It is an established fact that political theories nowadays stand in the foreground of the whole theory-complex of the individual. This is clearly seen in the way in which the newspapers are classified by their political points of view. The political theories, however, comprise distinct views about other phenomena of life. A Conservative organ has different opinions about Religion, Literature, and other unpolitical topics, from those of a Radical newspaper. The reason is that political antagonisms are merely the outward expressions of antagonisms of world-views. In the course of the development of democracy, politics has become a predominant factor—like religion in the Middle Ages,—so that now it is political colour which determines the standpoint of individuals—a standpoint, however, which is of itself a standpoint for all the phenomena of life which fall within the sphere of interest of the individual. It is the ancient struggle between world-views—in new forms, it is true; but the antagonisms are the same, because they spring from what is deepest in man, namely, his temperament—that is to say, his tendencies, founded on the whole of his physical and pschical disposition.

Strongly marked temperaments are rare; the majority are so much blurred that they are difficult to define. The views of persons endowed with

temperaments of this indistinct nature are apt to take their colour more from outside than from inside, and the more this is done the lower is the general level of intelligence and education. The most important factor at work is material interest. A man thinks that he has formed his political views as the result of mature consideration of the best interests of the community, while in point of fact it is regard for his own material interests which has marked out the path of conviction for him. Socialism has as its immediate goal the improvement of the material conditions of the working-classes; so practically all workmen are socialists from "conviction." The employer who turns Conservative after being, as a workman, a social democrat, is also a good type of the kind. Then there are the men whose material circumstances do not directly point them the path to political conviction. These are apt to be influenced by their *milieu*. Their surroundings, and accidents of every kind, lay the foundations, and lead them in the choice of their favourite newspaper, which in its turn strengthens the basis provided for it and provides them with the necessary political shibboleths, which they neither can nor will think out, but which play the part of rough finger-posts. Inasmuch as they, though unwillingly, fight shy of the effort required for the revision of their standpoint and for the eventual adoption of a new conviction, they oppose themselves to all attempts at conversion with



an obstinacy which they themselves applaud as loyalty to convictions. In the same way as we talk of conventional Christians, we can talk of conventional Conservatives and conventional Liberals.

In addition to these two great groups, the *profit-determined* and the *convention-determined* partisans, there is a small minority of people whose political convictions are formed by an internal propensity. These are the *temperament-determined*. / These also escape but rarely the influence of material interests and of their *milieu*—even if it be a *milieu* in whose choice temperament has had comparatively free play,—and this circumstance makes it possible for those whose political interests are determined by temperament to combine into groups, and not to dwell apart as separate units.

(The political views based on temperament can be referred to two—or, if you prefer it—three main standpoints: *positive* and *negative Conservatism* and *Progressivism*. / The positive Conservative considers that things as they are, are on the whole good, and do not call for any alteration; while the negative Conservative also does not want any alteration, but only in view of the fact that, while things are altogether in a bad way, yet that no improvement is possible.<sup>1</sup> The Progressive, like the negative Conservative, sees the gloomy side of

<sup>1</sup> This is the standpoint of the sceptics. The reader should refer to the classic dialogue between Candide and Martin in Voltaire's work: "Croyez-vous, dit Candide, que les hommes se

things—indeed, perhaps he overlooks such bright sides as they may possibly have,—and because he believes in the possibility of improvement, he determines to collaborate in the progressive movement. (Of course we must not allow ourselves to be misled by party labels; parties are continually altering while their labels remain, and gradually become misleading.) Parties which call themselves “Conservative” may be moderately progressive, and so-called “Progressive” parties can be comparatively conservative. Party-temperament and party-names are not always coterminous. Among the Progressives we must also reckon the *Reactionaries*, in the real meaning of the word. The word “Reactionary” is often, especially in a hostile sense, used improperly of Conservatives, though there really is an essential difference between the two: the Reactionary is, like the Progressive, discontented with existing circumstances, and would like to see them reformed; instead, however, of introducing untested novelties, he thinks that the best way of securing progress will be by the restoration of what has stood the test at some previous date.

soient toujours mutuellement massacrés comme ils font aujourd'hui? Qu'ils aient toujours été menteurs, fourbes, perfides, ingrats, brigands, faibles, volages, lâches, envieux, gourmands, ivrognes, avarés, ambitieux, sanguinaires, calomniateurs, débauchés, fanatiques, hypocrites et sots?—Croyez-vous, dit Martin, que les éperviers aient toujours mangé des pigeons quand ils en ont trouvé?—Oui, sans doute, dit Candide.—Hé bien, dit Martin, si les éperviers ont toujours eu le même caractère, pourquoi voulez-vous que les hommes aient changé le leur?”

Here, too, it must be remembered that absolute standpoints do not exist in actual life. Nobody is so conservative as not to wish for alterations in one point or another, and nobody is progressive to such a degree as not to wish something to be left as it is. The negative Conservative adopts a middle standpoint, he is latently progressive in his Conservatism; a newly acquired conviction of the possibility of progress will see him enrolled in the ranks of the Progressives.

If we now consider more closely the possibilities of political propaganda, we shall readily understand that it is very difficult to influence the members of the temperament-determined party by agitation. The truth of a political theory cannot be proved by logic; it will always be possible to adduce as many arguments for as against every theory. Every individual possesses in his temperament a leader whom it is not easy to turn aside from the right path. A man's temperament can of course alter, and with it his political theories will alter; chronic gastritis has more influence in this direction than ten agitators. Commonly, too, a man's progressive zeal abates as he grows older—indeed, is transferred into positive or negative Conservatism, according to the direction in which his temperament leads him.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A similar development can often be observed in the profit-determined partisans, when in the course of years they have worked their way to the flesh-pots.



While agitation is of little effect with the temperament-determined, it demands, as we have seen, from the convention-determined partisans also the overcoming of a certain opposition: an opposition, however, which, as it is only born of laziness, *can* be overcome, especially if the people concerned can be persuaded that this or that policy is of material advantage to themselves, and can thus be enticed to join the class which forms the most hopeful field for propaganda, namely, the profit-determined. That is why promises of food are made to artisans, of railways to peasants, of protection to business men, etc. Here election rhetoric with its perversions of the truth, deceptions, empty promises, and other characteristics, finds its proper field of activity. The good of the community is a bait which will catch the votes of those only who can be persuaded that the social-happiness plank in the platform will first and foremost benefit themselves. The ideal of liberty is a lusty plant, in theory. In practice it has gone the way of other social ideals dating from other periods of culture; we resign our liberty in order to fight in serried ranks for Power, that is to say, for the disposal of the goods of the community, for liberty to distribute them at pleasure. Political agitation must thus become ever increasingly materialised, the more historical development tends to make of economical questions the determining factors in the political struggle. No unbiassed observer can fail to notice that we are moving in this direction.

This development need not be deplored. It will gradually make politics more business-like, more brutal perhaps, but it will banish at the same time many illusions and much hypocrisy. But the ancient struggle between world-views will not on that account cease. We shall be able to fight it out in a more open arena. Just as religion has already been precipitated to a striking degree in the ferment of world-views, so will politics also assume more modest proportions. The temperament-determined world-views will not entirely disappear from politics, but they will come to play a secondary rôle, and they will seek out for themselves new fields in which the struggle can be continued under new forms.

One point must always be borne in mind: the temperament-determined world-views do not fight to conquer and annihilate each other; for they are all equally necessary and equally imperishable, precisely because they are temperament-determined. They fight in order to keep the development of the world in equilibrium.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CROWD—THE PART PLAYED BY SUGGESTION IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

“Les hommes n’aiment pas à s’approfondir jusqu’à un certain point : ils vivent au jour la journée avec leur conscience. C’est surtout dans les siècles corrompus qu’on se scandalise aisément et qu’on exige des livres qu’ils nous donnent bonne opinion de nous-mêmes ; on voudrait être flatté par des philosophes : mais des hommes simples et droits supporteraient sans horreur la dissection du cœur humain.”—RIVAROL.

THE development of the world is based not only on individual world-views, but also on the interaction between personality and crowd. Personality, which is itself the product of the crowd *milieu*—that is to say, is determined by circumstances, by time and place—contributes from the store of its own individuality and provides new ideas, which are absorbed more or less quickly and thoroughly by the crowd. Thus there is a steady stream of new thoughts pouring into the crowd, generally in a much-coarsened and simplified form, which secures the adaptation of the ideas to the conceptive capacity of the crowd. Incoherent, confused, and rough in its outlines as is the crowd’s world-view, yet it instinctively

avoids the most serious contradictions and takes the form of a stream which is definable in its general direction. Thus we get the formation of, and changes in, what are known as the spirit of the age and public opinion, as well as formations of, and changes in, parties and sects. Crowds are the blind instruments of historical development, strangers to all power of independent thought, a host of nameless units; and for clumsy artillery they have the collective world-views, whether these be called Romanism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, the spirit of the Renaissance, Romanticism, or bear the names of Lutheranism and Catholicism, Conservatism and Liberalism, Nationalism, Socialism, and so forth. No idea can conquer until a crowd has inscribed it on its banner; no poet can flourish without the crowd; no monarch, no government can exist without crowds to swear allegiance to it. Every form of government (absolutism no less than democratic constitutional government) is in reality an expression of the will of the crowds.

(A "*crowd*" can be defined shortly as a group of individuals which, in a given moment, is filled with a common idea or a common desire, and is conscious of this community of thought, will, or action.) Not every chance collection of men constitutes a "*crowd*" in the sociological sense of the word. The multitude which hurries hither and thither in a frequented street is no "*crowd*,"



because no common bond binds the units together. If, however, the pedestrians throng together because of some unusual occurrence, an accident, or an arrest, or in order to listen to a street-preacher, then the contact is established between the individuals, a moment of common consciousness binds them together; the chance multitude becomes a "crowd."

The magic charm which brings about this transformation is *suggestion*. Suggestion focuses the attention, the thought and the will of the individuals, and thus makes common action possible. Without suggestion any psychical connection between a considerable number of men of different social origin and level of education would be out of the question. Consequently suggestion must be regarded as the fundamental factor in the psychology of crowds.

Suggestion is the phenomenon which subjects the individual, with no contributory effort of will on his part, to an impression which forces his thought-processes in a definite direction. It is essential for a condition of suggestion that a "narrowing of consciousness," to borrow Wundt's expression, should exist: a "narrowing" which in given conditions can operate with such force that the suggestion becomes what the Germans call "Wach-hypnose"—"hypnotism in a waking condition." If I, through constant repetition of an assertion, without the addition of proofs or



rational arguments, cause a person to believe in it, a case of suggestion arises. The assertion may be so unreasonable that simple reflection would show its untenability; but the narrowing of the consciousness prevents such reflection on the part of the person influenced by the suggestion, and makes him impervious to objections from a hostile quarter. Suggestion can also be exercised without words; gestures, movements, play of features can have the same effect. When a child follows with his eyes the movements of my forefinger, when anyone, by standing still in the street and looking steadily at a house, compels the passers-by to follow the direction of his gaze, similar phenomena of suggestion are presented to us.

Suggestion is a universal phenomenon, which is present everywhere and in all manner of circumstances. The art of advertisement is the art of exercising suggestion on the public; we come across the name of a certain firm so often that at last we go and buy our goods from that firm, although we have not the slightest guarantee that we shall be better served by it than by its neighbour. We go to a theatre in order to submit ourselves to suggestion; when we say that the piece played produces an "illusion," we really mean merely that it is suggestive; in reality we are conscious all the time—however absorbing we may find the drama—that it is a play and not reality; it is rare for the suggestion to result in a real illusion, so that the

spectator, for instance, cries out to the hero that he must take care because the villain has a revolver in his pocket.

The speculator, who causes a rise and fall in prices on the Stock Exchange, acts with the help of suggestion. The conception of "actuality" rests on suggestion; there is no reasonable ground for my interesting myself in Eskimos and polar bears to-day, when a famous Arctic explorer comes home, if such things were of no interest to me yesterday, and in a week's time will again be indifferent to me. Take another example: a famous picture, an original Rembrandt or Rubens, has a market value of £40,000, while a copy, which is painted in so masterly a way that even the greatest connoisseurs can with difficulty distinguish it from the original, can be bought for £50. It is obvious that both original and copy have the same power of producing a definite artistic impression—in other words, the æsthetic value of each is absolutely the same. Accordingly the £50 represent—at any rate approximately—the real artistic value; the remaining £39,950 represent—the suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of clearness we have here left out of account another factor which would certainly play a part in this case, namely, *contrary suggestion*. The copy is perhaps worth more than £50, but the circumstance that it is "only" a copy lowers its price. Contrary suggestion is equally a common phenomenon, which influences crowds as well as the individual. On certain people an exaggerated or importunate recommendation of an article will act as a deterrent. They will be less inclined to

The action of suggestion on the physical condition of the individual, its power of inducing sickness and conversely of promoting a cure, is a matter of common knowledge. A woman patient was brought into a hospital at Copenhagen who was suffering from a cancer in the abdomen. She implored the surgeons to operate on her. They proceeded to do so, but discovered that the cancer could not be removed. With the view of quieting the patient, the surgeons told her that the operation had been successfully performed. Contrary to everybody's expectation, the patient recovered and was discharged from the hospital. A short time afterwards she was killed in an accident, whereupon the body was dissected, and it was found that the cancer had disappeared. The release from a depressing auto-suggestion, and the simultaneous imparting of a cheering suggestion, had strengthened the woman's physical constitution to such a degree

tackle a book, if they are urged on all sides to read it; and they find a tune unbearable, just because it is popular. Here, too, we have a narrowing of the consciousness, but in a contrary direction to that which produces ordinary suggestion. Still commoner is the contrary suggestion aroused by a prohibition ("stolen fruit is the sweetest"). Advice not to read a book will usually only incite people to read it. If it is prohibited by the authorities, its success is assured; though here the suggestion of sensationalism is apt to co-operate with the contrary suggestion of the prohibition. If a politician speaks to a mixed public of adherents and opponents, the speech will produce contrary suggestion in the latter with the same force as suggestion in the former; the opponents will be confirmed in their hostile attitude towards the views the speaker expresses.



that she had got the better of her sickness. Numbers of such cases are to be found in the case-books and in the accounts of "miraculous cures."

In many cases the operation of *foreign suggestion*—suggestion from outside, exercised by the will of some other person—is enhanced by *auto-suggestion*. Auto-suggestion by itself, too, is a very important phenomenon. It operates, for instance, when anybody, by concentrating his attention on a particular portion of his body, produces a sensation of itching at that spot, or when a man shivers at the sight of people bathing in winter, or perhaps simply at the thought of a bathe at that time of year. Giddiness is a characteristic case of auto-suggestion. The fear of a fall causes such a narrowing of the consciousness that we can think of nothing but the gulf at our feet, and it evolves a tickling sensation as vivid as that of an actual fall through space; we anticipate the fall, so to speak, and the idea can take such possession of us as to force us to throw ourselves down. The so-called idiosyncrasies, *e.g.* disgust at the sight, smell, or touch of certain animals, plants, or objects which do not evoke the same feeling in the majority of people, are based on auto-suggestion; so are imperative ideas and monomanias. Prejudices rest partly on foreign suggestion, partly on auto-suggestion: there are both common prejudices, which are part and parcel of the times or have

their root in definite social circles, and personal, self-created prejudices.

Foreign suggestion may be of a twofold kind, in that it can proceed either from a definite person, or from the whole *milieu*, in which we live and move. *Personality suggestion* is exercised, for instance, by parents and teachers—indeed, education really rests on the correct application of suggestion ; it is also exercised by priests and physicians ; in fact, in all relations in which there is authority on one side, and on the other more or less blind confidence. Strong characters always exercise suggestion on weaker. ) Prophets and the founders of religions are but rarely persons of outstanding intelligence, but they are always strongly-marked characters, whom the auto-suggestion of their particular monomania endows with an extraordinary power of exercising suggestion on others. Princes and statesmen exercise suggestion, both through their exceptional and exalted station and through the power which they possess, or which they are at any rate commonly credited with ; their actions are followed with eager interest, even in matters in which those actions do not impinge directly on the welfare of the citizens, and their words, however commonplace, are telegraphed to the ends of the earth. The same thing on a smaller scale holds of all public personages, savants and financiers, actors and authors, footballers and bruisers ; each has his circle of suggestionees, who interest themselves in

his words, doings, and private affairs. Every kind of "snobbery" is a condition of suggestion. A popular author finds a market for everything he cares to publish, however trashy it be ; indeed, the still trashier things which he himself had banished to his writing-table drawer find readers when they are published after his death by merciless survivors. In love, too, suggestion, with its attendant narrowing of the consciousness, plays an extraordinarily large part ; the whole essence of love is made up only of sexual desire, social instinct, and suggestion. The popular orator and the advocate are artistically trained suggesters. In the conduct of lawsuits suggestion plays a prominent part. Plaintiff and defendant strive, each for himself, to exercise suggestion on the judges. The latter's professional experience may act for them as a counterweight against the suggestion, but the same can hardly be said of the tailors and cobblers in the jury-box, who are chosen without regard to psychological knowledge and experience, and are handed over to two practised suggesters, each of whom, in the interests of his case, seeks to narrow their consciousness and thus to prevent them from passing a sober judgment on the case at issue.

The methods by which personality-suggestion is exercised are many, and differ according to circumstances. Many people are highly susceptible to pomp and splendour, but unostentatiousness also can serve as an efficient method of suggestion ; the



silk hat of a popularly elected president can be just as much the object of "snobbery" as a court uniform hung with orders. Other people are more susceptible to wit and paradox, or to emphasis and pathos. Music is a powerful medium of suggestion. The most effective of all the means of suggestion, however, is language, language in all its forms, in prose and in poetry, with or without rhetorical dressing, language without proof, the oft-reiterated assertion and the categorical statement. One day at a watering-place the rumour went about that the "sea-serpent" was lying outside, some few yards from the beach. Everybody rushed to the shore, and all saw clearly the monster's head, as it stuck out of the water from time to time. Even sceptics felt themselves being convinced little by little of the existence of the mythical monster. Some photographed the beast; others talked about rowing out in a fishing boat to get a nearer look at it. A cod-fisher came on the scene, and explained that the "sea-serpent" was nothing but a brown stone, which now was covered by the waves, now came to light again. For years the visitors had watched the stone, without its having occurred to anyone that it resembled a sea-monster; but so soon as someone asserted that it was a living beast everybody else saw it in the same light, until the illusion produced by the suggestion disappeared before the cod-fisher's explanation as abruptly as it had arisen.

And language, the statement, not only inspires confidence, but also incites the crowd to action. The classic example is old Cato's "Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam."<sup>1</sup> The strongest effect in this respect is produced by the shibboleth, the pithy phrase, which for all its conciseness seems to contain a whole world-view. The shibboleth is first what the crowd requires: it is merely a rough generalisation devoid of precise meaning, but it arouses a vague sentimental conception which is eminently well fitted to evoke impulses. "Back to nature," "Down with Rome," "The struggle against capital," "The right to live," "The century of the child," and so forth, are phrases which sum up certain tendencies in an abstract generalisation, and which, because they seem in the eyes of the crowd to contain the key to the solution of great social problems, relieve it from the necessity of thinking out these problems, which lie outside the range of the crowd's power of thought; for the crowd can neither reason nor argue. Le Bon says, in his great work on *The Psychology of Crowds*, that the reasoning processes of the crowd consist in the "association of dissimilar things, which have only an apparent resemblance to each other, and in the immediate generalisation of particular cases." It would be more correct to say that the crowd

<sup>1</sup> Cato repeated his appeal for the destruction of Carthage for such a long time, that the Romans at last translated his thought into action.



is only suggestible by reasonings of the kind described; the crowd is by nature incapable of pursuing an independent train of thought. The shibboleth is a powerful stimulus, which produces strong reflex-motions in the crowd, and only misses its effect on such crowds as have been previously rendered immune by an opposite suggestion. And the shibboleth can be used over and over again without losing any of its effect. Long after actual circumstances have robbed it of all significance, the familiar and welcome sound of its words continues to have effect.

*Social suggestion* is founded on tradition and public opinion, on the contributions of the dead and the living. It operates on a small scale through the home and social circle; on a large scale through fashion, literary and artistic trend, all those sociable tendencies which together make up what we call the spirit of the age, and which in particularly concentrated and harmonious periods crystallise into "style." A single example will be enough to show the power of social suggestion. The refined social world of the eighteenth century had cultivated the art of dying with the same mild, harmonious calm as it had shown in life. The women in particular understood how to die stylishly. They left the world with tact and dignity, without a sign of fear or pain which might grate upon the survivors. "One could count," write the brothers Goncourt, "those who did not remain true in

their last hour to their life, their principles, their rank, even their want of faith. When the lady's-maid announced: 'Your grace, God is at the door: may He come in? He desires the honour of administering Extreme Unction to you,' some found strength to raise themselves in bed, as if to receive a royal visitor; others had strength of will enough to refuse admittance to a God for whom they had no use. Dying women summoned the cook, and gave him orders to look after the guests so well, that they might not be tempted to desert the house. There were women who whiled away the tediousness of a creeping disease by writing a will, in which not one of their relations, friends and acquaintances, not one of their poor dependants was forgotten, a masterpiece of clearness, a miracle of calculation! Some crowned their death with garlands, cheered it with flowers, with dances, comedies, or with a last love-affair; others put their epitaphs into rhyme and buried their memories in a sprightly jest. There were those too who composed satirical couplets a few hours before their death, while others intrigued on the threshold of death, with a tune from 'Joconde' on their lips. It was the century in which the death-struggle had passed the stage of nonchalance and reached that of epigram, the century in which a dying princess summoned her physicians, her confessor, and her steward to her bedside, and said to the physicians: 'Gentlemen,

you have killed me, but in doing so, you have been true to your rules and principles'; to the confessor: 'You have done your duty, by frightening me out of my wits'; and to her steward: 'You are here by the wish of my people, who desire that I should make my will; you all play your parts very well, but you must admit that I am not playing mine badly.' The woman's soul went apparelled in wit to meet Death, while the Princess of Talmont's body was carried in a blue and silver robe to the grave."

Social suggestion in its various forms is altogether more lasting, more constant than personality suggestion; it operates with greater weight and less violence. Social suggestion is an impersonal power which meets the individual day by day from every side, and which therefore must leave its impress in a greater or less degree on all who live in the particular *milieu*. The highly educated man no less than the ignoramus is exposed to this kind of suggestion, which has its root in social instinct, in man's essence as a social animal. How quickly we become reconciled to a fashion which at first seemed to us ridiculous or ludicrous! And yet fashion is the most fleeting kind of social suggestion. It is true to say of personality suggestion, on the contrary, that it acts most strongly and most surely on the most primitive natures. The cultured individual, the thinker, demands sensible reasons for his conviction; the less highly developed man



is content to follow an authority. Similarly with the less highly gifted, the child and the savage; similarly also with the crowd, because the mental life of the crowd is extremely primitive.

We must not attach to the conception of the "crowd-soul" a mystic idea of a soul outside the several individuals. The crowd-soul is only the sum of the single souls which make up the crowd; but inasmuch as these single consciousnesses are, through the influence of suggestion, narrowed to the same point, are forced in one and the same direction, a kind of common consciousness is called into existence, which is independent of the will of the units. The individual is for a while detached from his own ego, so to speak, in order to become a dependent member of the crowd. When an assembly listens to a moving speech, it is influenced not only by the suggestion from the speaker, but also by the suggestion from the other hearers on whom the speaker exercises suggestion. The hearers exercise suggestion on each other by play of features, gestures, and cries. Each unit has an intensive feeling of being in contact with his surroundings, and is further inflamed thereby. This phenomenon, which we may call *inter-suggestion*, and which is the auto-suggestion of the crowd, is a very important factor in all crowd-movements. A practised observer will be easily able, when he finds himself in the middle of a crowd, to establish the effect of inter-suggestion

upon himself; the sight of the tense faces, the noise of the applause awakens in him a peculiarly intoxicating sensation owing to the immediate influence of the strength inherent in a crowd. He feels personally the strength of the suggestion, even though his thinking ego maintains a critical attitude towards the situation. On the occasions of crowd-healings at Lourdes and at other pilgrimage-resorts we see the working not only of the suggestion from those who have been already healed, and of the auto-suggestion of the units, but also of the inter-suggestion between the collected troops of sufferers, who are hoping for the miracle, and of whom one after the other proclaims the recovery of health and soundness. With the help of inter-suggestion, suggestion may sometimes rise to *ecstasy*, a condition in which "the domination of a single group of ideas is so absolute, that every other store of ideas which may present itself simultaneously to the brain from another source is completely absorbed by it and to some extent obliterated" (Stoll). A crowd in ecstasy is completely irresponsible.



## CHAPTER III

### THE MENTAL LIFE OF CROWDS

THE mental life of crowds is, as has been already stated, very primitive. I mean to say that, when a "crowd-mind" is formed by the irresponsible concentration of the individual consciousness into a kind of common consciousness, the presumption is that the emotions which constitute the common consciousness are common to mankind. An element of consciousness which does not exist in me cannot be evoked by suggestion. Everything individualistic is excluded from crowds. Qualities which exist only in the few cannot enter into the composition of the crowd-mind, but only such qualities as exist in everyone. Only the most primitive emotions find a direct echo in the consciousnesses of all; consequently only these are to be looked for in the crowd. As these primitive emotions are everywhere and in every epoch much the same, all crowds in their nature and their mode of operation are essentially the same. Le Bon says truly: "It is precisely this collation of ordinary qualities which explains to us why crowds

can never bring to a complete issue operations which demand a high level of intelligence. Decisions of general interest which are arrived at by an assembly of men who, though distinguished, are specialists in different departments, are not sensibly superior to the decisions which a collection of simpletons might arrive at. The former can in practice only contribute to the common stock those mediocre qualities which are common property."

The most primitive instinct in man is the *instinct of self-preservation*, which assumes the character of *self-assertion* when the possessor is conscious of it. With crowds self-assertion assumes a position of great prominence, for which reason also national movements (for instance) find in crowds a particularly receptive soil. If the crowd combines into a sect or party, the self-assertion usually develops into intolerance: in every opponent the crowd sees an enemy; in every argument against its lusts or its creed it sees a menace to its existence, and in the consciousness of its strength it relentlessly shatters everything that stands in its way.

In natural connection with the instinct of self-preservation stand various elementary emotions, chief of which is the *predatory instinct*, the instinct to appropriate by force the fruits of the work or plunder of others, extending even to the appropriation of human labour (Slavery). The accumulation in this way of booty and human tools develops and

stimulates a cognate instinct: the *lust of power*. Both these instincts, which supplement self-assertion and develop it from the self-preservation of the moment, are to be found in crowds. Crowd-actions under primitive or relaxed social conditions are apt to be accompanied by plundering; where a strong social bond and established legal relation exist, the predatory instinct also is subject to the regulating influence of the social order, without, however, being essentially weakened thereby. It shows itself in combination with the lust of power in the mutual relations of states and nations, in the relations between professions, classes, and parties: in short, everywhere where organised crowds are opposed to each other; it shows itself in the guise of conquests, professional privileges, class legislation, as well as in the guise of party tyranny, with its attendant phenomena, nepotism and corruption.

Again, *fear* is near akin to self-assertion in essence and practice. Fear is merely the negative side of self-assertion, but its results are the same as the results of positive self-assertion, of a man's satisfaction in the display of his own powers. Also, fear moves crowds to persecution. Crowds which have become "terrorist through fear" are perhaps the most dangerous of all. A city or a country is visited by a disaster, the crowd is seized with horror and excitement, one word is enough to direct their rage against a particular object. When a plague broke out in the Middle Ages, the Jews were often



accused of having poisoned the wells, and then bloody persecutions of the Jews broke out. In our own day the telegraph often tells us how the fury of Russian peasants during the cholera epidemics is directed against the physicians and sick nurses who are sent to them in order to organise the fight against the disease. Gisquet, who was Prefect of Police in Paris under Louis-Philippe, relates how, in the year 1832, when the cholera epidemic had reached its climax, a report arose and spread like lightning that the epidemic was due to the poisoning of provisions and drinks. Huge mobs gathered in a few minutes in the Place de la Grève, on the quays, etc., clamouring in the wildest excitement for the authors of the supposed crimes. Every person who carried a bottle or parcel was suspected. Several people were massacred on the mere suspicion that they intended to shake some poison into the wine-merchants' cans. In the Faubourg Saint-Antoine two men were followed by thousands of people, who accused them of wishing to give some children a poisoned cake to eat. The two men fled for refuge into a police-station. The station was surrounded, and both the guard and the two fugitives would undoubtedly have been massacred, had not the commissioner of police and an ex-officer hit on the happy idea of dividing the cake and eating it before the eyes of the crowd, an act of presence of mind which immediately turned their rage into amusement. This faculty of veering

round abruptly from one state of mind to its exact opposite is peculiar to the crowd as it is to children, savages, and impulsive natures in general.

A factor which often accompanies self-assertion or fear in crowds is *cruelty*, the cheerful enjoyment of the sorrows of others, a feeling whose preponderatingly sexual character can be regarded as established. Cruelty also belongs to the instincts, which always lurk deep down in the inmost recesses of men of culture. However much most men of a certain degree of education avoid being present at a public execution—because, among other reasons, their presence at a previously arranged act of slaughter would testify too clearly to the survival in them of a primitive instinct,—there are very few who deny themselves the spectacle of an accident, if one chances to fall in their way. The instinct which impels men to rush together to look at a man who has fallen from the top of a church tower is naturally very complex. The attraction of the unusual plays a part in it ; in a less degree pity also—in a less degree, because people flock to the spot even when they know that they can be of no use whatever. The most important factor is, however, the sadistical pleasure at the sight of physical suffering, popularly called “stimulation of the nerves.” The man who rushes up to look at a mangled body experiences, though vaguely, the same sensation as that which shows itself, in an advanced form, as “running amok.” This primitive



instinct of cruelty operates in a modified and therefore less exhausting form in the reading of sensational magazines and blood-curdling scenes in backstairs novels.

Such daily phenomena enable us to understand how the passions of the crowd can degenerate into blood-ecstasy. One glance at the men who, shivering with excitement, strain their necks and their eyes to catch a glimpse of an injured person, is enough to show that sadistical pleasure is a constant feature in the mental life of crowds. This feature in crowds is responsible for the power of attraction exercised by neck-breaking circus performances. The crowd of spectators watches the exploits of a trainer with lions and tigers, not so much in admiration of the victory of man over raw, animal strength, as in the hope of perhaps seeing the trainer mangled. It is a lottery with many blanks, but occasionally the spectators draw a winner.<sup>1</sup>

The step from the enjoyment of a bloody spectacle to active participation in such a spectacle is not such an excessively difficult one for the crowd to take, even if the standard of culture and the characteristics of a nation help to make it so. And the crowd itself is not conscious of this side

<sup>1</sup> When the accident does happen, the horror of bloodshed felt by men of culture is shown with such force as to lead sometimes to a panic. However primitive be the crowd-mind, yet antagonistic tendencies can exist in it at the same time.

of its mental life: the sadistic enjoyment cloaks itself with all sorts of honourable motives. A small element of suggestion, which may call itself, for instance, justice, the welfare of the fatherland or defence of the faith, need only be added to the cruelty, to get murder-ecstasy in full swing. The crowd of American citizens which drags a nigger off into the woods, drenches him with petroleum, and sets fire to him, believes that its motive is justice: the victim is accused of having outraged a white woman, and anything can be believed of a nigger. The crowd of Parisian *sans-culottes* which murdered an "Aristocrat" in the street, devoured his heart while it was still warm and carried his head round on a pole, would adduce zeal for the common-weal as its motive: were not all aristocrats "enemies of the fatherland"? The Inquisitors also considered that they were actuated solely by Christian zeal when they tortured men and women heretics with all the painful refinements of the Inquisition, and finally burnt them in a solemn *auto-da-fé* to the glory of God.

The *social instincts* also in human nature are to be found in the crowd. They find expression in an elementary *sense of justice* and in a certain *sympathy* with the weak and helpless. Both these feelings are to be found in crowds more universally in our day than in times past. In epochs in which the consciousness of right and sympathy are confined to community of tribe or religion, these

amount to little more than an aspect of the self-assertion of the crowd in question. A long period of development is needed before these crowd-emotions assume a more general human character. Crowds have existed for thousands of years which were susceptible to humane ideas (Buddhists, the earliest Christian congregations), but it is only in recent centuries that we have reached the point of finding chance crowds, who are not united by any bond of common faith or conviction, amenable to the suggestion of humane ideas. It is a proof that the crowd also is subject to the law of evolution, even if this evolution proceeds extremely slowly. But these secondary crowd-emotions are generally weaker than the primary. Where self-assertion or fear rule the roost, the sense of justice and sympathy must lie low.

These are the main ingredients of the mental habit of crowds. These elementary instincts and feelings are the weapons of the agitator and the popular leader. Intellectual factors play only a rapidly diminishing part, if any part at all. The crowd is impervious to logic, acts impulsively, irresponsibly, deflected by all the suggestions which offer themselves on its path, and easily inflamed by enthusiasm or fanaticism. The difference between the two conceptions is pretty well this, that we call enthusiasm in ourselves and those who think like us what we call fanaticism in our opponents, just as we talk of patriotism in our-



selves and our fellow-countrymen, while the same phenomenon in a nation which is unsympathetic to us is called Chauvinism;<sup>1</sup> what is the result, whether profit or loss, depends on chance circumstances and on the kind of suggestion. Enthusiasm is always blind. When the crowd is impelled by sociable instincts, it often in its blindness brings about other results than those at which it aimed; but its operations are sometimes marked by a self-abnegation to which the individual in his deliberations seldom attains. Its essence is an oscillation between extremes; the greatest martyrdoms and the greatest sacrifices may take place when intersuggestion is at work; but the reverse side of a crowd's operations is no less shocking, when intolerance or fear, in combination with cruelty, is its leading motive.

*Religious suggestion* is very complex, and impinges on all the above-mentioned facets of the mental life of crowds. In the first place there is self-assertion. The crowd which is organised into a religious society or a nation asserts its existence not only with earthly weapons, but also by its alliance with supernatural power. Fear comes into play, lest these powers should avenge themselves if they are not offered the tribute due to

<sup>1</sup> A pro-French club in Metz had arranged a revolutionary dinner in January 1911, despite police prohibition. A German newspaper described the dinner, and wrote, "All the little coxcombs were intoxicated with *so-called* enthusiasm."



them, or their interests are not safeguarded. The combination of religious suggestion and the predatory instinct (as well as the lust of power) is one of the most powerful ferments known to history. Instances of it are the "Holy War" which Mohammed, the type of the great religious suggesters whose strength lies in the intensity of their auto-suggestion, and his followers kindled, and which in a few years created a kingdom greater than the Roman Empire at its zenith; and on the other side the Crusades, which originated in one of the most gigantic movements of suggestion in the history of Christianity. Religious suggestion can at the same time provide fruitful soil for cruelty. Outrages from which the crowd might shrink in other circumstances are perpetrated without scruple, when the crowd can persuade itself that it is acting in accordance with the will of a divinity. The idea that a man, in perpetrating a cruel act, is only carrying out a divine punishment (justice), or is contributing to the alleviation of the victim's sufferings after death (sympathy!) frees the crowd from all misgivings, so that it can give itself up heart and soul to the delight of seeing physical suffering, or to active participation in martyrisation. *Auto-da-fés* are only a single, though certainly, in relation to the psychology of crowds, a most illuminating example.

That is not to say that sense of justice and

sympathy really ought to be excluded from the domain of religious suggestion; on the contrary, any religion which has an ethical character may well be a valuable stimulus to these sociable instincts, which often begin by assuming the form of divine commandments before they establish themselves as component parts of the consciousness of the crowd. The fact that religious impatience imposes certain limits on the sense of justice and sympathy does not justify us in denying the socialising influence of religion. A crowd of believers, which comes out of church after having taken a devout part in the service—devotion is a condition of suggestion, especially auto-suggestion—will usually be more disposed to charity than at other times.

Religious suggestion is altogether a topic of the greatest interest to the psychologist, precisely because it acts upon all the instincts of the crowd and gives them powerful utterance. It provides an opportunity of watching the action of crowd-suggestion, as it were, under a microscope. Religious suggestion always and everywhere employs the same means; first and foremost language, the oft-reiterated assertion, the language of pathos, which arouses now hope, now fear, enigmatical turns of phrase, which charm by the obscurity of their mysticism; secondly, a symbolical ceremonial, prayers and litanies, which are often repeated in a language not understood by the crowd (Latin,

Sanskrit, Zend-Avesta, etc.). The East in every epoch has been rich in religious suggesters, some of them prophets by conviction, others more or less charlatans. Al-Hallaj, who is held in great sanctity by the Sufis, the mystics of Islam, is described as a man "who knew something of alchemy, and was an ignorant, pushing, headstrong fellow, overbold against authorities, meddling in high matters, eager to subvert governments, claiming divinity amongst his disciples, preaching the doctrine of Incarnation, and pretending to kings that he was of the Shia, and to the common folk that he held the opinion of the Sufis. He was wont in his ecstasy to cry out 'I am God!' and he said to his disciples: 'Thou art Noah!' 'Thou art Moses!' 'Thou art Muhammed!' adding: 'I have caused their spirits to return to your bodies.' At other times he uttered entirely meaningless sentences, such as: 'There descendeth the effulgent Lord of Light, who flasheth after this shining.' He pretended to perform miracles, such as stretching forth his hand into the air and withdrawing it filled with musk or coins, which he scattered amongst the spectators; or he appeared to pluck fruit in the air; but a witness stated that the fruits apparently produced from nothing by Al-Hallaj turned to dung as soon as men took them in their hands. On one occasion Ibu Nasr al-Gushúri was sick and desired to eat an apple; but none were to be obtained till Al-Hallaj stretched forth his hand



and drew it back with an apple which he claimed to have gathered from the gardens of Paradise. 'But,' objected a bystander, 'the fruit of Paradise is incorruptible, and in this apple there is a maggot.' 'This,' answered Al-Hallaj, 'is because it hath come forth from the Mansion of Eternity to the Abode of Decay; therefore to its heart hath corruption found its way.'" The author adds that those present applauded his answer more than his achievement. Al-Hallaj was at last (922 A.D.) cruelly tortured and executed. But his disciples would not believe in his death, although his head was exhibited for some time; they maintained that not he, but one of his foes, transformed into his likeness, had suffered death and mutilation. How great was the impression made by this man on his time can be seen by the fact, among others, that the booksellers were made to take an oath that they would neither buy nor sell any of his writings.

Everywhere in the Mohammedan East we meet the Al-Hallaj type, even in our own days, when prophets preach the "Holy War" in Morocco and elsewhere. A saint of this sort, with a dash of the politician in him, in whose character auto-suggestion and conscious imposture blend without definite bounds between the two, can always in the East produce crowd-movements, which may sometimes develop into regular wars and threaten the existence of states and dynasties. In Europe



the Middle Ages were saturated with religious suggestion. The Pope, who without any army worth the mention was more powerful than kings and emperors, was a product of religious suggestion. The Crusades have been quoted above as an example of a suggestion in which faith and the predatory instinct collaborated. The taking of Jerusalem during the First Crusade shows how religious enthusiasm and sadistic enjoyment can combine into the wildest murder-ecstasy. All contemporary histories recount how the blood of the murdered in the Mosque of Omar covered the floor like a sea. The eye-witness Raymond d'Agiles relates — undoubtedly with significant exaggeration, which is due to auto-suggestion — that the blood reached up to the riders' knees. About 10,000 men, women, and children were massacred in the temple, according to Foulcher de Chartres. The pious Godfrey, who had taken no part in the bloodshed, went unarmed and bare-foot with three attendants to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. When the news spread through the Christian army, the Crusaders at once donned their blood-stained clothes and walked with bare heads and bare feet to the Church of the Resurrection, while Jerusalem resounded with their lamentations. Soon the whole city was filled with the sound of penitential Psalms and Isaiah's words: "Rejoice ye with Jerusalem, and be glad with her, all ye that love her." This act of devo-

tion was followed by a massacre of all the surviving inhabitants : some were beheaded ; others were shot with arrows ; others were forced to throw themselves down from towers ; others again were slowly burnt to death.

The taking of Béziers during the Crusade of the Albigenses is a similar example of religious murder-ecstasy in combination with plunder. "Our soldiers have spared neither rank nor sex ; they have killed 20,000 men ; the whole city has been sacked and burnt to the ground ; the judgment of God has raged in wondrous wise," runs the report to the Pope. The same features are to be noticed again in the unanimity of the crowd-suggesters on the night of the massacre of St Bartholomew—which, by the way, lasted for a month.

In the modern history of the East the Bâbist movement presents many characteristic features for the student of religious suggestion. Although Bâb, the founder of the religion, was personally but little known—very few of his followers had ever set eyes on him,—and although he in his wearisome and childish writings never reaches the level of his æsthetic model, the Koran,<sup>1</sup> yet, favoured by the general corruption amongst the Shiite priesthood, he started a powerful and, for the Persian state, dangerous movement, which proved, *inter*

<sup>1</sup> Beha-ullah, who published Bâb's works and continued them was undoubtedly far superior in intelligence to his predecessor.

*alia*, what courage the Persians, generally considered cowards, can display when they are seized with religious enthusiasm. In 1852 some members of the sect made an attempt on the Shah's life. This gave rise to a massacre of Bâbis in Teheran, which is a glaring example of blood-ecstasy on the one side, and of martyr-ecstasy on the other. One Bâbi was massacred by the brother and sons of the Grand Vizier and their servants, and hewn in little pieces; another was murdered by the Princes of the blood; a third by the Foreign Minister and another highly placed official; a fourth by the Khans and other high dignitaries of the kingdom. One was killed with swords and lances by the Professors of the University of Science; another was handed over to the artillerymen, who first tore out one of his eyes and then blew him from the mouth of a cannon. One Bâbi was handed over to the merchants for slaughter, another to the infantrymen, etc. One was given to the crowd, who pummelled, stoned, and beat him to death. Hadji Suleiman Khan was subjected to a succession of ghastly tortures, under which he, like a good Sufi, sang of his love for the Godhead. Children and women were driven away with whips, bleeding all over the body and with burning matches in their wounds. They went on their way dancing and singing: "Truly we come from God, and to Him we are returning!" The heroic courage which the victims showed on this occasion



made a deep and lasting impression on the inhabitants of Teheran, and brought Bâbism thousands upon thousands of followers.<sup>1</sup>

The French sociologist Tarde has examined the different kinds of crowds, of which the most important are the demonstrating and the acting crowds. As for the former, we observe in them two qualities which have something feminine about them, namely, a very expressive symbology combined with a remarkable dearth of inventive power in regard thereto, the symbols being always the same, and repeated *ad nauseam*. To carry in procession banners, standards, statues, relics, sometimes trunkless heads on a stake; to utter cries of

<sup>1</sup> See Gobineau, *Les Religions et les Philosophies de l'Asie centrale* (Paris, 1865), pp. 301-7, and the official report reproduced by A. L. M. Nicholas ("Seyyéd Ali Mohammed dit le Bâb," *Historie*, pp. 437-45), who with characteristic nonchalance tabulates all the horrors of the massacre. It would lead us too far to enter here on a discussion of the more complex forms of crowd-sexualism, as they appear in the conditions of ecstasy pertinent to religious conceptions, enjoyment of the self-infliction of physical pain (a co-factor in epidemics of flagellation and in many cases of martyrdom), the perverse instincts which display themselves in orgiastic forms of worship, Satanism, etc. Also such phenomena as dancing mania (Tanzwut) belong to the domain of religious suggestion. There are numberless instances of sadism combined with religious conceptions. News from the Balkans recounts the discovery of a rosary composed of babies' fingers in the possession of a Balkan soldier (whether Greek or Bulgarian is not clear from the report); another had a rosary made of women's nipples (Captain Aarestrup, letter from Athens to the Danish journal, *Berlingske Tidende*, 11th December 1913).



anger or to shout "Hurrah!" to sing psalms or songs, that is pretty well all they can devise as a way of expressing their feelings. But though their ideas are few, they hold firmly to them and never tire of uttering the same cry or of making the same promenade.

As regards the active crowds, we can distinguish—still following Tarde—between loving and hating crowds. "But to what really fruitful work do loving crowds direct their activities? It is impossible to say which is the more pernicious, the hatred or the love of the crowd, its curses or its enthusiasms. When it howls, in prey to a cannibal delirium, it is truly horrible; but when it throws itself in adoration at the feet of one of its human idols, when it unharnesses the horses from his carriage, or chairs him, it is generally a semi-maniac like Masaniello, a wild beast like Marat, or a quack-general like Boulanger, that is the object of that adoration which creates dictatorships and tyrannies."

There is at the same time a "variety of the loving crowds, which is very common, and which plays a very necessary and very useful part in society, acting as counterweight to all the harm caused by every other sort of gathering. I mean the crowd rejoicing and making merry, the crowd which is in love with itself, intoxicated with the pleasure of coming together merely for the sake of coming together. Assuredly production is not confined

to the building of houses, the making of furniture, clothes, or provisions; and the social peace, the social concord, which is maintained by popular fêtes, by junketings, by the periodical rejoicings of a whole village or a whole city, where every quarrel is sunk for an hour in a common desire, the desire to see one another, to rub elbows with one another, and to exchange sympathy, this peace, this concord are products no less valuable than all the fruits of the earth and all the productions of industry. And after the crowd rejoicing, can I forget to mention the crowd mourning, the crowd which, under the burden of a common sorrow, follows the bier of a friend, of a great poet, of a national hero? It too is a mighty stimulus to social life, and by common sorrow, as by common joy, the wills of a whole people are united in one." It is the crowd's social instincts which Tarde here emphasises as the fruitful element in the crowd-mind.

We must, moreover, distinguish between the two main categories of crowds, which exhibit not unimportant differences in essence and practice, namely, *local crowds* and *scattered crowds*. To the first category belongs every gathering of chance passers-by in the street, the audience of the pulpit and the stage, the bands of demonstrators, barricade stormers, etc.; to the other belong the men who have received suggestion from the same books or the same newspapers, who have developed in a

homogeneous *milieu*, people who, moreover, live apart, perhaps a long way from one another, most of them without being aware of each other's existence. / They are bound together both by social suggestion and by personality suggestion; on the other hand, they are not so directly influenced by inter-suggestion as the local crowds; they do not see and hear each other, but must rest content with the consciousness of the existence of others scattered over the world who read the same books and newspaper articles and are influenced by them in the same way as themselves, or of being surrounded by thousands, perhaps millions, of men who are indeed personally unknown to them, but with whom a common bond of language and tradition, and consequently of mode of thought and of life, unites them. This last holds of nations regarded as crowds.

The activities of the scattered crowds are not so strictly confined in time and space as those of local crowds; the suggestion is less acute and does not so readily turn into ecstasy or panic. Widespread reading at the present day has enlarged the sphere of influence of ideas, and has thereby caused the scattered crowds to become an extremely weighty factor. These are, however, not essentially different from the local crowds. They are, like them, "intolerant, arrogant, uncritical, presumptuous, and they expect that at the words 'Public opinion' everything will defer



to them, even the truth, when it stands in their way.”<sup>1</sup>

The “*corporation*,” on the other hand, is essentially different from the crowd, being a gathering of individuals with common material or intellectual interests. Even though suggestion here too makes its influence felt, yet the corporation’s range of ideas is to a preponderating degree based on competence and professional knowledge, *i.e.* it is rational and critical.

The interaction between the individual, the creating, leading, or dominating personality, on the one side, and the crowd, formed by suggestion or working under suggestion, on the other, makes history. All the “movements” with which history deals, war and peace movements, are operations of suggestion; battles are fought out, rebellions and revolutions are carried out in an intoxication of suggestion; cults spring up, are transformed and perish under the unceasing, slow, and stubborn action of social suggestion. The acute suggestions are the most conspicuous; characteristic proofs of them are to be found at every turn in history. The activity of an Alcibiades, a Demosthenes, a Gracchus, a Cæsar, springs, it is true, from the needs of the time, but is based, regarded from

<sup>1</sup> Tarde. I prefer therefore to keep the word “crowd” for both categories, instead of following Tarde in keeping the word “crowd” for the local crowd and describing the scattered crowd as a “public.” A common designation for both seems to me to be necessary.



a psychological point of view, on suggestion. Antony's funeral oration over Cæsar, composed as it was with great rhetorical skill and an eye for broad effects, aroused the Romans to such a murder-ecstasy, that they tore a tribune of the plebs, by name C. Helvius Cinna, in pieces, simply because he happened to have the same surname as the prætor, L. Cornelius Cinna, who had publicly praised Cæsar's murderers. The people who committed the outrage, as Appian relates, refused to listen when they were told that all that the two Cinnas had in common was their name. Everyone knows the suggestion exercised by such men as Louis XIV., Charles XII. of Sweden, and Napoleon. Voltaire was a striking instance of a suggester, who in many ways set his impress upon the times, and that far beyond the frontiers of France; several of the mightiest monarchs of the time thought it an honour to correspond with him, and his palace at Ferney became a place of pilgrimage for devout followers. The suggestion exercised by Rousseau stamps the whole of the hyper-sentimental period immediately preceding the Revolution, and his ideas permeate the theories of the Revolution and can be traced in every department of the intellectual and political life of the nineteenth century. "Men loved him," writes J. Lemaitre, "and many love him still; some, because he is a master of illusion and an apostle of the absurd; others because he was the one famous

author who was a creature of nerves, weakness, passion, sin, grief, and dreams." Rousseau was, in other words, a man whose nature was clearly stamped with the illogical, irrational qualities and the impulsive tendencies, which are best calculated to exercise suggestion on the crowd.

The French Revolution is the happiest hunting-ground for the phenomena of crowd-suggestion. It shows an uncritical fanaticism leading sometimes to self-sacrifice—as at the famous meeting of the National Convention during the night of August 4, 1789, when the representatives of all the three estates, under the influence of inter-suggestive enthusiasm, vied with one another in renouncing all their privileges—sometimes to the heroic exploits of the wars of the Revolution, now to the murder-ecstasy of the September massacres. Sentimental fraternity - feasts alternate with butcheries, in which cannibal features can often be discerned, and in which fear, sadism, and the predatory instinct collaborate. The power of shibboleths has rarely been more clearly seen. The shouts of "Vivat!" and "Pereat!" were continuous; the refrain "Ça ira!" roused men's hopes; and the fateful "À la lanterne!" found an answer in the reflex motions of the crowd. In the words "third estate," "the nation," "the people," a magic power resided; while the word "aristocrat" was enough to set the murder instincts of the crowd in motion, and the word

“veto” acted as a red rag even to those who did not understand what it meant. In short, the French Revolution can only be understood if it is regarded in the light of the Alpha and Omega of crowd-psychosis—suggestion.

Exactly similar phenomena can be observed in the Russian revolution of 1905 and the following years, with its fight for liberty, mutinies, pogroms, strikes, and epidemics of murder. Another interesting example of acute suggestion of the most infectious kind is the Dreyfus affair. No other question of justice has ever made such a stir over a whole continent. The Dreyfus affair has shown what an unforeseen significance the scattered crowd has attained in our day.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SOVEREIGN CROWD

PARLIAMENTARISM is the most powerful of all the social suggestions of our time. It has grown up from the soil of Liberalism and Democratism, grown up as a new world-view, which exerts its power by means, not of religion, not of fear of what is beyond the grave, but of politics, the constitutional, legitimate compulsion exercised by the crowd, an impersonal and merciless compulsion, which hides itself under the name of liberty. The principal fault of Liberalism was, that it based its programme on two fundamental principles which were mutually exclusive, liberty and equality. Tenacious of its dogmas and true to its principles, it has consistently shut its eyes to this contradiction. Consequently the rôle of Liberalism in history has been chiefly to act merely as a battering-ram for Democratism, the new Great Power, which has seized the helm with the help of the idea of equality. Democracy took liberty into the bargain, it is true, but it was ready to throw it overboard, as soon as it came to a conflict between the two principles.



Democracy became for the nineteenth century what the Church of Rome had been for the Middle Ages, a sacred, infallible institution, which traced its pedigree back to Holy Nature herself. Like religious faith in the Middle Ages, so democracy permeated the nineteenth century with its spirit, coloured all the phenomena of life: art and literature, manners and dress, all became democratic. Whatever stood in the way of Democracy was swept away, and, to complete its world-dominion, it began at last, with the help of machine-guns, railways and the press, to lift sluggish Asia itself out of the groove in which it had lain for thousands of years.

The world had had previous experience of representative systems. Professional interests, solid class interests, were represented in professional institutions; every profession defended its own interests, feeling itself to be on safe ground, as it knew pretty well what would be beneficial to itself and what harmful, and therefore was not likely to be misled by any suggestion. But the time came when the world was presented with a system in which every single individual represented a certain fraction, perhaps  $1/2,000,000$ , perhaps  $1/20,000,000$ , of the State, with all its endless chain of heterogeneous interests at home and abroad. Every individual represents in reality *the* State in microcosm, and every deputy represents again a certain constitutionally fixed number of these microcosms,

so many thousand fractions of the State. But it is clear that the individual cannot with the same clearness and precision represent the State as a whole—only very few can grasp all its interests—as he can represent well-defined class interests, with which he is specially familiar. The object of the democratic system was to secure the representation of ideal values; but the system has only resulted in the representation of abstractions and dogmas, and the unfortunate part of it is that the fewer concrete realities politics embrace, the easier target do they offer for suggestion. The greater the paucity of ideas, the greater power have the phrases which are used to cloak the confusion of thought. For this reason the nineteenth to twentieth centuries are in a striking degree periods of the Phrase and of Political Suggestion.

The *political* history of our times is, taken as a whole, tiresome reading. In former times political history was a history of personalities, now it is a history of number of votes. The chronicles of modern politics cover a succession of elections; they deal only with adopted and rejected bills, party changes, divisions, votes of confidence and no-confidence, and changes of ministry. But these party leaders, these ministers, past, present, and to come, are practically only names with a certain party sound, but without concrete personality; perhaps one or the other may be remembered because he has sat on the front bench for an un-

usually long time, or because some exceptionally striking occurrence has happened while he was in office; but the majority rarely come back to the memory as individualities; they are all cast in the same parliamentary mould; their activities consist of floods of words. Most personality is perhaps to be looked for in Foreign Ministers, because their particular province lies partly outside the parliamentary machine. Statesmanlike qualities are nowadays in other departments rather a drawback for a man who wishes to go far in politics, because his clearer insight makes him disinclined to bow to the wishes of the crowd. When Denmark in 1901 definitely adopted parliamentary institutions, one of the new "change of system" ministers announced publicly that "now the time of competence was past." In these words he portrayed curtly and clearly the essence of parliamentarism. Parliamentarism does not ask what is the right and sensible policy, but what is the will of the crowd. Its doctrine is interwoven with a mystical idea that the crowd is led by a divine instinct, which is more infallible than any amount of expert knowledge.

But if a politician is not required to possess statesmanlike qualities, another quality is absolutely indispensable to him—the power of leading the crowd. He must always have at the tip of his tongue just the word which he knows will catch the public ear, and he must be able to utter it over and



over again with undiminished enthusiasm, so as to keep the suggestion alive.

Political propaganda consist of the following main ingredients:—(1) The assertion of abstract party dogmas, whose suggestion has an exciting effect on those who are predisposed thereto by motives of profit, convention, or temperament. (2) The attack on the other side, whose baseness and stupidity are described with pathetic indignation, or maybe with irony: the nature of political strife guarantees a plentiful supply of objects for such an attack. (3) The indication of the fitness and ideality of the leader himself and of his own party: here the propaganda are helped by the crowd's taste for melodramatic contrasts; primitive folk-æsthetics takes a delight in crude characterisations, white contrasted with black, nobleness with baseness. (4) More or less veiled promises of material benefits, if the party comes into power or is given the opportunity of keeping in power when once in. The Phrase is throughout the suggester's best means of producing his effect. Every sober observer can gauge any day the power of suggestion if he studies the political speeches—and their echo: newspaper articles. They are full of the grossest perversions of the truth and the most appalling nonsense; the audience, being affected by suggestion in a certain direction, does not react, or only reacts with elementary fits of anger, when they are appealed to with logic; actual proofs



avail nothing against a reminder that an opponent twenty years ago did not hold the same opinion as he holds now. If ex-minister A demonstrates that minister B has committed a vital blunder, B thinks he has entirely cleared himself if he can demonstrate that A himself once upon a time committed the same blunder; the audience rub their hands, and it never occurs to them for an instant that B's blunder is not on that account a whit less nor its natural consequences less awkward. Another fact full of significance is the ease with which party leaders can convince their followers of the excellence of a party which is to-day allied to theirs, while they yesterday, when they stood in opposition to that same party, held it up to execration—and *vice versa*. Political suggestion is seen of course in its crudest form in election rhetoric. And not only do the election orators catch the hearers at the meeting, where perhaps the æsthetics of the speech may enhance the effect, but the newspapers devote columns to reports of the speeches, and thousands spend their time in reading them.

Election agitations assume forms which vary in grotesqueness in different lands. The Anglo-Saxons are famous for their huge election advertisements. In France the candidates use placards in brilliant colours, in which they crack themselves up and run their rivals down. This lampooning has the same attraction for the crowd as a cock-

fight or a boxing-match. The description by a correspondent to the *Kölnische Zeitung* in April 1910 of the behaviour of the Hungarians at election time is interesting for the student of crowd-psychology: "Fully a dozen different undertakings exist solely for the purpose of providing candidates with the means of rousing popular excitement. Banners are the most important for this purpose. . . . In addition the candidate has to provide not only the electors, but also the members of their families, with coloured feathers to wear in their hats, and the electors are expected to wear his name or his portrait somewhere about them. Parti-coloured ribbons also, buttons, even cigars with the candidate's name on them, have to be distributed. A recently floated company has started the manufacture and reproduction of caricatures of, and lampoons against, rival candidates. All that is necessary is to mention the party to which the opponent belongs, and one of his weak points, and £3 will buy a supply of 1000 caricatures and lampoons post free. Another undertaking publishes newspapers for each different village, in which the candidate is puffed and his opponent decried, and which during the election campaign are distributed weekly in thousands. . . . It must be added that the direct giving of money to the electors also continues, despite all the laws forbidding it. . . . Promises are not good enough nowadays. In former years a candidate has been known to win,

because he persuaded his electors that if he were elected, they would have to pay no more taxes, or that eggs would go up in price. . . . That candidate always gets off cheapest, who hits on a good idea for his election campaign. Thus one of the candidates at the last election hired some play-actors, who, wearing masks resembling the best-known political leaders, made a tour of the villages in his constituency and sang the praises of the candidate in glowing terms. The electors allowed themselves to be taken in, and elected the candidate at once, for he had been recommended, as they believed, by politicians of the highest distinction, Apponyi, Kossuth, and Ugron."

As for Parliament itself, it too constitutes a "crowd" with all the characteristic features of the crowd; it consists of people of different origin, civil calling and social rank, brought together not by competence in common departments of life, but by the chance circumstance that each of them has amassed more votes than his opponent. Parliament shows also the crowd's fear of expert knowledge. Expert representatives are tiresome and tedious and, what is more, superfluous, in so far as the attitude the members are to adopt towards a given bill has been prescribed beforehand by the political formulæ which serve as a guide to each single party. It is the suggestion of political formulæ which dominates parliament. Every bill is stretched on the Procrustean bed of dogmas. The house is fullest on



the days on which the struggle rages round the general principles of politics.

Of course a chamber can hammer out good laws, but these are always, as Le Bon remarks, the work of an individual. "They do not become harmful until a succession of unfortunate amendments has made them into a collective work." In connection with every question there will be found some members who are better acquainted with the subject than others, and who do their best to get their superior views accepted; their position is difficult and thankless, as they have to fight with the arguments of expert knowledge against the impalpable phantoms of generalities. Add to this that the positive subject-matter of the debate is apt to be drowned in a flood of personal attacks and counter-attacks, in quotations of old expressions of opinion culled from earlier issues of parliamentary gazettes, etc. On one single point, however, the member maintains an independent stand at all costs: that is, when the interests of his constituency are at stake. Perhaps he himself is a native of his constituency, in which case he is on this single point in positive touch with the realities of the situation, possesses a positive knowledge which renders him secure from the influence of abstractions and generalisations. If this is not the case, at any rate his re-election depends on his attention to the interests of his constituency, and his mandate is therefore one of the palpable realities



which are strong enough to cancel the power of the suggestions.

But on the whole it may be said that the terminology which distinguishes between "expert" and "political" considerations is full of significance. The former are thrust into the foreground in the course of the debates, now by one party, now by the other; but it is the latter which carry the day. "Political" considerations are the considerations of the many party and personal interests and of the predominant suggestions. If in the end the expert and the political considerations converge, the result is a compromise, in which the expert knowledge, be it more or less, is neutralised by a string of qualifications repugnant to expert knowledge, in which each party tries to embody the aspirations by whose realisation it sets most store, and to pay for them by concessions to the other parties on points in which they feel only a secondary interest. And a compromise of this sort, in which the idea of creating a sensible piece of legislation is postponed to the idea of creating something which will to some extent content each single party, is often worse than an entirely negative result, because the beneficial results which may possibly accrue from the reform, notwithstanding all the obstructions, may prove to have been too dearly bought.

The political passions which are particularly evident in the popular crowd at election times,

sometimes take such a powerful hold of the parliament that the suggestion increases to ecstasy, and the animal crowd-instincts find vent in inarticulate howls, scuffles, and the destruction of the parliamentary furniture. The following description of the meeting of the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies on 21st March 1910 is taken from the *Neue Freie Presse* :—

“ . . . In the narrow passages leading to the semicircle in which the table of the House stands, the deputies were packed tightly together. The hubbub was indescribable. Blows seemed imminent. In the middle of the howling and yelling throng it was Deputy Z. who first succeeded in getting close to the President. First he threw a rolled-up agenda paper at Count Khurn. Next he took a heavy code, which was lying on the table of the House, intending to hurl it at the President. Deputy G. of the Kossuth party caught him by the arm, and shouted at him : ‘ Are you mad ? What are you doing ? ’ But Z. tore himself free and made for G., who had had his left arm in a sling for some days. G. had strength enough in his other arm to push Z. back. The next moment Z. seized a code and threw it with all his force at the President. The missile found its mark. The corner of the book hit the President on the cheek, under the right eye, and then fell to the ground.

“ This was the signal for free fights on every side.

Paper bullets, books, and brass paper-weights hurtled through the air. The members of the House stood on the benches. The public in the galleries too were roused to a state of intense excitement. In the middle of the uproar the crash of benches in the gallery was heard, breaking under the weight of the people climbing on to them. The most brutal passions were depicted on the faces of the deputies. The members of the Justh party seized everything they could lay hands on, and threw it at the President and the deputies who were standing round him. The glass holder of an inkstand, which was used as a projectile, fell on to Deputy V., and the ink flowed all over his coat and shirt-front. The holder fell to the ground. Another inkstand fell behind the President on to the benches of the constitutional party, where the ink flowed over Deputy S. The President, Count Khurn, was hit several times.

“In the meantime a regular *mêlée* began in the middle of the Chamber among the deputies. Deputy N. attacked Deputy Z., N. shouted several obnoxious remarks at him, whereupon Z. at once challenged him. The members of the Justh party singled out Deputy H. for special attack, as he too had stigmatised the conduct of the extreme Left in biting terms; and he was set upon by several members. The stream of missiles now ceased, as the desks had been stripped bare. From the ministers’ desks to the outside places of the Left,



every object which was not nailed down had vanished. . . . Instead, the deputies hurled violent abuse at each other. The Justh party were assailed with cries of: "Uneducated dogs! That's the only use you have for books and inkstands. Villains! Rascals! Pigs! . . ."

Sometimes an uproar is part of a tactical scheme, a move in a game of obstruction, etc. In that case the movement begins as a well-calculated method of attaining to a definite end, but the spectacle soon comes to exercise a mesmeric effect, like the "Hu" cry of the howling Dervishes or the roll of drums of the Shamans, when the uproar of obstruction is transformed into ecstasy. The meeting of the Austrian Senate on 3rd February 1909 is thus described by the *Neue Freie Presse*: ". . . L. blew his trumpet, F. had brought a pair of cymbals with him, H. and his fellows belaboured a drum; the air was filled with the shrieks of whistles.<sup>1</sup> A section of the Czech Agrarians also took part in this violent obstruction and, for want of other instruments, banged their desk-lids. . . . The excitement amongst all the members of the House increased with the caterwauling throughout the house. Just as the Czech ob-

<sup>1</sup> Other newspapers give a description of an "obstruction machine" which had been constructed for the occasion: "It is like the wooden rattles which are used at Easter-time, only instead of the wooden-toothed wheel, iron teeth engaging in a piece of solid tin are used. The whole thing only requires a swing of the arm, and a ghastly noise is the result."



structionists were about to increase the ear-splitting uproar with a fresh torrent of bangs and trumpet-blasts, Baron Bienert got up, handed to the President, Dr Weiskirchner, the order, in the Emperor's handwriting, closing the House, and walked at the head of his followers out of the House. The tumult ceased for a moment; the House listened attentively to the reading of the Emperor's message. But scarcely had it been read to the end when the uproar began again, while the President and his staff left the Chamber, and the meeting was at an end. . . . Suddenly the piercing sound of a fire-trumpet was heard. Deputy L. had again produced that instrument of obstruction, and was evoking from it excruciating noises. Suddenly a free-socialist deputy dashed at L., and tried to wrench the trumpet from him. A few German Agrarians also pressed towards the Czech benches, and overwhelmed the Czech Radicals with their shouts. Thereupon the Czech Agrarian S. jumped over the benches and made for the German deputies. He was collared, whereupon a regular battle began. Blows fell on each side as thick as hail. The deputies on both sides joined in the scrimmage. The number of the combatants grew bigger—Czech Agrarians and Czech Radicals on one side, German Radicals and German Agrarians on the other. In the middle between the combatants stood Deputy S., laying about him like a maniac, while blows rained down

on him. In the scrimmage Deputy V. was bitten in the forefinger by the German Radical K. At last the Czechs succeeded in escaping from the scrimmage. . . . S. had had his coat torn in half; he had a black jacket on, half of which was missing. Some German Agrarians flaunted the sorry remnants of their garments as trophies. . . . Deputy H. had had his waistcoat torn off. The German Deputy G. had fallen among the Czechs, and had been horribly beaten. . . .”

Similar features occur in a report of the Russian Duma communicated to the *Journal des Débats* by its Petrograd correspondent about New Year's Day 1910: “Most of the deputies come to the meeting with big whistles. If R. tries to speak, the Right benches start hissing. If P. answers him, he is greeted by the Left with hideous caterwauling. The President is distracted, powerless, and tries in vain to bring about a semblance of order, while howls and insults resound from one end of the Chamber to the other, fists are shaken, and faces distorted.”

With all this “cult of incompetence,” as Émile Faguet calls modern parliamentarism, we might wonder why the world has made such great and conspicuous advances in so many directions under the ægis of parliamentarism. It is clearly this coincidence in time between the ascendancy of parliamentarism and the growth in civilisation and therewith in outward power of the European-

American world, which has made so forcible an impression on the Oriental peoples that they have one after another introduced parliamentarism as the great panacea for all misfortunes and all distress. Meanwhile it is not to be taken for granted that there is any causal coincidence between democratism and the progress of civilisation in the nineteenth century; history indeed traces the beginnings of the development of modern civilisation back to times antecedent to the introduction of the new political forms. That introduction resulted, first and foremost, in the grant of freer scope to the fresh, fermenting forces which have been evolved in modern times in the most various departments of life. The stress in this case lies not on any excellence in democracy or parliamentarism, but in the entirely negative fact that an absolute power, based on an organisation of society which was quite out of date, had been shattered. For the principal disadvantage of absolute power in comparison with representative government lies in the fact that it cannot be reformed without ceasing to be absolute power, while, on the contrary, the representative system within its elastic limits contains an infinity of possibilities. Of these the course of events has furnished us with one which certainly was not the best. But the mere fact that the old barriers were broken meant the setting free of a mighty torrent of latent energy, and this disclosure of power is the



characteristic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has indeed, through the very reaction of a healthy nature against injurious influences, to a certain extent tempered the effects of the new abuses which democracy brought with it. It has evoked a mass of varied movements—partly based on expert knowledge and reason, which have managed to win the day in the struggle between the various suggestions for the mastery, and to lead the parliaments in the right direction—such as hygienic crusades, various social movements, and so on.

Taken as a whole, the political government of the people by themselves began by hazarding a large sum of ideality, which has, it is true, led to many errors, yet has helped development over many a rock. It is this same circumstance, the setting free of strength, the self-confident idealism, to which is owing the fact that the introduction of parliamentarism has brought with it similar advances in civilisation in the different countries of the East. Just as the sick man, who travels to Lourdes in the confident assurance that he will there get rid of his illness, may in favourable circumstances return home healed by suggestion, so may the nation which sees in parliamentarism its social Lourdes, also through it—at any rate temporarily—find a cure in the enormous power of crowd-suggestion.

But human experience proves incontrovertibly that every spiritual force and every idea loses in



*ideality* in proportion as its position of influence gains in strength and security. A system which has a sufficient backing of *realities* may produce something great and good, but a power which is founded principally on the accident of suggestions, and only in a minor degree on real social interests, is ordained to irremediable decadence. The decadence in Europe in the last decades has been rapid ; its rate is not equally quick in every country, but the process of development is clearly marked everywhere. While the earliest years of parliamentarism were impressed by the type of idealist politicians who saw in politics an endeavour to bring about the best balance of power, the next period was the time of the party politician, whose horizon was confined to the interest of the party ; in the third period the professional politician holds the stage, for whom politics are merely an endeavour to bring about his private interests, the type which Faguet describes in these words : " He is a cypher, as far as personal ideas are concerned, a man of mediocre education ; he shares the ordinary moods and the ordinary passions of the crowd, and has no other trade but politics, for he would starve to death if he were shut out from a political career."

This third stage will probably be the last phase in modern democracy. The development of culture must shape its course towards new forms. We must beware of the common superstition that outside absolutism and parliamentarism there can

be no third system. The representative system indeed offers the possibility of an improvement in constitutional conditions, differentiated according to the needs of the several nations and states, conditions which, in a higher degree than the present, give the different social values the representation to which they lay claim. We have freed ourselves from absolutism, but this might prove to be only the first stage on a long journey. The law of development will show itself stronger than the dogmatism which believes the sacred power of parliamentarism to be established for ever and ever.

## CHAPTER V

### POLITICS AS THE EXPRESSION OF THE ETHICS OF CROWDS — THE STATE — INDIVIDUAL - ETHICS AND CROWD-ETHICS

“ Dans les temps les plus raffinés, le lion d'Ésope fait un traité avec trois animaux ses voisins. Il s'agit de partager une poire en quatre parts égales. Le lion pour de bonnes raisons qu'il dedivisa en temps et bien, prend d'abord trois parts pour lui seul, et menace détrangler quiconque osera toucher à la quatrième. C'est là le sublime de la politique.”—VOLTAIRE.

MANY attempts have been made to concoct a definition of the State. The results are often merely apophthegms of abstract philosophy, which, while they are interesting if regarded as witty conceits, do not give any positive help for the understanding of the essence of the State. Apart from metaphysical explanations of this sort, the definitions circle as a rule partly round the law-creating or law-regulating factor in the conception of the State, partly round the State's connection with the most primitive social institutions, the family and the tribe. The State, according to Cicero, is a legal society, and the professors of natural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw in it the result of a “social contract”

which need not be regarded as a contract in precise terms, the result of a conscious act of volition, but may be only a concise expression for the reciprocal obligations which every association implies. It was Hobbes who, with his theory that the State is created as a means of escaping the "war of every man against every man," originated the classical formula for this conception of the State as the result of efforts to substitute legal rules for arbitrary action. More modern international lawyers like Sir Henry Maine regard the State as the result of a natural social development through the family and the tribe.

Franz Oppenheimer, in his treatise on "the State," has recently investigated the conception of the State from a sociological point of view. He defines the State as "an organisation which is in origin completely, and in essence at its first stage of existence almost completely, social, and which has been enforced by a conquering group of men on a conquered group of men with the sole object of regulating the dominion of the former over the latter and of securing it against internal insurrection and external attacks. And this dominion has no other end in view than the economic exploitation of the conquered by the conquerors." Oppenheimer distinguishes between the "economic means," which are "personal labour and the exchange of personal for foreign labour," and the political means, which are "the appropriation of



foreign labour without compensation," or, in other words, plunder; and he regards the State as "the organisation of the political means." The foundations of the State are laid by the acquisition of booty and slaves; it is in form a dominion, in substance an economic exploitation of human energy, and it accelerates the development of the economic differentiation and social class-organisation which existed in the pre-state stage of existence.

The fact that every State is a class-State has been explained by the theory of an original accumulation of real and personal property in the hands of individuals, the prudent and capable collecting fortunes, while the incapable and extravagant sank into poverty and into dependence on the others. Oppenheimer shows the untenability of this theory in another passage, partly by reference to the history of the earliest times, when we find everywhere a relation of subjection, not of subordination, partly by a sociologic-economic deduction: all professors of natural law have agreed in admitting that the differentiation of classes by their incomes and property began at the moment when the occupation of the earth was completed; so long as a man still had access to free land, it never occurred to him to enter another's service. The professors of natural law admitted that the date by which the earth was completely occupied, though with only a tiny population, must have

come very quickly, and that the separation into classes must have begun at that moment. But Oppenheimer calculates that this moment has not yet occurred in Germany, much less in more sparsely populated lands. "Indeed, if we divide the number of acres of fruitful land all over the surface of the world by the number of living beings, we shall find that we could allot to each family of five an average of 30 acres of fairly good land (which the author considers to be enough to provide a peasant family with a comfortable subsistence), and that there will still be about two-thirds of the planet unoccupied."

Oppenheimer starts from the assumption, which is generally made nowadays, that the original form of society is that founded on the family, and that the State has developed therefrom. Therefore he recognises also "pre-state," primitive conditions. On the other hand, so distinguished a historical philosopher as Edward Meyer asserts that "we must regard the State-aggregation, not only rationally but also historically, as the primary form of human community, indeed, as the social aggregation which answers to the herd in the animal world, and as being in its origin older than mankind as a whole, whose development was first rendered possible by it." Generic combinations cannot be the original ones, because in respect to these at the primitive stage "we are met by a varied abundance of arrangements which are often

diametrically opposed to each other," and "not one of these different arrangements can be regarded as necessary, or as springing from a feeling innate in mankind." Similarly, in the organisation of sexual relations and in the institution of the family—taking the word in its widest sense—we are not dealing with an inevitable formation, which can be regarded as the root of all human fellowship, all social aggregations, but inversely with authoritative arrangements, which within an already existing social aggregation subject the sexual relations and the position of the children to fixed regulations. These regulations arise and operate not spontaneously in virtue of a natural instinct—which leads only to unregulated copulation, to free sexual intercourse,—but they operate by custom, and behind this custom stands the external compulsion of the State."

But even if we follow Edward Meyer, whose argument seems convincing, in referring the origin of the State to a not only prehistoric, but pre-human time, yet Oppenheimer's conception of the State's formation remains psychologically correct. The State is a battle-organisation. "State" is the name given to the human community, seen from its aggressive-defensive side; "Society" is the name given to it, seen from its social side. The State has come into being as an instrument of plunder and a defence against plunder; its object is not to put a stop to the "war of every man against every



man," but to stereotype the war and make it more effective. State and Community are not two parallel mutually independent organisations, but they cross and permeate each other, coalescing into an indissoluble whole.<sup>1</sup> The primitive instincts of the mental life, like those of the crowd, concentrate round the two poles: self-assertion, the active forms of which are the predatory instinct and the lust of power, and sociability, the social instinct. In the State, as in Society, both these kinds of instincts dominate; but while the idea of Society first and foremost emphasises the combination, as a combination, that is, sociability, the idea of the State primarily expresses the operation of the combination externally, that is, organised plundering. The State is an aggressive-defensive coalition, which systematises war and makes of it an art and a

<sup>1</sup> Martin Hartmann divides society into four different sorts of community: the blood-, the language-, the trade-, and the idea-community. Society is made up of these groups, *i.e.* the groups, which are constantly intermingling, all combine from the very beginning and at every single moment to form society. Blood-fellowship is the firmest of all bonds: on it is based the strictest group-formation, the family, and the clan which grows out of it. A wider group is the tribe, which is formed by the combination of several families, often based on a fiction of blood-fellowship. No less original than the blood-bond are the language- and the economical-bonds, and last we have the idea-fellowship, which expresses itself in the form of religion. The gods are house and family gods, later tribal gods; they have no power outside the society with whose existence their own is closely bound up, and the head of the family is the family priest, just as the chief of the tribe is High Priest and chief of the religious ceremonies.



science, the result of which is that a condition of war every day is replaced by a condition of alternating war and peace, which affords time and opportunity for the development of other sides of human activity. But the contribution of sociability consists in the instinctive recognition of a certain reciprocal obligation of duty, which accompanies every peaceable combination between men. This development of the conception of duty not only co-operates with the prescription of legal rules, which complete the State's development, but also contains within it the germ of ethics.

Even after the primitive State had developed into a culture-State, the law only applied to its own members; under the Roman Empire the non-citizens were in practice outside the laws. The State continues to be *outwardly* an organisation for plunder, and for the warding-off of plundering ("State interests," "reasons of State"), while inwardly it is a defender of the laws, *i.e.* it collaborates with the ethics represented by teachers and social reformers in checking the predatory instinct of individuals, at any rate in keeping it within limits in such a way that it does not expose the social fabric itself to danger. It is this two-sidedness in the essence of the State which explains the antithesis between individual and State morality, between ethics and politics; for politics, "statecraft," considers itself justified in itself obeying the primitive human predatory

instinct, which in its own interest it combats in individuals. It is true that it has in course of time formed for itself international laws: foreigners are no longer foes, though their legal rights be circumscribed. But the States are always on their guard against each other. They may make alliances among themselves for a time, but a hostile relation is the normal one; while their diplomatic representatives exchange exaggerated, conventional civilities and assurances of friendships, they are always prepared for armed encounters. The State considers itself justified, when its "vital interests" demand it, in using force against another State. And the State itself settles what are its "vital interests." That a State need only keep to agreements concluded with other States, so long as it pays it to do so, is a principle which is not officially enunciated, but which is again and again stated as a matter of course by the responsible press as well as by political authors. So the old two-sidedness still inheres in the essence of the State: the legal principle internally, between the individual citizens, asserted through the organs of the State; externally, in the relation between State and State, the contrasted might-principle, "In politics might goes before right."<sup>1</sup>

If it be asked, what is the reason for this relation, the obvious answer is that there is no authority

<sup>1</sup> As to the relations between the conceptions "Right" and "Might," see pp. 115 *et seq.*

over the States which can impose the law on them by force in the same way as the State can in dealing with individuals. This answer, however, leads to another question: since a natural development has created the State to be an authority of law for individuals, why have not the States been brought by a parallel development to create a common authority of law for themselves?

The answer to this question is to be found in the psychology of crowds. The States are "crowds," enormous and very heterogeneous crowds. We have seen that the crowd-mind is made up of the qualities which are common to all the individuals who make up the crowd, and are consequently liable to entirely primitive emotions. The ethical State corresponding to a psychical condition of this sort must itself be primitive: where a State or a nation is in question, it is not enough that the best men amongst the citizens should have a clear apprehension of the moral responsibility, or want of it, of this or that State—or national—action; they cannot communicate their conception to the crowd, if the crowd is not pervious to it. It is not till the moral basis for the judgment of the action in question has become second nature to each individual member of the crowd, that the crowd will attain to that pitch of ethical development to which the individual can raise himself in the course of a short span of life through education and self-education. The first huge difficulty in the path



is naturally the imperviousness of crowds to reason. A concrete, local crowd may perhaps be persuaded by rational argument of so simple a truth as that 2 plus 2 make 4—if the separate individuals in the crowd have no personal interest in believing that 2 plus 2 make 5, for in that case they will hurl the speaker down, assault him, do anything to escape the danger of being overpersuaded; but with a scattered crowd it is a desperate Sisyphus-task. The scattered crowd is like a bladder, which bulges out in one place when it is pressed in another. Far-seeing people may go on for ever correcting wrong ideas, whose unreasonableness is so evident to the single, thinking individual that it seems to cry to heaven; and every time a man believes that he has absolutely demolished the idea in question in the East, it crops up smiling in the West. The sober people who in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries champion the most elementary principles of sound reason, will have occasion to sound time after time with chagrin the depths of the stupidity of scattered crowds—despite the Press and the spread of education.

The history of individual ethics begins with tribe-morality; the individual is of no account by himself, but only in combination with the tribe, which also is responsible for the actions of its individual members. In the nature of things there can be nothing answering to this stage in the history of States; the States are isolated from the



very beginning. The individual is brought to the next stage of ethical development by self-morality ; at this stage his judgment of good and evil is determined by the direct, obvious advantage to himself. Culture (that is to say, the inner, intellectual development as opposed to the civilisation which is represented by outer, technical progress) widens the ethical horizon. The individual sees his ego in combination with its surroundings in ever-widening circles, until it at last embraces every living thing with which it comes into direct or indirect contact ; sympathy becomes the Caryatis of morality. It is only at this stage that we can talk of ethics in the proper sense of the word. But while ethics, helped by sociability, in course of time permeates the individuals more or less thoroughly, and with the help of the State by means of law and right forces on those individuals who are less pervious to ethical ideas that minimum of morality which is demanded by the standard of culture of the time, the crowd continues still standing on the lowest rung of the ladder, although the germ of a wider development of crowd-morality also exists in the social instincts. Politics—as the practical expression of crowd-morality—lags behind ethics. *Politics and ethics are not mutually exclusive, they only seem to be so, because individual morality has outstripped crowd-morality by many centuries.*

There is yet another reason why crowds are

immeasurably more difficult to set in motion than individuals: *crowds have no feeling of responsibility.* The more responsibility is distributed, the less heavily it weighs on each individual. An assembly, a whole nation, allows itself to do things which would horrify the civilised individual, if he had to bear the responsibility by himself. When 400 deputies adopt a doubtful Bill, each one of them can always console himself by thinking that he only bears one four-hundredth part of the responsibility. A parliament and a government would perhaps decide upon a war only with sore misgivings, but if they are urged on by a larger crowd, by a whole people in a state of frenzied excitement, they distribute the responsibility, though they may not say so, among the anonymous millions and let them have their way.

It would, however, be a mistake to conclude from this that absolutism is best calculated to forward morality in politics. In the first place this could only be true on the hypothesis that both the absolute monarch and his counsellors were exemplary representatives of individual morality, which is, as everyone knows, by no means always the case. Moreover, just as the idea of liberty in a democracy is illusory, so also the idea of the crowds' total lack of influence under an absolutism rests on an illusion; the democratic popular leader is in certain ways a despot, and the autocratic despot is in some ways the slave of his people. In things which appreci-

ably affect the fate of the whole people, the despot can in the long run enforce his will only when he has the crowds with him. The will of the crowds as regards the despot expresses itself not only in conspiracies, uproar, mutinies, assassinations, and bombs, but also in passive resistance; it is a factor which, so to speak, is taken for granted, which the despot reckons with without knowing it. Every despot is, besides, dependent on his instruments, from whom he gets his information and to whom he entrusts the execution of his orders. These men may be primarily concerned to use their position to their own advantage, but in matters in which this consideration does not play a part, and even when they are working to fill their own pockets, they will try to keep in touch somehow or other with the more insistent claims of the people, with class interests or with powerful suggestions; if the claims of the people are divided, there is all the more scope for a clever tactician. Compliance with the principal claims of the popular will was the secret of Darius', Alexander's, Louis XIV.'s, and Napoleon's, no less than Bismarck's and Gladstone's success. The question absolutism or democratism is indeed of relative, but not of primary, significance for the development of the ethics of crowds.

## CHAPTER VI

### INTERSTATE POLITICS

#### I. PRACTICE

THE character of interstate politics is most clearly marked in cases in which a State belonging to the European sphere of civilisation is confronted with a nation which lacks this particular kind of civilisation and is therefore weaker than it, because in such cases less complex considerations come into play. Colonial politics are for this reason especially instructive. They present two main forms of political action: (1) *Annexation*, i.e. complete appropriation of the foreign country with the intention of exploiting it to the conquering country's own economical advantage, and of sending the latter's own excess population to the annexed country, whose population is driven out or reduced to a position of dependence. The annexation may also be due to military considerations, as that the annexing State wishes to secure its frontiers against another State, and therefore improves its military position at the expense of a third party. (2) *Peaceful*



*penetration*,<sup>1</sup> i.e. gradual appropriation of the economic possibilities of the country in question, for, while the conquering State keeps alive the fiction of the country's "independence and sovereignty," it is apt to assume the rôle of disinterested protector of this "independence and sovereignty." "Peaceful penetration" is only a transition stage, to be observed just so long as practical reasons make it advisable not to proceed to annexation.

The methods are therefore in both cases the same. The first stage is for the conquering State little by little to bring the State which it has marked down for its victim within its "sphere of influence." A penniless State—Oriental States are always penniless in these days—is brought, by means of loans on hard terms, into economic dependence, whereupon it is powerless to resist any pretensions, however monstrous. The interest is charged on the country's budget, so that the country may soon be forced to raise a fresh loan. And so the avalanche grows, while the terms on which the fresh loans are granted grow harder and harder. The superior Power demands by way of guarantee the right of control over the customs and other revenues of the debtor-State, as well as concessions and monopolies for the exploitation of the latter's natural riches. The means of production of

<sup>1</sup> "Pénétration pacifique"; the description has that peculiar ring of hypocrisy which generally distinguishes the technical terms of politics.

the debtor-State gradually fall into the hands of the creditor-State, and so eventually does the land itself. Soon the debtor-State reaches such a pitch of dependency on the superior Power that its Government dares undertake nothing without the latter's consent; it is only in name master in its own house. Thus the world is gradually brought to regard it as the dependent of the superior Power, and when it is definitely gobbled up the fact comes as no surprise and arouses no particular excitement in the world around. The annexing Power naturally takes care, before it proceeds to its *coup*, to silence any competent rivals, partly by threats, partly by giving them in compensation a free hand in appeasing their own thirst for "economic expansion" in other directions. Previous precautions are also taken, so far as possible, to hinder the importation of European weapons into the dependent State, so that the machine-guns may have an easy task with the practically defenceless inhabitants when the decisive moment comes. This is, forsooth, a "humane" measure, for it means that the dependent State's opposition is broken down more quickly and with less bloodshed. If the superior Power has first acquired the position of Protector in one form or another, whether formally recognised as such by the other Powers or not, it can use any means it likes to attain its end. It brings one branch of administration after the other under its control; it

works systematically at the ejection of the native population from the soil and the introduction of colonists in its stead, etc. Of course, the standard of culture of each colonising Power influences the choice of the means it employs. The following features, among others, of Russian methods in Manchuria are described by a correspondent to the *Kölnische Zeitung* from Harbin, dated the beginning of August 1910 :—

“ . . . So long as the Chinese nation in its economic life holds fast to the lofty principles of culture which have become second nature to it, Russia will be helpless to hinder the reforms in the country's administration, and the rapidly advancing reclamation and colonisation of Manchuria and Mongolia (on the part of China). Russian policy knows only one method in the desperate struggle, namely, the demoralisation of the people, the Civil Service, as well as the mercantile classes, and, wherever possible, the delivery of attacks on the Chinese treasury, and the maintenance of a reign of disorder. The means Russia adopts to this end are as follows: she spends 300,000 roubles annually on the ‘encouragement’ of the Chinese Civil Service, which also receives pay from China. In China, as in every other part of the world, people expect some return for their money. All lawsuits against Chinese in the Concessions are conducted before the so-called mixed tribunals. These are intended to be humane, yet it is a matter of



common knowledge that the torture in the Kirin Bureau at the present day can challenge comparison with that exercised in the wholly Chinese courts. . . . The police force is composed of soldiers of the frontier guard. The several regiments contribute the necessary personnel. Naturally, every officer sends the worst men in his company to the police force, the men of whom he can make nothing himself. The higher police force consists of officers of the frontier guard. As the police generally in Russia are held in the lowest repute, and this is especially true of Manchuria, it follows that the soldiers who have once been admitted to the police are never taken back again into their regiments. . . . The interpreters are the most scandalous element in the Russian administration. . . . In its dealings with the Chinese, the Russian administration, that is to say, the police, are entirely dependent on the interpreters. Most of these interpreters already have a long career of villainy behind them, have already served in war-time in the Russian army, where they have made themselves experts in every sort of extortion. The chiefs of police in the several quarters of the towns receive orders, under the autocratic régime of the civil administration, from General A. to adopt this or that interpreter: objections to the interpreter are not listened to. The war against the many opium dens, houses of ill-fame, the opium trade, etc., is, of course, absolutely futile, because Mr Interpreter only gives



away those miscreants and knaves who do not pay him adequately. . . .”

“The whole of the life of the Chinese people, which is a replica of the life of a well-ordered family, is founded on reciprocal guarantees, on natural responsibility and voluntary surety. . . . No Chinaman takes another into his service without the latter demanding a surety, a Bau-thjan. A Bau-thjan is a small strip of paper, on which the surety writes that he goes bail for T with X; his own or his firm’s seal gives this Bau-thjan legal validity. The chain of sureties may be an endlessly long one. In practice one never hears of any person provided with a Bau-thjan abusing the confidence reposed in him, for who would be such an absolute idiot as to ruin himself, several sureties, and all his relations? If, too, he ran away, he would not be any better off; without friends and without sureties he would be lost. . . . In order to purge the Concessions of the system of culture based on guarantees, the administration published an edict for the information of all citizens of the Russian Empire. This edict, the non-observance of which entails a fine of 500 roubles or three months’ arrest, requires every Russian householder to see that his Chinese employees are registered at the police station. This registration corresponds to that which is required of Russian prostitutes and ex-prisoners. . . . This kind of registration, which at the same time imposes a considerable tax on the

Russian and Chinese element, implies no sort of security. No Chinese business can go bail with the police for the Chinaman in search of a situation, because the guarantee can only be given for each special occasion. A Bau-thjan is not transferable ; it is only valid with the party with whom somebody goes bail for a third person. In this way, therefore, the Russians manage to deprive this excellent guarantee-system of any effect in their own service. Those Chinese elements triumph which, by reason of their depravity, have been unable to get a Bau-thjan, and which now without any guarantee whatever get employment with the help of the Russian administration. Every remonstrance on the part of the Chinese is dismissed with scorn by the Russian administration."

The latest <sup>1</sup> typical example of an annexation is Corea's incorporation in Japan, an event which was heralded by massacres and other forms of terrorism, and carried through with a deliberate brutality which arouses the enthusiasm of all admirers of "civilisation by force," who will never rest until every acre of arable land has been snapped up by a development company and exploited by machinery. The world-press of course expressed

<sup>1</sup> Since I wrote this Tripoli has been "annexed" by the Italians. Still more recently the Christian Balkan States have "annexed" the largest part of European Turkey, after they had come to blows with each other over the spoils. The forcible denationalisation of the populations of the territories which have fallen to the different Balkan States began some time ago.

the conviction, which is traditional in such cases, to the effect that the subjected people would now be governed paternally and justly. As if the whole of history from remote antiquity to the present day were not there to show what fate is in store for Corea. Nobody seriously expects the Europe-varnished Orientals from Nippon to be pioneers in the path of humanity and justice.

Of course, annexations may be ethically defensible. When a Power annexes a negro-land, in which a savage population lives under a bloody tyranny, and is itself anxious for a European-ordered existence, such an annexation may be both justified and beneficent. But often European domination means a change from the frying-pan into the fire. There are certain naïve ideas commonly prevalent, to the effect that primitive peoples die out in a mysterious way when they come into contact with European civilisation; it has a paralysing effect on them, and notwithstanding all the humane exertions of the Europeans to keep them alive they pine away, just as trees sicken when high houses rob them of light and air. The Redskins in America "faded away before the basilisk glance of the white man," says Treitschke. There is, however, no mystery in the matter. The fantastic "basilisk glance" resolves itself on closer inspection into such realities as rifle-bullets, brandy, and measures of compulsion of various kinds. The natives are expelled from their lands,



are excluded from their wonted means of livelihood, are ruined with spirits and demoralised by the breaking up of their old social organisation. If despair drives them to rebel, the opportunity is seized of sending regiments against them and mowing them down wholesale. Perhaps conduct of this sort is unavoidable if the goal of colonial politics is to be reached, but to call it a "mission of culture" is a gross perversion of words.

Vignon, a former French consul, writes as follows of the conditions in French North Africa: "The administration, seeing the Governor-Generals confiscate a portion of the tribes' lands after every rising, considered that they had every right to choose the best land for the colonists and to drive the natives back. Gradually as the European element developed, the natives were driven out of their inheritances, whole tribes were removed from the region which was in a way their fatherland. . . . The results of such a policy, pursued for more than thirty years, could not be doubtful; in one part the Arab, who was being continually pressed back and saw less and less probability of harvesting the fruits of his toil, did not trouble to till the soil properly or improve it; in another, robbed as he was of the fertile soil of his tribe and robbed even of access to the watercourses, so that he was unable to fight against drought, he could not grow corn enough for his sustenance, and saw his herds day by day dwindle or disappear. In short, these



thousand sufferings kept alive everywhere the hatred of the natives for the colonist, and widened instead of bridging the already deep gulf which separates the two races."

The United States of America have finished by reserving some tracts of land to the few remnants of the Indians still in existence. The Indians hold the land in unrestricted possession, but they are under the obligation of not selling their possessions without leave of the Government. In recent years rich oil-wells and beds of asphalt have been discovered in the reservations of the Choctaw Indians in Oklahoma. Accordingly a syndicate of capitalists was formed to acquire 450,000 acres of the land. It offered the Indians thirty million dollars if they would evacuate the land, and announced that its connections with persons of importance at Washington would ensure confirmation of the purchase. The syndicate's lawyer demanded of the Indians an extra three million dollars for his exertions in this direction with the Government, to which the Indians readily agreed. When the affair was exposed by a senator whom the advocate had tried to bribe, the latter explained that he had never dreamt of enriching himself. Really his only object had been to devote the money to the corruption of Government officials and members of Congress, because he was well aware that that was the surest way of attaining his ends in the federal capital. And a whole collection of

reputable and respected newspapers declared that the advocate was right. So an investigation committee was sent down to Sulphur in Oklahoma to examine the methods by which the land-agents and other persons whom the syndicate had sent out had relieved individual Indians of their allotments. Thus it was found out that the costs of the sale of a single Indian's property was \$2075 higher than the proceeds of the sale. In the case in question the Indian proprietor was only eighteen years of age, and it was his white guardian who was the guilty person. Another man was shown up who had made a large fortune by cheating the Indians. As soon as an Indian property-owner died, this man betook himself to the Court and procured the nomination of an administrator, with whom he managed to arrange matters in such a way that the land was sold to him at a ridiculously low price. This man was only one of the many who, possessing nothing at first, subsequently became lords of principalities of 10,000 acres.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the predatory instinct of individuals, seconded by corrupt officials and deputies, is also one of the manifold forms under which the "basilisk glance" of the white man expresses itself. Of course, systematic eradication *en masse* of the native population, the method which the colonial politics of earlier centuries employed so

<sup>1</sup> *Kreuzzeitung*, August 29, 1910.

skilfully, is no longer carried out so directly. Still, there are not wanting even in our day reports which bring the chronicles of Cortes' and Pizarro's times vividly to mind. During the Boxer rising in China and on the Russo-Chinese frontier in the summer of 1900, an apparently quite designless attack was made by bands of Chinese on Blagovestschensk. The occurrence is thus described in a letter dated 6th August 1900, from Mr Wright of Oberlin College, Ohio, communicated to the *Evening Post*, and telegraphed to the English *Times* on 22nd September of the same year:—

“ . . . Fire was opened on Blagovestschensk, and some Russian villages were burned. The actual damage was but slight, but the terror caused was indescribable, and drove the Cossacks to frenzy. The peaceful Chinese in the city, numbering from 3000 to 4000, were expelled in great haste, and, being forced upon rafts entirely inadequate for the passage of such numbers, they were mostly drowned in attempting to cross the river. The stream was fairly black with bodies for three days after. Hundreds were counted in the water on our ride through the country to reach the city. We estimated that we saw the dwellings of 20,000 peaceable Chinese in flames on that day, while parties of Cossacks were scouring the fields for Chinese and shooting them down at sight. What became of the women



and children nobody knew, but apparently there was no way for them to escape. On our way up the river for 500 miles above the city every Chinese hamlet was a charred mass of ruins. We were told that 4000 Chinese were killed. This wholesale destruction of property and life was thought to be a military necessity."

And the Blagovestschensk massacres are not unique in modern colonial politics. The *Courier Européen* in November 1907 quoted the following passage from Felix Marten's book, *Le Japon vrai* :—

"At the beginning of 1896, order—to use the Mikado's expression—reigned in Formosa. But what hecatombs had it not cost! It was reckoned at the time that more than 50,000 Formosans or Chinese had been exterminated. An English missionary, who witnessed these massacres, wrote in June 1896 to the *Times* correspondent in Hong-Kong: 'After this victory the Japanese gave themselves up to a regular eradication of the Chinese in Formosa. More than sixty towns or villages were burnt to the ground, and thousands of persons perished. One day twenty-one Chinese were seized haphazard. While their graves were being dug before their eyes, they were horribly ill-treated, and were afterwards stabbed to death with bayonets. In another village the Chinese made ready to give the Japanese a warm reception, but were suddenly attacked, and fifty persons were slain on the spot. On 22nd June the authorities



at Hunnin published a proclamation, informing peasants who had left their villages that they might return without fear. The poor wretches followed this advice, and were relentlessly cut down.'” The *Courier Européen* appended to its quotation the following remark among others: “Here it is rifle-fire, yonder gun-fire. That is how the new-won territories are cleared; that is how the place is rapidly made ready for the Japanese colonists. If anybody presumes to reproach the rulers of Japan with facts so eloquent of extreme brutality, they answer with a sly smile that the methods they adopt are European methods.”

The massacres of the Arabian population carried out by the Italians in Tripoli in October 1911 have been described by a series of eye-witnesses belonging to different nationalities with details of a horrifying description. Such accounts of massacres always resemble one another everywhere and in every epoch, because the human soul is always and everywhere the same; an appeal to the destructive instinct of the crowd and to its lust of bloodshed is never made in vain. The aimless destruction and sadistic bestialities of which the various Christian Balkan armies were guilty in the Balkan War were all of a piece with what history since the time of the Huns and Mongols tells us.

Such methods of colonial politics are the more to be condemned, the more the subject people are cultured and conscious of their national individuality.

Indians, Chinese, and Persians have their own cultures; what the Europeans can offer them is not—or is only in a slight degree—*culture*, but only an external *civilisation*, and the European civilisation of machinery is after all of value only as means, not as an end. Therefore the annexation of a land of culture always gives rise to serious doubt whether, considered from the point of view of world-culture, it is not attended by more damage than profit. European civilisation, grafted on a non-European culture, gives in most cases discordant results, and discord generally in the history of nations results in revolutions and wars.

It is incorrect to regard “Real” politics as a special kind of politics. All politics is “Real” politics, carried out with more or less boldness and success. If the word has fallen into disrepute, it is because we, taught by ripe historical experience, associate with it the idea of a politics of violence, calculated on an obvious gain for the State which practises the politics and carried out with no squeamishness in the choice of means. When a statesman justifies a *coup de main* with the apophthegm, “Accomplished facts are the most convincing arguments,” he thereby gives typical expression to the crowd-morality reflected in interstate politics. This holds of course not only of colonial politics, but also in all other cases in which a hitherto independent State or part of a State is reduced by violence to dependency on another. In this

connection we can predicate that *every State has the irredenta it deserves*. "Irredenta" originally meant the struggle of the Italian-speaking districts of Austria for union with the kingdoms of Italy. Later the word has been extended to analogous situations, and its use in the daily press justifies us in giving it the wider meaning: the longing of a suppressed nation for freedom, and so in using it of cases in which the suppressed people does not happen to have a free State of kindred race with which it wishes to be united. It is obvious that the longing for freedom must gain strength in proportion as the *suppressed* nation feels that it is an *oppressed* nation. When its language is threatened with systematic extermination through legal enactments and administrative practice, when freedom of assembly and association is hampered—chiefly through "exceptional enactments,"—when the oppressed nation is more or less consistently excluded from self-administration and public life as a whole, when perhaps at the same time a bureaucratic and arrogant Civil Service reminds the suppressed nation every hour of the day that it is an oppressed nation—how is that nation going to be convinced that it has gained more than it has lost by being conquered? *And it is only through such conviction that the bitterness of the conquest can be allayed and an end put to the enormous loss of power which is involved in the quiet, bloodless, but dogged and embittered national*



*struggles in frontier provinces.* When the suppressed nation is and continues to be superior in culture to the conquering nation, and the conquering nation seeks to drag it down to its own level, there the irredenta can only be vanquished by downright extermination. When the cultures are equal, there is particular need of sound reason and an insight into national psychology, and, above all, of realisation of the fact that the obstinacy of a suppressed nation is the natural reaction against the want of sense on the part of the conquering nation, and that the reaction grows in proportion to the action.

Moral indignation in this connection has an almost comic effect. Articles often appear in the national press of the conquering nation, whose line of argument is this: "The territory in question belongs to us by right of conquest; we work hard to wean its population from their own language and their own culture, and to give them instead our own language and our own culture, which are much more useful to them; but this disinterested activity is repaid with shameless ingratitude. The population is disloyal and treasonable enough to dream of nothing but emancipating themselves." Press articles of this kind are characteristic of the blindness of the crowd, whose own wishes act auto-suggestively. Conquest cannot possibly entail moral obligations on the conquered. Only complete equality of rights in everything—in language,



culture, justice,<sup>1</sup> admission to official posts, etc.—will gradually cause the conquered to forget the violence of the conquest and impose upon them an obligation of loyalty. Obedience can be extorted with cuffs, but not respect or affection.

In Europe the treatment of conquered nations exhibits everywhere the same dreary story of tragic delusions, everywhere the same lack of appreciation of the maxim, that pressure begets counter-pressure. Everywhere valuable energies are wasted in national struggles, because the conquering nations will not understand that association pays better than violence, and because statesmen and diplomatists of average ability are distinguished more for their ability to manœuvre a scheme through than for their power of making a far-seeing estimate of the advantages or disadvantages which are likely to accrue from that scheme.

In a recently published brochure Professor Jorga of Bucharest University describes in the following words the conditions in which three millions of Rumanes live in Hungary: "They have never in any way whatsoever adopted a defiant attitude towards the laws of the land; they have never shown any inclination, notwithstanding their strength, to dare to break the most stringent legal regulations. So long as the new Hungary

<sup>1</sup> A judge who officiates in a conquered country will often, under the influence of national suggestion, pronounce extremely partial judgments without knowing that he is doing so.

has existed, that Hungary which the Magyars seized when it was entrusted to them by the authors of the Dual Monarchy, they (Rumanes) have never stood for anything but the hardest work, the truest military courage, the most unshaken loyalty to the throne. It is ancient history how they were hit in their most vital interests by the quiet abrogation of the laws of nationality, by the factious distribution of seats in parliament, by a long succession of laws whose object was to ensure to a Hungarian minority, chiefly composed of officials and politicians, a permanent supremacy, and finally by the barbarian customs of an Asiatic administration; now they see themselves also refused admittance to the polling-booths on election days.”<sup>1</sup> The other non-Magyar nations in Hungary are in precisely the same situation as the Rumanes.

On 26th November 1907 the Imperial Chancellor, Fürst Bülow, introduced a bill into the Prussian Chamber of Deputies for the encouragement of German colonisation in the Baltic Provinces, containing provisions for the expropriation of Polish property for the benefit of German colonisation. The bill passed the Chamber of Deputies with certain modifications in the expropriation provisions. In the Upper House, in which the interests of the landed proprietors were predominant, more serious misgivings as to the establish-

<sup>1</sup> Cp. p. 207.

ment of a precedent for expropriation were felt; the members recognised that by weakening the respect of public opinion for private right of possession, they were forging a weapon against themselves. In the end, however, the Government got the better of these misgivings and secured the passing of the bill as drafted in the Chamber of Deputies. Fürst Bülow was himself attacked in the Upper House, and on 27th February 1908 spoke as follows: "The German people have always distinguished themselves by a pronounced sense of justice. It is a fine quality; it is one of the finest qualities of the German people, a quality which we all esteem highly. But, my lords, the reverse side of this lively and cordial sense of justice which distinguishes our people is an inclination, which is often politically dangerous, to lose our way in an abstract formalism, and the impulse which has always been peculiar to us Germans, the impulse to judge public questions, great political questions, exclusively from the standpoint of private rights. That path will not lead us anywhere in great political questions affecting our national existence.<sup>1</sup> The first, the highest, the noblest duty of a State is to hold its own. That is what other nations do, and if we do not do likewise, we shall go under." After this explanation, the general effect of which (veiled in various circumlocutions) was to establish that there

<sup>1</sup> There are three millions of cowed Poles, who threaten the existence of about fifty-seven million Germans'



is a difference between private morality and State-morality, and that might goes before right in politics, the Imperial Chancellor concluded by referring to the special case under consideration. "This measure . . . is an exceptional measure, whose character as an exceptional provision I have emphasised from the first. We bring forward this measure as an exceptional measure, in order that Germanism may acquire in the Baltic Provinces also the solid position which is its right everywhere in the Prussian Monarchy and the German Empire."

The whole of this Polish policy, which had been pursued for years past, and which was now to be pushed by exceptional legislation, is thus characterised by Karl Jentsch: ". . . As the Minister for Agriculture stated when he was explaining the first law of colonisation, the years 1860-85 saw a decrease of 195,537 hectares in the landed property of Poles in the province of Posen; the capable German worked the incapable Pole out. And what is the result of the colonisation which has cost 350 millions of the taxpayers' money? Since 1886, 100,000 hectares in the Polish districts has been lost to the Poles! . . . If it be once assumed that the intention is to exterminate Polism . . . there is only one way of attaining that object: the Poles must be forced to emigrate or be butchered. But if courage is lacking to adopt this old-fashioned method, the gradual ab-



sorption of the Poles must be arrived at. This is—or rather was—possible, had been in progress for centuries in Schleswig, and in Posen and West Prussia since the Prussian occupation. It was possible and was in progress, because no hostile antagonism between the two nationalities hindered friendly intercourse; because in such circumstances the majority always swallows up the minority, and because the process was accelerated by the fact that the majority stood the higher in economical development and in culture, and was in easier circumstances. Instead of leaving this process to run its tranquil course, what has happened? The people have been tormented and embittered with the notorious policy of pin-pricks on the language question. And this at a time when every unimportant, every long-vanished and buried nation was awaking to a consciousness of its nationality. . . . Let us assume that we had secured that not a single Pole any longer understood his mother-tongue; had we thereby made him our friend? In 500 years' time the Poles will not have forgotten what they have undergone, and will hate the Germans for it as bitterly as the Irish hate the English for the injustice with which they were treated by them centuries ago, and that although they now speak only English. If the Poles learn German, that does not profit us in the least, but only themselves. They of course know that, and that is why they used to learn German

and were glad to have their children taught it in school. But from the moment when they were forbidden the use of their mother-tongue, they have naturally said, 'Not now!' and will not hear of German. They would not be men, but dogs, if they thought, felt, and acted otherwise. . . . From my observations at a distance I should judge that our Poles, from whining keeners, have all, including the children, been transformed into energetic men, from cowed slaves have become, down to the tiny infants, a nation of stubborn Protestants."

In Austria the Poles have won themselves a position of political power which provides them with the opportunity of oppressing a smaller nation, the Ruthenes. No profound knowledge of crowd-morality is required to guess that they would use this opportunity to some purpose. "The Russian officials," a Ruthene deputy once declared, "only bring the laws to bear on the Poles, while the Polish authorities in Galicia abuse the laws, which are not so bad in themselves, and trample them underfoot."

The bill drafted by the Russian Government for the abolition of the constitution which had been confirmed to Finland by the oaths of five successive Czars was passed by the national majority in the Duma at the first reading on 8th June 1910, and at the second and third readings two days later. Its final adoption was hailed by Purischkevitch with

the shout of triumph: "Finis Finlandiæ!" On 3rd June the Prime Minister, Stolypin, had made a speech in the Duma, in which he called attention to the fact that the centrifugal current in Finnish affairs was doing more and more harm to Russia: "The destruction of our homes is implied in the threats of passive resistance on the part of individual Finns, as well as in the advice of volunteer counsellors and in the complaints of some members of our community who believe neither in the justice nor in the might of the Russian people. Those who here represent Russia and have been called into council by the Emperor in a situation whose like you have never before had to deal with, must now prove that for the Russian Empire a justice which is founded on the might of the people is the highest justice of all." These words, which were calculated to stimulate national suggestion, did not miss their mark; they were received with "storms of approval and hurrahs from the Right and Centre." The centrifugal current in Finland, which Stolypin held up as a bogey, is a phenomenon, the first mention of which dates from the period of Russification initiated by Bobrikoff. This is only natural, because the psychological fact is everywhere the same. Pressure begets counter-pressure. But it is a common trick on the part of oppressors to represent the oppressed as rascally disturbers of the peace. For the rest, it is strange that a great Power never finds it inconsistent with its national



pride to complain that some diminutive and oppressed frontier people "endangers its existence." Whenever this piteous complaint is published abroad, some act of oppression may be confidently expected. All means are justified in the sacred cause of oppression. National crowds have a propensity, like children, for destroying just for the pleasure of feeling their strength; but naturally this propensity can only be indulged in when the nation really is powerful. And crowd-morality has stereotyped a method of statesmanship, which persists despite the teachings of experience, thanks to the suggestive power of tradition.

If the conquering and the conquered nations belong to entirely different culture-worlds, the task of establishing relations of confidence becomes appreciably more difficult. But history will find no excuse in this for the sovereign State whose endeavours in this direction fail, still less for that which makes no effort at all. The State which subjugates a people of foreign culture, must know that it is undertaking a difficult task, that all the moral obligations are on the side of the conqueror, and that it is only by the conscientious fulfilment of all those obligations that it can hope to establish relations of confidence, from which it itself will extract the greatest benefit in the long run. Beside the association method and that of extermination, we have the rule of the sword as a form of domination which never gets beyond the



stage of insecurity. It has been very happily said that a man can build himself a throne of bayonets, but that he cannot sit on it. Dominion can only be maintained for a time by dividing up the subjugated people and fostering internal differences among them. The Romans, the nation who brought the art of dominion to the highest pitch, were obliged at last to abandon the sword method for the association method, and to give the Roman citizenship to all the inhabitants of the Empire. Even if this concession was made at a time when it had no political significance, yet it had social significance, which was perhaps really quite as important; the conquered were no longer an inferior class of humanity, they were "Roman citizens."

A primary difficulty in a State's attitude towards a nation of foreign culture lies in idiosyncrasies of race and culture. Europeans are always prone to see in a foreign culture an inferior culture or even a want of culture; to the average European un-European spells barbarian, non-Europeans are "savages." It is only to be expected that the savage in the presence of the swaggering and thoughtless tactlessness of the civilised European will adapt a corresponding standard. The purblindness of the savage towards the European is more pardonable than that of the European towards the savage, because the latter as a rule never has a chance of finding in the European anything

better than a more or less brutal oppressor. Many a European who, equipped with absolute powers, is sent out to Eastern colonies, leaves his varnish of culture at home. At the same time he is apt to be blinded by the glamour which surrounds the "Empire-maker"; he sees the immediate growth of territory, power, and commercial possibilities, but he does not notice whether the men of action, by establishing proper relations with the native population, are building up guarantees for the safe continuance of the property they have acquired.

It is a peculiar fact that the English, who of all European nations control the destinies of the greatest mass of non-European nations, have won the reputation of being the nation which of all colonising nations is most readily dominated by race-idiosyncrasies. The non-English European who has travelled in India has usually been profoundly impressed by the way in which the English, with an instinctive sureness and a consistency which is based on a tradition rooted in the British nation, establish a difference in value between themselves and the natives. "The native" is to the English a being of an inferior clay, not a proper complete man like an Englishman, and he is treated accordingly in all the circumstances of life. The Indians themselves take every precaution to observe the distance which the conquering nation prescribes, but it fills them with bitterness and rancour. That the Indians, notwithstanding the reforms in the

administration introduced in the course of years, are practically excluded from the government of their own land, that considerable sums in salaries, pensions, etc., are yearly squeezed out of the not over-rich country, without its receiving a corresponding equivalent in contributions from the Government, and that a large part of this money goes out of the country never to return, because the pensioned officials prefer to pass their days of retirement in Old England—not one of these is the primary cause of the antipathy of the Indian population to their British masters. The most deep-seated cause is to be found in the barriers which the English have erected in the race-idiosyncrasies; it is to be found in the fact that even the Indian who has acquired the highest European education, has won scientific degrees and distinctions, yet always remains an inferior being.

The anti-English movement in Egypt has exactly the same character as the anti-English movement in India, because the fundamental causes are in both places the same. It is a fact that the nations enjoy under the sceptre of the British a greater security of justice and are entrusted with the administration of their own affairs to a greater extent than in French North Africa, for instance; but the contempt of the English for the natives “shows itself on all occasions in the most galling manner,” writes the correspondent who was sent out by the *Temps* to Egypt in February 1910.



“The native is deliberately excluded from all good society, as belonging to an inferior race. Just as, for instance, it is expressly forbidden to even the most highly educated Chinamen to set foot in an English club in China, so will English officers never invite Egyptian comrades to their mess. Thus I have seen with my own eyes a smart lady, on leaving the theatre, brutally thrust aside a most polite gentleman in an Oriental head-dress, as if it were a donkey-driver or newspaper-hawker who stood in her way.”

As economic exploitation—along with strategical aims—represents the motives of all colonial politics, whether the colonial politics take the form of annexation (and what is really the same thing, occupation) or of “peaceful penetration” (protectorate or simple “sphere of influence”), the first Power on the scene naturally strives to extort for itself as many economic advantages as possible. The man who puts money into the concern expects dividends. On the other hand, the “free competition” of the Powers in the so-called independent exotic States is one of the watchwords of the times. The other Powers usually demand as the price of their recognition a share in the exploitation of the economic possibilities. A way out of this dilemma is found in the way usual in politics, namely, in a phrase. “The open door” is a pretty technical term of politics. It has come to be the fashion, every time a Power seizes a hitherto independent



country or part of it, or every time it restricts in one form or another the commercial freedom of a hitherto independent country, for it to proclaim the "policy of the open door." But the actual facts show that the word is calculated to carry weight more by its power of suggestion than by any real meaning. It may be confidently asserted as a fact that everywhere where the real rulers expressly assert the policy of the "open door," the door is more or less tightly shut. The expression is only intended to keep alive amongst the simple crowds the illusion of a freedom of competition which no longer exists.

The "open door" was solemnly proclaimed in three different quarters of the world: Morocco, Persia, and Manchuria. In Morocco Germany has been obliged for years to strain every nerve to make good her economic interests in the face of France (and Spain). In Persia the British and Russians have taken care that foreign economic interests shall not gain a footing. As far as Manchuria is concerned, the American Secretary of State, Mr Knox, brought forward a proposal having for its object the placing of the "open door" under international control. The proposal was passionately rejected both in Tokio and in Petrograd, and hastened the agreement which was concluded between Russia and Japan in the summer of 1910. The two Powers intended themselves to safeguard the interests of the "open

door." Mr Cloud, for many years Deputy Consul-General for America at Mukden, states that in 1908 Japan had already appropriated 60 per cent. of the total imports into Manchuria, and that this percentage had increased in 1909.

## II. THEORIES OF "IDEAL" POLITICS AND "REAL" POLITICS

Mankind has an irresistible tendency to optimism. However much the individual may feel the unpleasantnesses of life and all the imperfections of human society, yet he cannot reconcile himself to the thought that these unpleasantnesses and inconveniences are the rule and not the exception. Everything *must* be for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Even the man who grumbles most in the concrete is often a great optimist in the abstract. The optimist comes to terms with politics in two ways, either by simply denying that it is the brutal greed for power and the material benefits of life which governs politics, or by maintaining that these factors certainly are determinants in politics, but that politics really is what it must and ought to be.

The two conceptions may be described as the theories of "Ideal" and of "Real" politics respectively. The "Ideal" politician is so much entangled in the suggestion exercised by the idea of progress, that he sees human culture through a magnifying

glass. He just adds the great advances of modern civilisation to the distinctly more modest advances of culture, and imagines that an epoch which has evolved railways, motor-cars, flying-machines, and other amazing technical discoveries, not to mention social legislation, the Hague Tribunal, etc., must also have got the better of the predatory instinct and war. He cannot help seeing, it is true, that the military budgets all the world over are bewilderingly higher than ever before, and that the question arises with every new technical discovery : what use can be made of it in war? But he imagines that all this is due to the want of sense of the State leaders, in that those Governments in particular which depend upon Conservative parties will not abandon the thought of war, and the more Liberal Governments are thereby forced to follow suit. But the popular crowds will not have war, therefore there will be no more war between civilised nations ; and if only one nation had the courage to throw all his war-machinery overboard, the spell would be broken and the millennium of peace secured.

But the psychology of crowds does not justify this optimistic view. There is, it is true, as we shall see later, a contrast between official State-morality and public opinion, which points in the direction of the standpoint adopted by the " Ideal " politicians ; but we here see only the beginning of a development which will certainly take a long



time. Moreover, the "Ideal" politician has his attention fixed so one-sidedly on the question of peace and war, that he takes no account of the internal national suppressions which are exercised in time of peace, and which flourish to-day as vigorously as ever before. He sees clearly enough, but he is not capable of realising, that this state of affairs must always be a menace to peace. National suppression is often a result of war, and itself contains the germs of war.

The fault of the "Ideal" politician is not that he takes an ideal view of politics, but that he mistakes ideality for actuality and thereby misapprehends the goal to which politics should be directed. For this reason the theories of the "Ideal" politician may lead him, when he attempts to realise them, into the most fatal and irreparable errors. A slackening of the national capacity for resistance against the predatory instinct which is still alive under various forms—economic, diplomatic, and military—may lead to catastrophes of the kind which a balance of military powers is best calculated to ward off. The goal must be reached by other, longer and surer, ways.

While the theorist in "Ideal" politics sees the reality in a false light, the theorist in "Real" politics sees the reality rightly, but puts a false value on it. He sees in the oppression of the weak by the strong a matter of course, a law of Nature. It is a case of Darwin and Nietzsche in the seat of



honour in politics. A law of Nature will not submit to moral evaluation. Politics is a conception outside good and evil. In politics might goes before right, because it does not and cannot do otherwise. The theorist in real politics is so closely entangled in the suggestion of the present, that he cannot picture to himself a further development. He forgets that Nature acquired in man a new, a psychical factor, namely perfectibility, that man is not only a beast of prey, but a beast of prey which is capable of development. He forgets that man—apart from any similarity in other respects—has an intellectual plus in advance of the hyæna and the jackal, and that this plus makes every application of Darwinian theories to human society perverse and false. He never sees how illogical it is that there should be two different kinds of morality established for all ages, a double ethical goal for the same human activities. His situation is the same as that of the man who believes both in the Biblical and in the Natural Science account of the Creation, for he either does not see the contradictions between them or, if he sees them, explains them away by means of symbology and allegory and similar makeshifts, devices dear to lovers of compromise. Choice must be made between the desire for club-law all along the line and the desire for ethics all along the line. Life does not offer us two equally legitimate kinds of morality, but a more highly developed individual

morality and a less highly developed crowd-morality. How the latter can be raised to the height of the first, and how long it will be before that happens, is a question by itself, but the first condition is that the desire be appeased, and, before it can be appeased, we must consider whether it ought to be appeased. Every endeavour to "go back to Nature" or to stand still with Nature is directly hostile to culture.

But the theory of "Real" politics sometimes goes a step further. Not content with making of the predatory instinct a merciless law of nature quite outside good and evil, it tries to make it the centre of a cult. "We ought not," as it is stated in an article on the theory of real politics by J. Ostrup,<sup>1</sup> "to sympathise with the weak, but we ought to admire the strong. For when the events of history are considered in their entirety—apart of course from certain sudden or temporary changes,—it will be quite apparent that their course is the expression of the highest justice; and if it were not so, the world would simply not be worth living in." The last sentence accentuates the teleological-religious character which this intensified kind of "Real" politics always has. The mystic-metaphysical application of the conception justice—a conception which applies exclusively to the relations of man with man—to existence in general, to the absolute,

<sup>1</sup> *Vor Formtid*, Nov. 1909.

leads unconditionally to a Moloch-worship of strength, a glorification of club-law and a denial of all ethics. For if I am to admire power in the abstract, I cannot see why I should not use it in the concrete within the bounds of possibility and the penal law.

This view of politics conceals a fallacy which arises from a confusion between "right" in the ethical sense and "right" in the sense given it in the "Philosophy of Right." Right in the first sense does not admit any motive outside the human world, like might, and the expression of the right is, according to the cultural standpoint, the written or unwritten law or self-controlled free will ("Despotism circumscribed by murder," applied to international relations: oppression circumscribed by insurrection). In the ethical sense right is the antithesis of un-right. In the sense given to the word in the "Philosophy of Right" I have a right to everything which I can in fact accomplish, even though, in the ethical sense, it be the bloodiest un-right. The State is an institution for the exercise of might internally and externally; the State-right (international law) is the doctrine of the distribution of might. When the forms of the State-right of a country are altered by a revolution, the new forms are legitimate so soon as they can make their superior might good. The expression, "*Right is might*" is an axiom of the "Philosophy of Right," in which



morality plays no part. In the expression "Might goes in politics before right," on the other hand, the word "right" is taken in the sense of moral right, which is what gives this assertion, when it takes the form of Maxim guns, its odious character.<sup>1</sup> In practice might often does thus go before moral right, but this fact is none the less to be condemned for that, whether in politics or in private life. If a man takes morality into consideration at all, he cannot with any logical fitness recognise its validity for the relations between individuals only and exclude it from politics.

Although the theory of "Real" politics ends thus in a sentimentality which is hostile to culture, it regards the "sentimental politics" as something quite beneath contempt. There are "Real" politicians who consider that man in private life should be guided by a suitable compound of "reason" and "sentiment," but in politics exclusively by "reason." They start from the popular and naïve idea that "reason" and "sentiment" are two separate drawers in a man's conscience, either of which he may shut at pleasure. An examination of the relation between acknowledgment and sentiment inevitably falls far outside the limits of

<sup>1</sup> Generally, the ambiguity of the word "right" (philosophy of right, juridical and moral) causes much confusion of ideas. In political writings and articles, in which right is dealt with, it will often be found that the word is applied now in one, now in the other sense, and that the line of argument skips from one kind of right to the other indiscriminately.



this work ; nevertheless, I will mention a psychological fact which in my opinion appears to justify to some extent the line of reasoning which would exclude "sentiment" from politics. Sympathy can only be felt in connection with individuals. I can sympathise with the individuals whose sufferings I see or hear described ; but I cannot feel sympathy with collective sufferings, which only present themselves to me in an abstract way as a matter of numbers or as a collective conception. The horrors of poverty, oppression, or war must be described to me in detached pictures, or my fancy must picture them to me thus, before sympathy can make itself felt. The mere information that 10,000 people in a town have no roof over their heads, that a whole nation is the victim of arbitrary administration, or that 50,000 men have fallen in a war, is only registered as a statistical detail in my brain, and arouses, it is true, different apprehensions with the sentimental factors appropriate to them (indignation, bitterness), but cannot give a hold for sympathy. A suggestive or auto-suggestive factor is required as well for sympathy to be awakened. If too I am but little suggestible—or actually influenced by contrary suggestion—and have but little imagination, my "sentiment" will only be aroused by the individual sufferings which I meet in private life, and will remain cold in face of the sufferings which present themselves to me in the form of an abstraction.

The fault of "Real" politics, then, is that it is not "real" enough. It takes account of some values, but not of all; it is inclined from opportunist considerations to sacrifice more weakly represented interests to those which are more strongly represented. In this respect it presents an analogy to the home politics which is inclined to sacrifice minorities to majorities. ) But whatever is detrimental in the inner life of the State will be certain to prove detrimental also in the mutual relations of States. So too in regard to the barbarising influence of oppression on the oppressor, interstate and international "Real" politics may be reflected in party tyranny within the State.

In fact every politics of oppression possesses a corrupting power which is based on the *imitation* which Tarde so energetically claims to be the fundamental principle of sociology. In the first place, the crowd no less than the individual imitates its own earlier exploits, and each time repeats them more easily, more mechanically; the scruples which perhaps make themselves felt with a certain force the first time are felt distinctly less acutely the second time, and gradually fade away in the course of repetition. This observation holds true in politics as certainly as in the statistics of crime. The nation which oppresses a neighbour will be all the more ready to oppress every other neighbour who comes within its reach. And others follow its example. Whatever one State—or, within the

State, one party—can condescend to, need cause no misgivings to the other State or the other party. Both for States, nations, and parties, when their proceedings are censured from an ethical point of view, the final and most effective plea is always this: “Pluck the beam out of your own eye; you are not one whit better than we!” In a State composed of many different nations, oppression on the part of one rapidly infects the whole. In Austria every nation’s hand is against every other. This tendency to imitate is chiefly significant perhaps, when all is said and done, because in it lies the greatest danger attaching to politics of conquest; it perpetuates a method which stifles social development—a method which comes to be regarded by politicians as the only one possible. Even in cases in which conquest and annexation result in a revival in a hitherto stagnant land, this beneficent influence may be overshadowed by the harmful influence of the use of violence as an example for imitation, which is all the stronger, the more the progressive development brought about by the annexation seems to justify the use of violence.

That other methods are conceivable is seen in the case of the United States of America and Canada, among others, where the different nationalities work peacefully together for the good of the common soil—peacefully, because their mutual relations rest upon free association; while in Europe



—with Switzerland as the solitary exception—it is founded upon a tradition of violence handed down from generation to generation: pressure begets counter-pressure.<sup>1</sup> The method of free association also infects with imitation. Australia and New Zealand have fashioned their political institution in the likeness of Canada, to be imitated at a still later date by that conquest-structure, the Dominion of South Africa. The practical, “Real” political, superiority of free association to the method of violence is seen nowhere more strikingly than here. While in Europe the Polish question still, more than a century after the partition of Poland, is a cause of disquiet to three Powers, while Germany still, after nearly fifty years, has a bitter strife of nationalities on her hands in Schleswig-Holstein, the national hatred in South Africa between conquerors and conquered, only eight years after the annexation of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, has sobered down to a merely national contrast of the kind which always exists where two different nations live side by side in peaceful association within the frontiers of the same State. The energies of the two nations have banded together instead of seeking to strangle each other. Each portion has preserved its freedom of movement, and, now that the national conflict is settled,

<sup>1</sup> The negro question in the United States is connected, *inter alia*, with the above-mentioned race-idiosyncrasies of the Anglo-Saxons.



the increase in the economic possibilities, due to the coalition of the States and the reciprocal exchange of culture, results in conditions of progress which are equally beneficial to both parts. Of course this result is not attributable to any especially prepossessing qualities in the British nation, but to the circumstance that the method of association has been induced by imitation in the place of the method of violence. In those regions in which the English employ the latter (Egypt, India), they have exactly the same difficulties to contend with as the Continental States of Europe.

The future, then, must build upon a politics which is in a true sense real, a politics which enlists the energies of everybody in its service, because it allots to each his proper place. Only such a politics can be of service in the long run to the world-economy.

But it must not be forgotten for one moment that it exists so far only in embryo.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I cannot leave the theory of "Real" politics without quoting a remark of Tarde's about the susceptibility of historians to suggestion by "political crime": "It is the fashion, and a very regrettable one, for historians to frown upon the high-principled actors in the historical drama, and self-complacently to bring their shortcomings and narrowness of view into the lime-light, while, on the contrary, they burn incense to the arch-scoundrels of politics—in France, Philip the Fair and Louis XI., to name only the best of them; in England, the Tudors, including Henry VIII.—and to go into raptures over the perspicacity with which they are credited, for the most part undeservedly.

This affection for the freebooters of history, and this marked antipathy for the shepherds of the people, result in the long run in the ascription to the first of nearly every reasonable and profitable achievement in the department of administration or legislative reform. But the truth is that the more honourable of two statesmen of equal talent or genius is always the more useful to the nation. Those who believe in energy only, those who believe in genius or character only, need only look at Napoleon. Assuredly it was not character he lacked, or genius either. But if he, with a trifle less strength of will, lively imagination, and enterprise, had combined a little more of that despised thing called heart and sense of duty, should we not now be chief among the nations of the earth?" (Tarde, *Les Transformations du Pouvoir*, pp. 245-46.)

## CHAPTER VII

### STATE-MORALITY AND PUBLIC OPINION

THE great battering-ram in the onward march of the crowd toward ethical development is "public opinion," which acts as a kind of unofficial crowd-morality as compared with, and often as opposed to, the official crowd-morality, *i.e.* State-morality.

An insurrection which fails is described in official terminology as a disgraceful riot, and its leaders are called (State-)criminals. If, on the contrary, the insurrection succeeds, it is labelled a "war of independence," and its leaders are "champions of liberty." This terminology conceals, in the first place, the fact that right in the sense given it in the Philosophy of Right equals might. But it also attempts a moral valuation: he who has luck has Right on his side, he who has no luck has Un-right. A State-morality of this sort answers to the primitive individual morality.

The unofficial crowd-morality often adopts another point of view. Public opinion is less dogmatic and is affected by suggestions of all kinds. When an insurrection occurs in one part of the

world, public opinion in countries which are not directly affected is predisposed to take sides with the insurgents, because, following many well-known analogies, it premises that insurrection is a reaction against oppression. This view may be correct in some cases, incorrect in others. The motives of an insurrection may be highly complex, there may be endless gradations in their moral justification. But the crowd cannot go into details, it is content with crude generalisations.

When two States go to war, public opinion in other countries involuntarily takes sides. Many considerations operate here. If one of the warring States has been our enemy in a past which is not remote enough to have lost its historical—suggestive—influence, or if there is a probability of its adopting a hostile attitude towards us in the no distant future, our sympathy is quite naturally with its opponents. There is no ideal valuation in this, it is the same consideration which causes us instinctively to look with sympathy on those animals which are “useful” from the human standpoint, on the “harmful,” on the contrary, with feelings of antipathy. Consciousness of racial affinity is a powerful motive of sympathy. Should our Royal House happen to be nearly related with the ruling dynasty in one of the warring States, this factor will often suffice to give our public opinion sympathies in this direction. Community of religion also still has some power of suggestion. Armenians



and Syrians are regarded as our fellow-creedsmen ; the ordinary man actually knows very little about these peoples, and his knowledge of the fact that they are Christians is perhaps drawn from the newspapers. Although the cultural gulf which separates a Christian Englishman, Scandinavian, or German from a Christian Armenian or Syrian is very much wider than that which separates the Armenian or the Syrian from his Mohammedan surroundings, the simple word "Christian" secures for the Armenian and the Syrian a general sympathy in Europe, of which they are not slow to take advantage.

Finally, there is the suggestion of humane ideas to be considered. Humane ideas are the fruit of the development of individual morality. Seeing that suggestion is continually being exercised in every department of life by individuals on the crowd, and that the crowd, under the influence of suggestion, can be persuaded to anything, from the lowest infamies to the most sublime devotions, we need feel no surprise at the power of humane ideas also to affect the crowd. Public opinion here, as an adjunct to State-morality, is the motive element in the development of the crowd. It is capricious, incalculable, operates blindly in the detached case without the ability to survey the consequences of its actions, which are sometimes detrimental, sometimes beneficial. State-morality is a mummified primitive morality, which believes itself to be

throned on an Olympus high above all development ; it is the factor of inertia in the history of crowds, while public opinion is energy. Herein lies the significance of public opinion ; it may often go astray, and its errors may perhaps lead to fatal results, but it is subject to the law of development ; it is constantly absorbing new elements from individual morality ; it is the bond of union between the individual and the crowd.<sup>1</sup>

While State-morality in its essence is the same now as it was thousands of years ago, public opinion is widely different from what it was only a hundred years ago ; and it takes a long, a terribly long time, for public opinion so to react on interstate morality as to make it somewhat less barbarous, at any rate in its outward forms.

An illustrative example of the way in which unofficial crowd-morality can come into conflict with official is to be found in a modern phenomenon :

<sup>1</sup> It has often been asserted that the judgment of public opinion on human actions is more severe than that of practical individuals. Business tricks, which public opinion condemns, are daily employed without scruple by worthy citizens of average respectability. The observation is undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless it must be remarked that in this connection it is not crowd-actions but private actions which are in question. The conception "public opinion" is taken here too in a rather different sense from that given it above, namely, in the sense of the current moral judgment of *individual* actions ; and as this has its roots in the theories of social pedagogues which are concocted with the object of serving as a guide for individuals, it must necessarily look beyond the average individual ethical standard in force at the time.

the uninvited intervention of trade unions, professional groups or representative chambers in the internal affairs of foreign States. An intervention of this kind usually bears the character of a protest against national oppression. When the Russian Government in 1910 brought before the Duma its proposals for the adjustment of the relations between Finland and the Russian Empire, protests against the abolition of Finland's autonomy poured in, first from a meeting of jurists and international lawyers in London, next from a string of English Chambers of Commerce, and finally from members—generally of the Left party—of a succession of European Parliaments. The indignation at the proposal was expressed not only in Russia, but also in the “real political” press of the respective countries. The train of ideas in all the articles was built up on three arguments, which deserve to be examined in detail.

(1) Uninvited intervention in the internal arrangements of another State by prominent men in our public life is unwise, as it may arouse dissatisfaction with us in the State in question, and thereby upset our political relations with it. This reasoning has a lot to be said for it, but its significance decreases in proportion as the number of the States increases, whose prominent men take part in such a demonstration. When an act of oppression by a great Power is met by protests from the public opinion of all the other great Powers—followed by a string



of minor Powers as well,—the oppressor-State can spare itself the trouble of taking offence, because it cannot possibly fall out with all of them.

(2) To intervene in another State's abuse of power is also unwise, on the ground that we risk being repaid by the intervention of other States in our own. We all know that those who live in glass houses must not throw stones. But suppose our neighbours also live in glass houses, yet throw stones. Our cautions will not help us. If we perform a sufficiently brutal and startling act of oppression, the protest from other countries will pour in none the less, even if we, with our own glass house in mind, had always been careful not to take part in any demonstrations of the kind.

(3) It is not merely unwise of us to intervene in another State's affairs, but it is also not right to do so, for every State has the right to order its internal arrangements as it likes. Yes, from the point of view of the "Philosophy of Right," it has; but from the moral point of view, of course, it has not, and it is in a moral sense that the argument is conceived.

Intervention cannot be condemned on ethical grounds. Besides, this principle of non-intervention is in practice maintained only in face of the Great Powers, not *e.g.* in face of weak Oriental Powers, which show clearly enough what the moral argument is worth.

This encroachment by public opinion is a sign



of growing solidarity between nations, despite politics; we are in presence of a movement whose object it is to overthrow "Real" politics with their own weapon—force. Public opinion cannot rule, it is too inconstant for that; its sway would mean irregularity and fecklessness, resulting in insecurity and anarchy. Politics can rule, because it has a school and technique and a solidity of its own, but it must be based on public opinion. If there are several opinions which clash with one another, politics finds its natural support in the most conservative. But public opinion may point with such concentrated intention in a new direction as to qualify for the designation "spirit of the age," and thereby to become a permanent force, to which politics must give way. Public opinion builds actually on suggestion, and suggestion is a power for good and evil. But when it bestirs itself in the direction of the humanisation of politics, when, in other words, it shows a tendency to reform State-morality on the same lines as those along which individual morality has developed in the course of centuries, then we may confidently assume that it is in the right path.

## I. NATIONAL SENTIMENT

National sentiment is the sentiment of solidarity due to community of language and tradition on the basis of a more or less conscious recognition

of the fact that the individual's freedom of movement and power of action stand in direct relation to the nation's independence.<sup>1</sup>

The history of conquered nationalities provides evidence enough that the material and intellectual freedom of the individual is dependent on the independence of the nation. Seen from the defensive side, national sentiment rests on the instinctive perception of the fact that the predatory instinct and the lust of power regulate the mutual relations of nations. It rests upon the implicit mistrust which animals, barbarians, and nations have of one another, whose justification, as far as the last are concerned, is to be found in the experience of centuries. Defensive national sentiment is the nation's instinct of self-preservation.

Language is the means of exchange of consciousness and of confidence, it is the means to the gratification of the social impulse. Conversation in a language of which the speaker is not a complete master is tiring, and produces a feeling of constraint; the difficulty of the language in foreign parts fosters boredom and homesickness. In reality the language question is the kernel of every national question. Certainly a nation *can* feel itself knit together by tradition alone, without any community of language (Switzerland), and the

<sup>1</sup> Home sentiment cannot be reckoned an ingredient of national sentiment, but it generally acts parallel with it and serves to strengthen it.

example of the Irish shows that a people can preserve its national consciousness after it has lost its language, but these are exceptional cases; in general the renunciation of a nation's language means the beginning of its death. Consequently, linguistic compulsion is the means by which every oppressor - nation tries to paralyse its victim.

It follows from this fundamental importance to a nation of its language, that national sentiment must be most prominent in the stratum of society to which its mother-tongue is most essential—that is to say, first and foremost among the peasants; in a somewhat less degree among the urban middle-classes—who are as a rule sharper than the peasants,—and the labourers, who can be comfortable anywhere, and whose conversational needs are met by a few quickly learnt scraps. National sentiment will be least prominent among the educated classes with some skill in languages, especially among those who are sensible enough to bring themselves into contact with individualities stamped with the impress of a foreign nationality.

But a succession of different factors may interfere and alter this natural relation between the individual's social position and the intensity of his national sentiment. Trade interests may make their influence felt, just as individual differences, of course, play a prominent part. A more superficial and transitory perversion of the relation in question



may also arise from the suggestion exercised by patriotic or anti-patriotic propaganda.

A man of pronounced national sentiment has no right to reproach his neighbour for his cooler outlook on the national question, for it is a matter of course that the man who feels strongly the need of the society of his fellow-countrymen, because he cannot get the same intellectual values from others, must feel himself more solidly bound to his nation than the man who can gratify his yearning for mental pabulum just as well outside as inside his own nation. Reproaches are not justified unless the man with the weaker national sentiment—nobody who lives and works among the nation to which he belongs is altogether devoid of national sentiment—agitates against national sentiment and so tries to deprive his less fortunately situated fellow-countrymen of a value which they sorely need, and which in the last instance is the natural defence of their individual freedom of movement.

As long as the relations between nations retain their present character of armed peace, *i.e.* potential war, national sentiment will necessarily wear a military garb, and the individual's conception of national sentiment will be influenced by his attitude towards the question "Peace and War," and therefore by the antithesis between the theories of "Real" and of "Ideal" politics. But the antithesis also between conservative and progressive temperament



and between the individualistic and the collectivist view of society contribute to the determination of the individual's attitude towards national sentiment. When also the material interest which the individual may possibly have in the success of efforts towards nationalisation or internationalisation is considered, it is clear that in patriotism and anti-patriotism we are dealing with very complex phenomena. Behind the spokesmen of patriotism and of anti-patriotism we catch sight of the crowds, which seize upon the rough outlines of the various doctrines presented to them. The usual conditions of crowd-psychology, suggestion from the crowds' own camp, contrary suggestion from that of its opponents, accentuate the one-sidedness of the doctrines, while the arguments employed in the struggle are coined into phrases.

While self-preservation is the most obvious factor in national sentiment, there are other factors to be found in it. Self-preservation, the warding-off of foreign violence, is, so to speak, the negative pole of national sentiment. The positive pole is the nation's consciousness of its power of production, of its creative ability, its ability to produce new values of a material or intellectual kind. National consciousness creates its own concentration, which, because it impresses a certain personal stamp on the nation, enables it to take its part in the world's economy. For, just as it is the individual, and never the crowd, which creates, so

the collective work of culture proceeds from the, so to speak, individualised national units, and not from an abstract mankind. Community of language and historical memories creates the first bond between the creative individuals in a nation; it is their common denominator, it is a common basis, which unifies and harmonises the national work. This elementary intellectual unity is accentuated according as later generations of creative individuals build upon the foundations laid by their predecessors. It works suggestively on the susceptible crowds in the nations and impresses them with a peculiar character, which again reacts on the individualities. National character, so called, assuredly rests only partially on cognate race-characteristics;<sup>1</sup> geographical conditions, differences in mode of life—which partly rest on tradition—make their influence felt, but national character in a preponderant degree is formed by the sum of the nation's creative individuals and by the interaction between individual and crowd. This is the reason also why individuals whose father and mother belong to widely different races (half-castes) often turn out unsatisfactorily, from a moral point of view; they hover between two incommensurable traditions, and thereby lose a *point*

<sup>1</sup> These, indeed, come into play at most only in the case of great races between which there is a strong line of physiological demarcation (white, yellow, black races, etc.), not of different peoples within the same race, as Germans, Rumanes, Slavs, for example.

*d'appui* which is important for the development of the individual also; their mixed origin stamps them socially as second-class among both their father's and mother's kindred, and prevents them from assimilating with either of them.

National character again conditions the nature of the nation's contribution to the cause of civilisation and culture. Every national work has a world-value, because it provides matter for exchange, and it is only through exchange and conflict that development can be secured. The more heterogeneous the exchange is, the more elements there are in the conflict, the surer and smoother will the development as a whole be.

A self-conscious nation is proud. Pride is only an uncritical self-consciousness, and the fact that nations are uncritical is due to their character as crowds. Of course national self-assertion does not leave so important a means of suggestion as lyric poetry unemployed. National songs treat with warmth and feeling of the home, the nature of the country, and the daily activities of the people, or extol the warlike attributes of the nation either directly in martial strains, or indirectly by childish exaggerations and abusive references to the enemy, just as in the laudatory poems and lampoons in the literatures of primitive peoples. National poetry in all its forms is of the greatest significance as the most concise auditive symbol of unity—*cp.* the flag as the



visual symbol—and as an effective promoter of the concentration of national power.

But the step from pride to arrogance is not a long one, and national pride is apt to develop into national arrogance, if the littleness and political insignificance of the State or the people do not of themselves forbid such a development. The nation regards itself as more excellent than any other, as a tool in the hands of Providence for the guidance and enlightenment of all other nations. If these do not act as their own welfare demands, they must be compelled by all the means at the disposal of the “superior” power. And there is a teleological factor to be considered which is apt to complicate the tendencies to aggression. A false idealism combines with the elementary impulses toward subjection and exploitation—some payment is naturally expected for the disinterested work of culture. National sentiment is a complex instinct, in which defensive and aggressive elements are always to be found intermingled; a nation is determined not only to secure its independence, but also to increase its strength, and that can only be effected at the expense of other nations. The self-conscious nation, if it has the power, is impelled with instinctive certainty towards a policy of oppression.

This development is natural and right for State-morality, whose basic principle, in spite of all hypocritical diplomatic phrases, is that might goes



before right. But public opinion also, which otherwise, when its own interests are not directly engaged, acts as a corrective to State-morality, generally fails here. National suggestion operates so violently that, when it appears in an acute form, it tends to turn into ecstasy. All deliberation is then at an end. The crowd does not distinguish justifiable defence from vulgar assault, it reacts instantaneously and irresistibly, and woe to him who tries to bring it to reason! The language of national suggestion—the flag, the nation's honour, etc.—can be used in the service of a good cause, and misused in that of a bad cause, but its effect is always equally great. The matters at issue may also be so involved that the crowd, even if they had the ability to deliberate, could not get to the bottom of them. If the leaders of a State desire war, they can induce the right attitude of mind by official untruths, perfidies, concealments, even forged documents. Sometimes, too, a Government which is threatened with revolution can, by the skilful application of national suggestion, divert the blind rage of the crowd against some peaceful neighbouring State. On the other hand, a national movement which is checked or which is humiliated by defeat will often break out in internal revolutions. The crowd - paroxysm demands a vent. Therefore it is always a dangerous game to speculate in national sentiment. The unscrupulous agitators who, with some object or other in view, open the

floodgates of national passions, are never sure that the forces, in which so many unknown and incalculable factors co-operate, may not turn against themselves.

Often public opinion will demand war, in spite of the leaders of the State, who see the dangers and difficulties of the undertaking more clearly than the over-excited crowds. The motive crowd-morality may thus, guided by irresponsible counsellors (*inter alia*, by an unprincipled press), degenerate into a barbarism against which it is the duty of the representatives of the stative crowd-morality to make a stand in virtue of their superior insight. Often these national ambitions, which set the crowds in motion, and involve Governments in so much trouble, in exchanges of notes, protests, and apologies, are nothing but a scarcely veiled predatory instinct. National crowds readily find excuses for demanding the "annexation" of a neighbouring State in the fact that their ancestors were its lords one thousand years ago, or that its inhabitants speak a language which is related to their own.

At the same time public opinion is never a single and undivided stream. Even within the life of the nation opinion is ranged against opinion. The acute attacks of passion, which can be only improperly described as public "opinion," will, even if they succeed in temporarily terrorising all other opinion, always in the long run come off second best with

the less superficial opinions, with the calmer, more smoothly flowing streams in the evolutive flood of public opinion. The important point is to prevent their doing any damage while they last.

## II. THE WORLD-PEACE

In Voltaire's tale *Micromégas* the travelling giant from Sirius converses with one of the earth's philosophers, and the latter says to him, *inter alia*, "Do you know, that while I stand here and talk to you, 100,000 hat-wearing fools of our beast-class are about to kill 100,000 other beings with turbans on their heads, or to be hewn in pieces by them, and that this has been the usual mode of proceeding nearly all over the world time out of mind?"

The man of Sirius shuddered and asked what could be the reason for the hideous quarrels between such paltry creatures.

"They turn," answered the philosopher, "on some heaps of mud about the size of your heel. But you must not suppose that any one of these millions of men who cut each other's throats claims one fragment of these heaps of mud; the only question to be settled is whether they shall belong to a man called 'Sultan,' or to another man who, for some reason or other, is called 'Emperor.' Not one of them has ever seen or will ever see the piece of ground in question; and there is scarce one of the beings



who murder each other who has ever seen the being for whose sake he lets himself be murdered."

"Wretches!" cried the inhabitant of Sirius excitedly. "Such an excess of insane rage is beyond comprehension. I have a mind to take a step or two and scrunch the whole swarm of ridiculous assassins in three kicks."

"Do not interfere with them," was the answer; "they are doing their best to ruin themselves. Know, that after the lapse of ten years, not one in a hundred of these poor wretches will be left; know, that even if they had not drawn the sword, hunger, toil, and intemperance would have swept them almost all away. Besides, it is not they who deserve punishment; it is those idle barbarians who sit in their studies, and, while they digest their food, give orders for the slaughter of a million men, and who afterwards arrange solemn thanksgiving-services to God."

Since Voltaire wrote this satire, the nations have acquired the rich measure, the blessings of the right of free action, without wars being made to cease in the world for all that. The right of free political action was followed quite naturally by greater consciousness of national cohesion, greater propensity to self-assertion. Liberalism obtained its complement in nationalism. The time had come for the revision of national frontiers. General military service, which followed on the franchise, created a new kind of army, instinct with national



spirit. The nineteenth century became the epoch of the national war. But Liberalism was only a brief intoxication. Democratism, hostile at bottom to liberty, gradually thrust individualistic Liberalism into the background. The battle is not yet ended ; but Liberalism—in the original meaning of the word—is steadily losing ground before the advance of Democratism. New communities develop within and partly athwart the national community. The result is a very slow decline in Nationalism. Changes and revaluations are taking place ; society is striking out new paths for itself. While past times had their religious and national wars, in which economic realities underlay religious and national suggestion, the present day has chiefly to do with economic wars, in which national—and sometimes religious—suggestions only operate as a ferment.

At the same time the peace-idea has developed into one of the great social problems of the present day. The idea is naturally, like all social ideas, a very old one. From Saint Peter to Kant, from Kant to Tolstoy and Bertha von Suttner, the peace-idea has undergone a long course of development, until ever since the close of the nineteenth century it has begun to come down from the breezy heights of a theory into the arena of practical life.

A rational investigation of the peace problem must start from two fundamental questions: "Is a world-peace desirable?" and "Is it practicable?"

*Is a world-peace desirable?* The arguments against war are that the human sacrifices of war—men of an age when they are best fitted for work—signify a weakening of the people; that this systematic blood-letting must have a partly brutalising, partly nerve-destroying effect on the participators; that war costs an endless amount of human suffering; lastly, that financially it means a calamity which may paralyse the nation for a long time. The determined enemies of the peace idea concede all this—perhaps with the exception of the brutalising influence of war—even though they assert that the friends of peace exaggerate its significance. But the opponents of the peace idea assert that war brings other advantages, which far outweigh the above-mentioned inconveniences; and this is the real point of difference. The arguments of the enemies of the world-peace can be in the main condensed into three: war develops new, valuable moral qualities in men, it sets a natural bound to human increase, and it promotes technical perfection.

The advocates of war assert, firstly, that war develops the national consciousness and is the prime creator of a national spirit. In times of peace the nation falls a prey to effeminacy and egoism; in war, on the contrary, it learns economy, concord, and self-sacrifice, and gains in moral fibre.

Now it cannot be said that war creates new moral qualities. It brings individuals nearer to

each other, and in presence of the common danger qualities which already exist find an opportunity of displaying themselves in a more conspicuous way. As a rule, also, a noticeable growth in these moral qualities takes place. Of course, examples can be found under peace conditions also of courage and self-sacrifice in unusual circumstances, not only in individuals but also in the crowd; the labouring crowds suffer hunger with their families when class solidarity bids them strike; and if a national disaster occurs, a flood or an earthquake, the same good qualities will crop up wherever there is meet soil for them. But war is significant, *inter alia*, for the reason that it forces social classes, who are otherwise absorbed in a selfish hunt after the material blessings of life, and who shut their eyes to the stern realities of life, into the atmosphere of general self-sacrifice, and brings them into direct contact with the serious things of life. While in times of peace the predatory instinct of individuals tends to get the upper hand, war strengthens the solidarity of the State organisation for plundering and for the warding off of plundering.

On the other hand, the national spirit often assumes, after a war, an extremely aggressive character, which may have a barbarising effect, and which incites to new hostilities. The more irritable the national consciousness, the more infectious is



war. A study of the alternation of peace and war in history might tempt the reader to predicate as a general rule, that the unfortunate after-effects of war, the defiant arrogance and the Quixotism which is falsely labelled "manliness," subsist for a considerably longer time than the moral spurt which war calls forth. Moreover, no human being can foresee what new psychical factors would manifest themselves if the heart of the European culture-world, now after one hundred years of peace, were visited by a war. The tools of war have become immensely more murderous than before, and the nerves of our epoch have become more sensitive than those of any preceding epoch; nobody knows what alterations these circumstances might make in the aspect of the time, from the point of view of war-psychology.

War, continue the opponents of a world-peace, is beneficial and necessary for the keeping of human increase within reasonable bounds. Le Bon cites in this connection India,<sup>1</sup> whose population, after more than a century of compulsory peace, is increasing to an enormous extent, a fact which must naturally enhance the general impoverishment. "And is death by starvation really so much better than death by a cannon-ball, that man will choose to escape the latter at any price, only to resign himself to the former?"

Now, India is a land with a high and valuable

<sup>1</sup> *La Psychologie politique*, p. 93.



upper-class culture, but its uncultured masses breed thoughtlessly with all the prolificness of people living in a state of nature. Le Bon may perhaps be right in holding that the highly prized "Pax Britannica" is a doubtful blessing for India. Possibly frequent blood-lettings in war are beneficial to extra-European, over-plethoric peoples. But in Europe, where a certain relative culture is more and more permeating the people, the increase of the population is undoubtedly tending to regulate itself. In Le Bon's fatherland the stagnation of the population is a continual subject of lament, and a decrease in the percentage of births is noticeable among nearly all the cultured nations of Europe.

Finally, Le Bon asserts that the great advance in modern industry, especially in the working of metals, is due first and foremost to war. This argument does not seem to me one of fundamental significance. Railways, telegraphs, and flying machines would have made their way even if the art of war had had no use for them; and even if the progress in technics had been more gradual in certain directions, that would not have been such a great misfortune.

Weighing the considerations on both sides, then, I think that the scale inclines to the side of the pacifists when the question as to the desirability of replacing war by other methods is put in a general way. There remains, however, one peculiar argument in favour of war. That argument is

founded on a conception of war as something divine.

“Perpetual peace,” wrote Moltke, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is a link in the Divine system of the world.” The pacifists might with just as much right assert that labour to establish a world-peace was well-pleasing to God, because God, according to the Christian conception, is Love. Assertions of this sort are always cheap, because they lie outside the bounds of argument. Directly one begins to inquire into God’s intentions, all discussion is at an end, because every single person who believes in God can attribute to Him the intentions which happen to suit his case; and to those who do not believe in God, the attribution does not convey any very definite idea. The “Divine system of the world” is a religious conception, and as such falls outside the sphere of rational investigation. And what after all does the Divine system of the world mean? Is it the primitive condition of things? In that case all culture is a presumptuous attack on the Divine system of the world, and we had better get back to cannibalism as quickly as possible. If it is not the primitive condition of things, what is the precise stage of culture at which we must cry a halt, having regard to the Divine system of the world? A couple of centuries ago the idea of lifting oneself up into the clouds with the help of machines would have been considered to be an

Utopianism and an outrage, because it "offended against the Divine system of the world"; and yet we fly.

Treitschke speaks of the holiness of war. On this it may be remarked that "holiness" is not an objective thing, but a subjective emotional disposition; not a quality in things, but a peculiar light in which the individual sees things. "Holiness" is often a declaration of tabu, by means of which a man, backed by the power of suggestion (popularly called "bluff"), tries to keep a subject outside the sphere of discussion.

When the "Divine system of the world" chrysalises itself into the expression "law of Nature," the conception at once assumes a more scientific aspect. And this brings us to the second main question: *Is a world-peace possible?*

The adherents of the physical necessity of war reason much as follows: In our day war is not brought about by human wills, but it arises as the result of an economic necessity which operates with the inflexible force of a law of Nature. According as the economic spheres of action of nations are extended, and the world is contracted, there must come a collision of interests at more and more points, and this collision will from time to time inevitably come to the *ultimo ratio* of competition—war.

But does the question really turn on a law of Nature which can be compared, for instance, with



the law of gravity? It is possible that there is a propensity in men to get rid of a rival by killing him off; but this "law of Nature"—in the mutual relations of individuals—has been got the better of by the power of the State; so that it can hardly be called inflexible. In reality, the law-of-Nature explanation conceals, under its precise exterior, a mystical — teleological view. After all, on what is economic development founded, if not on human will? Nowadays it is, as a rule, not a king or a minister who desires war, but it is the shareholders in the business called the State. What is the will of nations and States but the sum of individual wills, fashioned of course in accordance with the laws of crowd-psychology? The law-of-Nature conception goes wrong, just like its near relation "Real" politics, at the very starting-point, because it forgets that man has added a new factor to Nature, namely, culture.

The advocates of the idea of the natural necessity of war forget to take another law of Nature into consideration—a law of Nature which really counts in human life, because it is a psychical law, namely, the law of development. The peace movement has grown to an extent unknown hitherto; it has developed organically with a consistency which testifies that it is not a merely fortuitous movement of fashion, but that it responds to a deeply felt impulse. Men of old times were wont to regard war as the natural regulator. The losses



it occasioned were not much considered ; it was a dispensation of heaven. The world was divided and incoherent. To-day, the world-economy has become something quite different. The world is tending more and more to become a single, coherent, all-embracing labour-machine, which cannot suffer one of its wheels to slip out of gear too often. Modern society has learnt an obstinate, tough, persevering manliness in labour. If there is a problem of civilisation or culture to be solved, it calls into play activities at a hundred different spots on the world's surface at once ; if a thread is dropped in one place, it is picked up in another ; energies work in support of other energies ; the game is never thrown up, the goal never lost sight of, and at last it is reached and forms the starting point for the setting up and solution of new problems. It is a development which must face interruptions from modern condottieri. National feeling, that is, the nation's instinct of self-preservation, is faced by an equally legitimate factor in the shape of the pacifist movement, which is the instinct of self-preservation of the labouring world-organism. And this pacifist movement has gradually grown so strong, that it has begun to stir the sluggish State-morality. Statesmen and diplomatists have been forced to busy themselves with it. Efforts for the preservation of the peace have already become one of the conventional after-dinner topics of princes and ministers. The phrase

does not mean in the concrete, it is true, more than other polite phrases, yet, like all other constantly repeated phrases, it produces its suggestive effect.

Further, the pacifist movement has called into being the Hague Conferences, whose significance or insignificance has set so many pens writing. The first Hague Conference took place in 1899, on the initiative of Czar Nicholas II., whose programme included the limitation of armaments, and, in addition, a codification of the law of war by land and the possibility of a wider application of the principle of arbitration to international disputes. Twenty-six States took part in the Conference, which was accompanied by the best wishes of the pacifists. The question of the limitation of armaments resulted in a resolution that it was to be wished that such a limitation could be arrived at. On the other points of the programme, more or less agreement was reached about a series of provisions, part of which were designed to make the arbitration procedure a more manageable machine, part to make the conduct of war more "humane." The second Hague Conference was delayed by the outbreak of the war in East Asia. When Russia had got this war off her hands, the preparations were again taken in hand, and on the Czar's initiative the second Hague Conference was opened in 1907. This time popular feeling was distinctly more sceptical all over the world. Two big wars

had followed the first Conference, and here sat the second "Peace Conference" talking about peace and toleration in fine language, after having closed their doors to the uninvited representatives of despised Corea. The very title "Peace Conference" began to acquire an ironical by-sense, and a caricature depicted the forty-four participating Powers meeting for a Peace discussion with their pockets and belts bristling with weapons, and Dame Albion, with a mighty "Dreadnought" ornament in her hair, mooted her disarmament proposals. Of course the star-turn of the programme again resulted in a fiasco: nobody had ever expected anything else. Instead, several provisions of international law—this time chiefly bearing on maritime law—were adopted, as well as a convention for the establishment of an international prize court.

The interest of all this phase in the history of the pacifist movement lies perhaps less in the particular provisions on which agreement has been reached, than in the actual fact that statesmen and diplomatists have become conscious of the movement, and have seen that it was so important a factor that it was worth the trouble to intervene and to try, as the movement could not be stayed, at least to turn it into a channel in which State-morality could keep a better hold on it. The real advances which were made by the conference, *e.g.* readier access to arbitration, were due thus to a



compromise between the official and the unofficial crowd-morality, between State-morality and public opinion. How much practical value will come to be attached to the results of the Hague Conferences it is as yet too early to judge. But a certain scepticism seems to be gaining a hold on the experts in international law. Thus the *Kölnische Zeitung* writes, in an article dated the 19th of June 1910, that, unless appearances are deceptive, the literature of international law in Germany, following the line of development of the English theories of international law, has recently veered round in such a way that the theorists are now more friendly than hitherto to the principles of the diplomatists, and are showing an inclination to recognise the vast importance of "Real" politics, and of the political interests of different States for the establishment and development of international law. This is explained more in detail as follows :—

"The experiences of international law in practice up to the present time teach us that at Conferences on International Law those proposals have been resultless which purported in time of war to impose on the belligerents any limitations with regard to the use of military resources and the display of military power which were necessary to the object of the war (the killing of the adversary, the securing of the national existence by the successful conduct of the struggle); in other words, that after resultless efforts, every attempt has been abandoned



to limit Hugo Grotius' proposition, which is the fundamental rule for international law in war: *omnia licere in bello, quæ necessaria sunt ad finem belli*. And though agreement has been reached on provisions of international law dealing with these weighty questions, into which war-considerations entered, yet its adoption has not been accompanied by any very great hopes in its binding force; at least, it is undoubted that a State, when its public policy comes into conflict with rules of international law, when the welfare, freedom, and independence of the fatherland are at stake, will and must without any hesitation ignore the regulations which stand in its way, however clearly they may seem to be the ideals of the moral law, the abstract axioms of natural law. It is not possible to quote an instance of this, because the most important prescriptions of international law from the three great Conferences up to this date,<sup>1</sup> those which really do matter, have not yet undergone their fiery ordeal in war. . . . And too strong an emphasis cannot be laid on the great and sole-determining influence which real politics and the well-understood interests of the States concerned have on the determination and further development of international law, a politics which ought on no account to allow itself to be led and blinded by considerations of civilisation and humanity. Might, in questions which impinge

<sup>1</sup> The third was the more restricted Conference in London, 1908, concerning which see below.

on the interests of national existence, goes before right. . . .”

Thus writes the *Cologne Gazette*, basing its chain of reasoning on several of the most recently published works on international law in Germany. The development of its lines of thought lacks nothing in clearness. If it be conceded that “omnia licere in bello, quæ necessaria sunt ad finem belli,” the natural conclusion is that not only the bulky papers of the Hague Conferences are worthless waste-paper so far as the “humanisation” of war is concerned, but that all the provisions of international law, written and unwritten, are not worth a pinch of snuff.

It is to be hoped that in this case practice to a certain extent gives the lie to theory.<sup>1</sup> When the author, towards the end of the article, emphasises the significance of the conventions on international law for the “determination of the limits of the sphere of war-considerations, and for averting the unavoidable hardships of war” from such questions as do not involve a State’s honour or vital interests, it might be supposed that the efforts of diploma-

<sup>1</sup> Too optimistic a view of the situation, however, is not justified. Each succeeding war in recent years seems to have left international law more and more out of account, and each war has brought an increase in the number of accounts of breaches of faith, acts of violence and inhumanity, massacres of non-combatants, women and children.

The Balkan wars have in this connection put the clock of civilisation back a hundred years.

tists, without being actually superfluous in this respect, yet were not so decisive as is generally supposed, since the general consciousness that the machinery of war, vastly complicated, vastly expensive and capricious in the extent of its action as it is in our time, ought not to be set in motion on account of trifles, is quite as solid a guarantee in this connection as the Hague Conventions.

The peace work of the diplomatists is significant because it is symptomatic, rather than because of its positive results. All these provisions, expressed in cautious terms of phrase and sanctioned by the separate Powers with all sorts of reservations, so that they may always have a back-door to slip out of, *may* perhaps through development acquire a real significance. It is indeed possible that the "cards are faced." But public opinion will be proved to harbour the suspicion that the wolf has been set to guard the sheep. Diplomatists are, for better or worse, in their professional activities the representatives of interstate nigger-morality. If wars have become more humane, this is not due to philanthropic diplomatists, but it is due to an accumulation during thousands of years of crowd-psychological imponderabilia, which have gradually made the worst barbarities impossible. When anything is really accomplished, diplomacy usually registers the facts in paragraphs in elegant official style, and takes the credit to itself. If ways of avoiding war show themselves, it is hardly ever the



diplomatists who have evolved them, but, on the contrary, the realities in development which "Real" politics so often seems to undervalue.

The fact that wars have become so preponderatingly economic has for one thing influenced the mode of fighting. This circumstance has produced the modern means of fighting in which Eastern peoples in particular have shown themselves such experts—boycotting, a bloodless, but effective method, which is especially useful in the hands of the weak against the strong: a method which drowns the opponent's suggestive cries about vital interests and insulted national honour in a vulgar and prosaic anxiety for his purse. This method really does paralyse diplomacy. It blunts the weapons which have served diplomacy for so many centuries—the pen and the sword. Diplomatic protests are answered with expressions of regret; but no Government can prevent people buying or abstaining from buying in any quarter they will. The only *sine quâ non* is that the boycott committees should have enough control over the crowds to prevent them from supplementing the boycott by acts of violence which afford an excuse for reprisals. "In order to avoid dealings with a shop," declared one of the Young Turk party-leaders to a public assembly in Pera during the Bosnian war, "it is enough simply to abstain from going to it. It is meaningless and superfluous to go to the shop and demonstrate outside it and tell



everybody that you are not going to buy there any more."

Naturally the application of the weapon of boycott is limited. In order that it may be employed, in the first place, boycotters must be able to do greater damage to their opponents than the latter could do to them by returning the boycott; in the second place, they must be able in any event to meet for a good while, from their own resources, their need for the articles which they have hitherto procured from their opponents. Moreover, not every nation has the cohesion and discipline which are required in order to carry out a boycott. But in any case this weapon will certainly be used in future everywhere, when it can be used with a prospect of success, and will thus often prevent a war with the sword.

But the fact that in our day economic realities have come to the front signifies in another way an unqualified advance. It effects a restriction on the incalculable cross currents of suggestive influences which indeed, in the capacity of ferment in public opinion, have had a significance of their own for the development of crowd-morality, but are only a relative blessing. The suggestion will lose its power in face of economic realities, and the various peoples will find it easier to take a clear view of their goal and of the means to attain it, and to judge in cold blood whether it pays to go to war.

The labouring classes have come to the conclusion that war does not pay for them as labourers, and as these classes have quite consistently emphasised the prior rights of class interests, as compared with national interests, they have as a matter of course given pacifism a prominent place in their programme. At Social Democratic conferences, the desirability of stifling a threatening war by a general strike and similar measures has been discussed over and over again, without ignoring, however, the great difficulties which stand in the way of any departure of the kind.

Similar considerations have been given prominence on the side of the capitalists. At the "National Arbitration and Peace Congress," which was held in New York in April 1907, Andrew Carnegie moved that moral and economic, and even military, pressure ought to be exercised on every State which was minded to break the peace. The neutral States ought to form a fear-inspiring coalition against the peace-breakers. But before force is employed it would be advisable to begin by proclaiming the rupture of all relations with the nation which breaks the peace. No exchange of products, no loans, no imports of a military or naval kind, no post: these measures should serve as a solemn warning, and would probably prove effective. Force ought always to be the last resort. The people who purvey capital and war material will be sure to complain of illegal en-

croachment on their interests ; but the preservation of peace is always the chief interest of industrial nations ; for the thousands which are gained by foreign wars, millions are lost.

This last thesis was developed at the Congress by a prominent manufacturer, James W. van Cleave.

“Many people believe,” said he, “that war stimulates trade, and therefore that it supports agriculturists, manufacturers, and producers of every kind. But that is only true for a while. The Russo-Japanese war increased America’s sales to Japan, Russia, and China while the war lasted, but produced a falling-off in them directly afterwards. Those countries will have to economise for several years to an extent corresponding to the diminution in their means caused by the war. Their purchases from the outside world will be smaller. The world, to an extent which cannot be measured, has become more than ever before one big family. International trade has played a very large part in the furtherance of this solidarity. What helps one country benefits all the rest in a greater or less degree. The war between Japan and Russia promoted, while it lasted, our trade with these countries and also with China, as the war was carried on partly in the territory of the latter country. But it gave a set-back to the trade afterwards. It killed hundreds of thousands of men, and impoverished millions. Consequently,



all we manufacturers lost many customers. Dead men buy no clothes, poor folk cannot pay for them."

Capital and labour, the partners in production, meet here in condemnation of war from a business point of view. But these tendencies, which are backed by the suggestion of humane ideas, are confronted by others, backed by national suggestion. It is a fact that, if a war in the long run proves to be a bad business for neutral trade and industry, yet it may be an excellent business for that one of the belligerent parties which emerges victorious. Though international trade may have lost a little through the Russo-Japanese War, Japan has undoubtedly made considerable profits directly and indirectly out of it. Every day sees a terribly involved duel between the economic factors whose interests lie in opposite directions, a raging, world-embracing struggle between the war—and peace—tendencies, with huge capital sums speculatively engaged on both sides. The result of this struggle behind the scenes of history has been a never-ceasing fear of war, and a competition in armaments of which the end is not yet in sight ; scare telegrams from East and West have become so much a matter of daily consumption, that the public have at last become sated with them.

That is no indication that the hour of the world-peace is at hand. And perhaps it is not such a very great misfortune that it is postponed. For if



the world-peace is to be desired, it is on the understanding that the world-peace proves synonymous with a free association of the powers of every nation; and in that respect the brutally stupid national policies of oppression which are being pursued all the world over are anything but assuring; and the same may be said of diplomatic pacifism. It has been observed that there are tendencies at work, seeking to alter the great "Peace Conferences," in which all independent States can take part, into narrower Conferences of the Great Powers. An indication in this direction is the Conference which took place in London in December 1908, in which, besides the Great Powers, only Spain and Holland took part. Attempts to elbow the smaller States aside on various occasions were noticeable at the second Hague Conference. No agreement was reached as to the establishment of a standing international tribunal of arbitration, because the motions proposed would have favoured the Great Powers; they would each have had a judge sitting for the whole of the twelve-year spell of office, while the smaller Powers would have been allotted judgeships for shorter periods only. The smaller Powers' standpoint of absolute negation towards such a proposal was formulated by the Brazilian delegate, Ruy Barbosa. An attempt at an international legislature, in which the principle of equal rights for all States was abandoned, and the small States were required to submit without

protest to whatever the Great Powers resolved, would hardly be of much service to the cause of progress.

On 5th May 1910 ex-President Roosevelt, in the capacity of Nobel-prizeman, delivered a lecture in the National Theatre at Christiania. In the course of the lecture he declared that it would be a master-stroke if the Great Powers who honestly desired peace would form a League of Peace, not only for the maintenance of peace among themselves, but also for the prevention of breaches of the peace on the part of other States, if necessary by the exercise of force. The greatest difficulty in the way of the further development of the work of peace at the Hague lay in the complete lack of an executive—or police force—which could execute the judgments of the Court. In every society the authority of the Bench rested upon actual or potential force, upon the existence of a police or the knowledge that all the men in the nation who were able to fight were ready and willing to see to the execution of the decisions of the Bench and Legislature. Every individual nation must be ready to defend itself, until the establishment in one form or another of a police force able and willing to prevent violence between nations. In existing circumstances a force of this kind for the maintenance of the world-peace would be best secured by some sort of agreement between the great nations which honestly desired peace and

did not themselves meditate any act of aggression. The objects of the agreement might be restricted, to begin with, to the securing of peace within definite limits and on definite conditions. But the ruler or statesman who procured the establishment of an agreement of this sort would have won a place in history for all time, and would be entitled to the gratitude of the whole of the human race.

These thoughts, which follow the same lines as those of Carnegie, were well calculated to arouse attention. But about three weeks later, Mr Roosevelt made a speech at the Guildhall in London about English policy in Egypt, in which he said that the English had failed through attempting rather to do too much than too little in the Egyptians' own interests. Unfortunately all those nations who had to do with uncivilised, and at the same time fanatical, people had to bear the fact uppermost in their minds that in a situation like that of the English in Egypt, weakness, apprehension, and sentimentality did almost more harm than violence or injustice. Of all the bruised reeds, sentimentality was the most insecure staff on which justice could lean.

One begins to have misgivings as to what dish diplomatic pacifism is cooking behind the scenes. One catches a glimpse of a future development in which the price of peace would be agreements of this sort between the Great Powers, in pursuance of which they would secure to each other



the right to oppress the small nations not only within, but also outside, their own frontiers.<sup>1</sup> In existing circumstances there is a division of power. A Great Power has its attention fixed on those foreign equals who are hostile to it, and whose jealousy it must be careful not to arouse; it cannot indulge in oppression to its heart's content. Directly international peace was established by an agreement of the Great Powers, the last barrier of State-morality would have been thrown down, and the lesser Powers would be relentlessly crushed, slowly and surely, while assurances of humanity and care for the victims' true weal were showered upon them. The treatment which the Korean deputies received at the second Hague Conference affords grounds for anticipating that the belief that the progress of diplomatic pacifism would involve greater justice in the relations between stronger and weaker States and nations will prove itself to be a fatal illusion.

Thus State-morality will continue to exercise its suggestive influence upon the men who are its custodians. However well-intentioned these men may be, they are quite certain to be carried back sooner or later to the atavism of politics — oppression. "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes!*" When brutal instincts cannot find a vent in any other way, they will revel with all the greater zest in the enjoyment of peaceful oppression, which has the great advan-

<sup>1</sup> Compensation!!



tage into the bargain that the oppressor does not risk his own skin. Mankind is not refashioned from day to day, and the growth of sociable instincts at the expense of the predatory instinct and the lust of power will take time. And if diplomatic pacifism were to lead to the formation of a monopolist Great-Power Trust for the trampling down and impoverishment of all other State and national life in accordance with the time-honoured principles of official crowd-morality, its immediate results must inevitably be highly detrimental, not only to the victims themselves, but to the whole world-development, to which the small national organisms are indispensable. If hatred, envy, mistrust, and fear of war between the Powers are the only bulwark of the lesser nations against the predatory instinct of the greater, it must be hoped in the interests of the world-development that hatred, envy, mistrust, and fear of war will continue.<sup>1</sup> The prospect of impoverishment and devastation in war is preferable to the prospect of a hopeless stifling of all values outside the trust-magnate interests of a coalition of privileged Great Powers. Better let the world continue with war with all its chances as the *ultima ratio*, and pay its price, until development has proceeded so far that the advantages of the in-

<sup>1</sup> In this respect the Pan-Germans, among others, play a useful part. The openness with which they announce their aims will always keep the mistrust of others alive.

dependence and freedom of movement of all naturally developed national and State organisms have infected all the ideas from which suggestion springs, the correctness of which calls for no discussion, and which therefore co-operate of themselves with the activities of the crowd. Not until it has become a self-evident, indisputable truism that oppression does not pay, will pacifism have acquired the complement which makes the approach to its ultimate goal desirable, and which, indeed, when all is said and done, alone can make it possible.<sup>1</sup> Until that time we must be satisfied with the—certainly dearly bought—relative condition of peace in which Voltaire saw the highest point to which mankind in general would be able to

<sup>1</sup> There is no point in the objection that there are Great Powers who are already so much surfeited with land as not to feel the faintest desire to swallow any more. In the first place, this is an entirely momentary situation; in the next, it is entirely without significance, so long as there are other Great Powers whose land hunger is not yet satisfied. To take an example, there is no doubt that England has for the time more land in Asia than she can digest, and that she has for the time no ambitions to take possession of half Persia into the bargain. But if Russia finds it prudent to initiate a direct "Annexation" policy in Persia, England will be forced against her will to do the same. And for the nation which is the object of this policy it must be more or less a matter of indifference whether it is the predatory instinct on the one side or the other side's resistance to the former's predatory instinct which drives it into subjection. After the outbreak of the Turco-Italian war, a great English newspaper, the *Daily Graphic*, while recognising the unconditional rectitude of the Turkish cause, wrote: "Right has never prevailed in international politics, and it would be very inconvenient for all the Powers if it were to

attain, the condition in which it can be said that "mankind enjoys perpetual peace, just as it can be said that it enjoys security in cultured States, even though a murder be committed from time to time."

prevail in this instance." That is plain speaking, at any rate. It really is high time for the smaller independent States to free themselves from the delusion that no dangers threaten them from the side of the "Culture-Powers." The non-Great Powers must first boycott the Hague machinations unconditionally, and then exert themselves to the utmost to evolve sound foreign policies, so as to be in a position to carry on their struggle for existence by all the means at their disposal.

## CHAPTER VIII

### HOME POLITICS : EXPERIENCES

IN home politics the relation between theory and practice is rather different from what it is in interstate politics. Interstate "Real" politics asserts a theory more or less to the following effect: "The interests of our own State take precedence of everything; it is natural and right that we should employ violence or cunning to compass our State's profit at the expense of other States, without troubling our heads about nebulous ideas of humanity." Following this analogy, the theory of home "Real" politics ought to run as follows: "The interests of our own party take precedence of everything; it is natural and right that we should employ violence or cunning to compass our party's profit, without troubling our heads about nebulous ideas of our Fatherland's welfare." However, this theory does not exist, or at any rate does not dare to show itself.<sup>1</sup> In home political relations the

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately I have here expressed too favourable a verdict on party politics. After the debate on the Reform of the Franchise in the French Chambers in June 1911, which was the chief cause of the fall of the Monis Cabinet, the *Lanterne*



spheres of action are so confined that the immorality of the Real-political maxim would strike everyone. However much it may be followed in practice, people are bound to disown it in theory. The politician who adopts it cannot, like his interstate colleague, vaunt his Realism, but must try to persuade others—and if possible himself—that he is acting in the interests of his Fatherland. There is only one Ideal-Real political theory in the sphere of home politics, and that is that home politics has one exclusive goal—the interests of the country, the people, and the State, and that party considerations must yield to considerations of the common weal.<sup>1</sup> The divergencies in the theories of home politics rest upon different conceptions of the way in which the interests of the country, the people, and the State are best served.

A closer investigation of home politics in their relation to morality will begin most naturally with the least advanced form of State—absolutism. As it is always the individual, not the crowd, who creates, absolutism would be the ideal form of State, if it were certain that the ruler always was

wrote: "M. Monis, by sacrificing the all-important interests of his party to a disgraceful transaction, . . . declared himself an advocate of Proportional Representation."

<sup>1</sup> Social democracy, which provides the protagonists in the battles of the classes, always takes refuge in a fiction that the "party's" welfare really is the welfare of the whole of society. Thus they take precautions against a conflict between considerations of party and those of society at large.

cleverer, more prudent, and more upright than everybody else in the land: in other words, if the monarch were a god. In absolutely governed States faith has had to supply the deficiencies of reality. A prince was commonly pinnacled on a more or less lofty height of divinity, or at least regarded as God's deputy upon earth, and as far removed from everything which did not fit in with this theory. Despotism has always found a support in the power of religious suggestion. But in the long run reality proves too much for the suggestion, especially when the latter finds a rival in the suggestion of the sovereignty of the people. In our days absolutism as a State form has vanished from Europe; in Asia, Persia has obtained a constitution, and China is arranging for the introduction of a constitution. Soon Afghanistan and Morocco will be left the only absolutely governed countries of considerable extent. India also, and Egypt, which is really under English rule, are absolutely governed, but with the peculiarity that the "autocrat" is not a single person, but the British nation through its Crown, Government, and Legislature.

History tells us what have been the results of absolutism in the largely preponderating periods in which the ruler did not happen to be the best specimen of cleverness, prudence, and uprightness in the land. Persia in the nineteenth century, the Turkey of Abd-ul-Hamid, and modern Russia,

afford more or less similar pictures of corrupt conditions. Russia is the most instructive example, as it lies nearest to our civilisation. As its passage from absolutism to a much restricted constitutional government only dates a few years back, the old conditions naturally cannot yet have altered to a very marked extent.

In Stolypin's ministry the so-called "Senator revisions" were set on foot for the investigation of the condition of the Russian Civil Service. Everywhere, wherever the revisers thrust their noses, they found the same thing—embezzlement, bribery, corruption on a big scale, of every sort and form. The report of the revision from Turkestan, of which a full copy is accessible, gives a characteristic picture of the situation<sup>1</sup>:—

"These worthy officials adopted the standpoint that neither law nor order concerned them; consequently waste, unlawful earnings, bribery, neglect of official duties, and abuse of power had become a habit with them. Indeed, matters had gone so far that they took no notice, not only of ministerial rules, but even of the dispositions of the supreme power in the State. Thus, for example, the order not to grant any loan out of the provincial exchequer, which was addressed by the Ministry for War to the office of the Governor of the Trans-Caspian territory, was obeyed in the sense that a downright pillage of the provincial treasury was begun. In another

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 25, 1910.



case a *Pristav* (police-officer), K. in Merv, who had been dismissed in 1901 for forgery and speculation on the verdict of the supreme court, was reappointed *Pristav* the same year in the same town. And the report is full of similar cases. The impending revision caused no qualms to the local rulers. Their first measure of resistance was to issue a police prohibition of the presentation of petitions by the natives to the revising senators. The chief of police in the native quarter of *Taschkent* summoned the representatives of the natives before him, and insisted that the petitions to the senator should be first submitted to him for inspection. In addition, he did not forget to remind them of the consequences of eventual disobedience: 'Remember that we are living in a condition of extraordinary protection.<sup>1</sup> I may add there is such a place as *Siberia*!' Other means of pressure were adopted. Thus the natives of *Pekent*, who came forward with a list of grievances, received the answer that 'the revisors had only come on a sporting expedition, they were only there as guests, and were not receiving any petitions.' *Pristav* P. at *Duma* distinguished himself by his audacity. He addressed the following warning to the natives: 'If you managed somehow to bring your complaints before the revisors, you would not be any better off. The revision comes and goes, but I remain;

<sup>1</sup> A kind of State siege, which had been declared on the ground of revolutionary movement.



and I will strip you to the skin!’ And the natives knew by experience that this was no empty threat. When the natives did summon up courage, in spite of all the terrorisation, to present their complaints, it was only because the administration had overshot the mark and overstepped all limits to arbitrary actions. . . .

Pristav E. collected for his own benefit a new tax of 6 roubles per head of the population, and raised this ‘direct tax’ to such an extent that by 1908 it amounted to 8 roubles 50 kopecks. These sums were collected at the same time as the State taxes. E., practical man that he was, made no distinction whatever between these taxes, for he put the proceeds of both in his own pocket. In most cases no books or accounts were kept. Heaven only knows what became of the proceeds. Thus when the revisors were examining Captain S., over two thousand documents, amongst them papers of great importance, were not to be found. All papers relating to past abuses disappeared without exception in the governors’ offices. The report simply teems with facts of this kind. . . . As if by agreement, all the Pristavs regarded the prisons as their chief source of gain. The prisoners were given neither soap nor candles ; they were often left to starve, or kept on half rations. The Pristavs fetched the inhabitants from their work and used them for their own service. If a native dared to utter the slightest expression of discontent, he was

thrown into prison—on the ground of the state of ‘extraordinary protection.’ The sections relating to the extraordinary protection were particularly profitable where people of means were concerned. They were arrested without the slightest provocation, and were then allowed to buy their freedom. . . .”

And it was not only in their dealings with Asiatics that the administration behaved in this way. Everywhere where the revision was held, in European Russia and Russian Poland as well, similar conditions of deep-rooted corruption were found to exist. Everybody has heard of the Reinbot affair at Moscow, which showed that the police had been for years in league with the bands of robbers which made the environs of Moscow unsafe in the stormy times of the revolution.

In course of time such atrocious abuses naturally give birth to revolutionary tendencies; and the moment that the rulers begin to have fears for their personal safety, the secret police, with its excrescence the system of *agents provocateurs*, steadily grows to full development. When the Azer-Lopuchin affair at the beginning of 1909 once more drew the attention of Europe to the activities of the Russian secret police, the *Golos Moskvy* produced a series of articles, full of interest to the student of the psychology of absolutism, from the pen of an experienced old statesman, who “at an earlier date had occupied

an exceptionally eminent post," and who was at the time a member of the Senate.

"First of all," the writer explained, "we were, of course, obliged to find out how strong the revolution was, and what were its objects. So our first task was to procure a 'peach' out of the revolutionary camp. This 'peach' was forthcoming when the first attempt on my life was planned in the social revolutionary committee. The 'peach' proved to be a bit of a revolutionary. He happened to have been arrested in connection with another matter, and to have been kept for a long time in solitary confinement. This he could not stand, so he declared that he was ready to reveal an important secret if his freedom was guaranteed him. This was promised him, and he disclosed the attack which had been planned against me, in which he was to play a supernumerary part. We then communicated with the man whose duty it was to secure my safety, with a view to taking measures for the forestalment of the attempt. This man, who was very shrewd and had a thorough knowledge of the world, having been himself a revolutionary, said to me, 'Excellency, this is a case where an agreement is necessary.'

"'What do you mean?'

"'An agreement must be reached with the leaders, and the safety of both parties must be mutually guaranteed.'



“ ‘How do you propose to manage that?’

“ ‘In the following way, Excellency. We demand of them that they shall not attack your Excellency, and guarantee them in return safety for their leaders. We have now the trumps in our hand; thanks to the revelation of the spy, we can lay bare the whole organisation. But that will not help us. If we frustrate this organisation, others will avenge it. So that it is better to come to an agreement.’

“ ‘His Excellency paused, and suddenly added with a sly smile:

“ ‘I may as well tell you that the officer was very much devoted to me. I had saved him from the gallows, when he . . . And now I trusted him. It is quite true, I thought; I must make an agreement, it is undoubtedly the safer course; and so I continued my conversation with him.

“ ‘Well, tell me how you intend to arrange the agreement.’

“ ‘That’s all right; we will give up one of our own men to them. They must kill one of our minor officers in order to justify themselves to their own people; and we will choose one of our more insignificant men for the purpose. If that does not satisfy them, we shall have to hand over our spy to them.’

“ ‘But that’s a vile suggestion!’

“ ‘As your Excellency pleases . . .’

“ ‘Very well, do as you think necessary.’”

The Russian constitution was only attained after



strenuous struggles. In the third Imperial Duma the Conservative groups became steadily stronger, their predominance steadily more absolute as the Centre, the October party, gradually fell to pieces. Conservatism, which has shifted its centre of gravity from the extreme right to the "nationalist" rallying point, has acquired a taste for power and is no longer so bitterly anti-constitutional as it was. It is only to be expected that a parliament, the opposition in which has always been as good as powerless, will be little calculated to instil a nation with a consciousness of its political freedom. Nevertheless this consciousness is a salient feature of political life in Russia at the present time; though it may not go deep down into the wide strata of the population, yet it can be discerned clearly enough in the politically important social circles; in fact, in the strata which are labelled reactionary by their opponents. The proof of this is to be found in the strength of the nationalist movement.

In fact, it may be held to be a maxim of modern history that *when a people has won for itself political freedom, its first efforts will be directed to the practice of national oppression*. There is, as has been already remarked, a natural connection between political emancipation and the intensity of national self-assertion. It is not till a people begins to govern itself that it becomes fully and clearly conscious of its national oneness; it feels itself strong, and at once takes steps to measure its

strength. Every citizen of different nationality must, in virtue of the rights of the stronger, be as far as possible denationalised, must be marked with the unifying stamp of the dominant nation. Teutonisation, Slavonicisation, Magyarisation are the order of the day. It is only with the constitutional movement of the nineteenth century that these policies have come into prominence. Formerly foreign nationalities inside the frontiers of a State were occasionally attacked from motives of rivalry, public safety, religious intolerance, etc., but they were seldom oppressed on national grounds. A constitution brings the language question to the front. In Austria the different nationalities fight with one another with the most intense bitterness, but the dominant nations are so equally matched that no one can entirely get the upper hand; the Germans and the Czechs try to oppress each other, the Poles oppress the Ruthenes; the same fight goes on between the Germans, Slovenes, and Italians. In Hungary everybody who is not a Magyar is oppressed with unswerving consistency. The old Turkey used to be the scene of struggles of a religious colour, as well as of national struggles between the non-Turkish peoples, who enlisted the support of independent, politically free States outside Turkey (the Greeks and the Bulgarians); but not until the formation of the new Turkish constitution do we hear any mention of an "Ottoman nation," whose supremacy must be recognised and

if necessary asserted by force. This feature is the same as we see in Russia after the introduction of a constitution. And in this case it is marked by a peculiar recklessness, which indeed corresponds with the stage of culture at which the country has arrived. There had been several earlier persecutions of the Jews, but these were mainly the result of economic considerations coupled with religious antipathy; the Poles had been made to feel the mailed fist, because the Polish risings had shown that danger might threaten from that quarter. Persecutions of a serious nature on national grounds date only from the introduction of a Russian constitution. The Jews were expelled, laws were enacted with the object of securing the preponderance of the Russian element in the semi-Polish Governments of the West; the citizens of German nationality saw their freedom of movement curtailed by new legislation. Finland was reduced to being merely a Russian province.<sup>1</sup>

When Prime Minister Stolypin, on 20th May 1910, made a speech in the course of a debate in the Duma on the Semstvo arrangement in the Western Governments, in which he declared with emphasis that the Russian State element must be preponderant, the Russian State idea must obtain a foothold and defend itself against the deliberate

<sup>1</sup> The oppression of Finland is of course only a revival of the policy of the Bobrikoff period, but what was then only a State action was regarded in 1910 as a national question.



attacks of the Poles on Russian culture, an ovation unparalleled in the history of the Duma was accorded him. The two Russian bishops who took part in the proceedings hastened to the Prime Minister and kissed his hands. There we have a typical example of national suggestion.

While these tendencies to oppression testify that the constitutional idea has definitely struck root in Russia, on the other side also they are responsible for the only sharply-defined feature in a still amorphous constitutional life.

Opposed to absolutism stands the form of representative government which is accounted the most complete type for the modern constitutional State, and which, with more or less consistency, is adopted by the most constitutional States: parliamentarism, whose characteristic is that the majority in the chamber—in the second chamber if there are two—decides the political colour of the Government. There is, however, a certain distinction between English parliamentarism and Continental parliamentarism, which is seen not so much in the outward form of the constitution as in its connection with the development of the respective nations, inasmuch as the English has been built up on historical lines, the Continental has been introduced fully fledged; the former is a tradition, the latter a dogma. Parliamentarism on the Continent is often exalted into an impeccable doctrine, a religion, whose cult is upheld with the utmost strictness



in the smallest details. Parliamentary has its orthodoxy and its Pharisees. A Danish politician says: "I have met a member of the Lower House who asserted absolutely and positively that parliamentarism required that all the ministers should be chosen out of the popularly elected chamber; he believed that that was an item in the doctrine." This kind of political fetishism is very common. People in these days present a defiant front to all the authorities with which they are brought in contact, they consider themselves emancipated, and do not remember that the new-fangled authorities have precisely the same hold on them as the old despised authorities used to have. They believe in the axioms of parliamentarism as in a catechism, even if they have not always a clear conception of their meaning. Many who have given up believing in miracles from heaven, believe in miracles from the sovereignty of the people.

Political party-distribution follows several different lines. I distinguish between the following:—

1. *Grouping by temperament*: Conservatism (positive and negative) and Progressivism. The antithesis is by no means an absolute one; an endless graduation is conceivable in the progressive tendency and the determination of the correct rate of progress, but regard for the unity of the party necessitates the establishment of a certain standard to which the individual temperaments may adjust themselves.

2. *Grouping by social theory* : Individualism and Collectivism. Individualism attaches the greatest weight to the grant by society to the individual of the greatest freedom of development possible ; collectivism insists that the activities of the individual only possess significance in relation to their helpfulness to society. In reality these are only two aspects of the same truth. But in its extreme form individualism regards society as the means, the individual as the end, while collectivism sees the end in society and only the means in the individual. Here too there is a theoretical possibility of an unlimited number of shades of conception. In practical politics the difference between individualism and collectivism in no way coincides with the difference between liberalism and democracy, two conceptions which the man in the street considers to be almost identical, but which in reality are absolutely distinct. The Liberal posits liberty as the *summum bonum*, and is inevitably—even if he dare not own it—a foe to equality ; for equality can only be established by coercion. The Democrat puts equality at the top, and only throws liberty in because the word is a pretty one, and prettiness does not cost anything.<sup>1</sup>

3. *Grouping by persons* : the parties group themselves each round the person of its leader, without any fundamental difference of programme. This

<sup>1</sup> As to "fraternity," it can only be regarded as window-dressing, whichever party uses it.

was the case, *e.g.*, with the so-called “progressists” and “regenerators” in Portugal before the 1910 Revolution; in Greece the parties are still described by the names of their leaders: Theotokists, Rallists, etc.

4. *Grouping by trade interests*: Agrarian party, Labour party, etc.

The formation of parties is influenced also by national and religious ideas, and ideas of constitutional theory. Usually these motives are only secondary, which does not mean to say, however, that they operate with any less strength; they can quite properly find a place among the foremost planks of this or that party's programme, but they cannot usually be described as lines of party cleavage, because even if one particular political party adopts as its main plank the interests of a definite creed (the Centre in Germany), or concentrates its efforts on a national question (the Irish Nationalists), or on the carrying through of one of the divergent State forms in existence (Monarchists in France, Republicans in Spain), such special considerations as a rule are not—or are only during transitory crises—determinative for the politics of the other parties.<sup>1</sup> But exceptions may arise. In Austria

<sup>1</sup> It might also be debated how far we are to regard grouping by persons as an independent line of party cleavage, as I have done, or not. However, it will generally be found that where one party groups itself round a person, the others as a rule do so too. In a country like Greece grouping by persons is undoubtedly the chief line of party cleavage.



nationality is incontestably a line of group cleavage; in Turkey the parties are first and foremost religious and national. Where a State only contains one nation, or only one decisive nation, the national motive coincides for its parties with patriotism, and in order that patriotism may become a real line of cleavage, a strong current of anti-patriotism must exist. Racial considerations also may play a part as subsidiary motives (the Negro question in the United States). In the case of a factor like anti-Semitism, which contains both racial, religious, and economic elements, the last will be as a rule the decisive ones.

Differences in wealth, education, etc., do not in our days as a rule form a basis for the formation of parties; but these considerations influence the groupings in another way. The propertied classes are inclined to fear any alterations in existing conditions; naturally therefore they attach themselves to Conservatism and add a material element to the temperamental. People of a certain amount of education are disposed to assert vigorously the right of the individual, and therefore form the picked troops of Liberalism. The great masses, who have neither property nor any particular education, are induced by the practical circumstances of their life to wish for change, and therefore become progressive (because they regard all the changes which they themselves desire as improvements); and as they can only operate by



weight of numbers, they become at the same time collectivist and democratic as well. Thus they array themselves against both Conservatism and Liberalism.

Political parties commonly come into existence through an intersection of two or more of the lines of cleavage, furthered by the contributory action of the subsidiary motives referred to. The economic element (trade interests) is found in all political parties everywhere and at all times. The temperament element also is so common, that it will hardly be found wanting in any party. The presence of the social-theoretical element is not so much a matter of course; it has only attained in modern times so great significance that it can be described as an actual line of party cleavage. The personal element in the parties will only make its influence felt to the extent that the party leaders possess the power of exercising suggestion on the rank and file.

In Denmark the groupings of the Right (including the Free-conservatisms) are the result of an intersection of Conservatism, moderate Individualism (Liberalism), and trade interests, partly of a commercial and industrial, partly of an agrarian kind. The Reform party of the Left (including the Moderates) is to a striking extent determined by trade interests; it is an agrarian party of moderate-progressive and moderate-democratic colour. The constitutional-theory motive has

played an important part in the formation of the party (the idea of the Right's violation of the fundamental law); and although this motive has long lost all real significance, its suggestive after-effects still make their influence felt at many points. The Radical party represents, as a trade group, free trade to all intents and purposes; it is Progressive, Liberal also by nature, but influenced by a democratic suggestion, which has acquired quite exceptional strength owing to its close connection with Social-democracy. This involves a self-contradiction which obviously hampers the growth of the party. Social-democracy is here, as it is everywhere else, first and foremost a trade party: a progressive-democratic labour party.

In Germany the Conservatives form a Conservative Agrarian party, the Centre a Conservative party, in which the religious motive (Catholicism) is pushed so strongly into the foreground that it is able to gather under the same banner distinct social-theoretical and entirely different trade interests. The National Liberals are a moderately progressive and moderately individualistic party, which, from a trade point of view, represent partly official, partly industrial, interests. The Free-thinkers are a progressive party, which represents commercial, mechanical, and industrial interests, and free trade, and which, from the standpoint of the question of Individualism *versus* Collectivism, is hampered by the same self-contradiction as the

Radical party in Denmark. The position of Social-democracy is the same as in Denmark.

The parties stand to one another in home politics in the position of independent powers, in relations of alliance or war. Though they cannot conquer each other with the sword, they have to hand instead a constitutionally recognised and therefore never-failing weapon in the majority. So long as a party or a combination of parties ("Block") can keep its majority together, it can impose its will undisturbed. In a State in which the popularly elected chamber has no counter-weight in a chamber composed on another basis or in the veto of the ruler of the State, the predominance of the majority knows no bounds except the purely moral ones which are imposed by certain imponderabilia of public opinion. But this factor cannot prevent every uncontested majority-rule from becoming a majority-tyranny, as it is in the nature of every crowd to misuse the power it possesses. The majority will make full use of its power so much the more recklessly because it knows that itself will be tyrannised over when it ceases to be a majority. The defenceless minority consoles itself with the thought that some day or other in the vicissitudes of time it may get the upper hand and take its revenge. The anvil of to-day may become the hammer of to-morrow, and *vice versa*. This, the basic principle of brutal party egoism, of course holds good,



whether the constitution is strictly parliamentary or not, *i.e.* whether the Government conforms by law and custom with the popular chamber or not. There must always be, even in a State which does not possess a strictly parliamentary constitution, a majority opposed by one or more minorities. So long as the Government is in conformity with this majority, the position is the same as under an absolute parliamentarism, and if a nonconformity arises between Government and majority, the result will be a conflict, which cannot last more than a certain time. Whatever be the result of this conflict to the contesting parties, in any event after its conclusion the Government and the majority will inevitably once more fall into line as regards the oppression of the minorities.

In France well-informed men have lamented over and over again this "Jacobin spirit which, for the benefit of a sect, appropriates all the advantages of power and entertains the deepest contempt for the right of the minorities" (Aynard in *Revue Hebdomadaire*). If only the majority consisted of the nation's best men! But the psychology of crowds has taught us that a parliament is not composed of the cleverest, most conscientious, and most competent men, but of those who have the greatest power of exerting suggestion on the crowds, and the least scruples in using this power to the full. What is more, the demands which the assembly makes on a man's time prevents busy



men, merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists, from devoting themselves to political activities, which tend to fall more and more into the hands of professional politicians.

Naturally, politicians do work for their salaries. The legislative machine works without stopping. "The Chamber would think they had wasted a day if they had not met for several hours in heat and racket to elaborate some law or other. As if in the sphere of politics, social questions, or finance there really were material for continuous legislation, and as if the development of the nation required to be regulated every day!" (Raymond Poincaré in the *Revue*). All the inquiries which have been conducted in the course of a year in French newspapers and periodicals into "the Parliamentary crisis" emphasise the purposelessness and uselessness of this incessant legislative machine. Paul Leroy - Beaulieu is altogether convinced that "three-quarters of the laws which Parliament enacts confuse society and embarrass it much more than they contribute to its progress." Others assert that most of the laws which the French Parliament, especially in the last few years, has adopted, testify to its absolute ignorance of the circumstances of the people, their conditions of life, and only prove the zeal of the popular representatives to ingratiate themselves by any and every means with the electors (Marcel Prevost in the *Revue*). Le Bon devotes a chapter in

his book on *Political Psychology* to the examination of what he calls "the misdeeds of the Laws."

Meanwhile, all these good-for-nothing laws cost money. France has the largest national debt in Europe, over thirty-two milliards. The budget has risen to five milliards, and showed in 1909 a deficit of two hundred millions. In ten years the taxes have risen by 40 francs per head (Ferneuil in the *Revue politique et parlementaire*). And this same state of things is met with again and again in all parliamentary countries. How, indeed, could a collection of several amateurs be expected to legislate in such a way as to balance receipts and expenditure? The planks in the programme must be dealt with, never mind what the cost is; the electors must be kept quiet by local sops, never mind whether the State suffers in consequence. Why should any notice be taken of expense, when the money does not come out of one's own pocket? If not, what are loans for? And what is to stop the majority from adopting new taxes, proper precautions being taken, of course, that they should fall where they chiefly hit the stratum of society which the majority does not represent? Armaments devour enormous sums, but the complete lack of economic business principles, which shows itself in legislation, undoubtedly costs more. Any private business which was conducted in the same way would in a short time go bankrupt. The States have many resources for postponing the catastrophe, but that

things *must* come to grief when the national debt and deficit grows everywhere at so formidable a rate as at present ought to be self-evident.

But legislators everywhere have a regular Turkish faith in their own competence. "Directly you have chosen us," says Raymond Poincaré,<sup>1</sup> "we feel ourselves equal to any duty; there is not one of us who does not think that he is a pocket edition of the whole country, and who does not on occasions quite sincerely delude himself into thinking that he combines in himself all the energies of the nation. And so by a natural development we come to think that we ourselves possess the whole sovereignty of the people, and that nothing exists outside us, neither government, senate, administration, nor judiciary." The consequence of this is that the deputies are not content to turn out laws and to control the finances of the State, but meddle in the government, and made the executive authority obey their orders. Let us take another of the standing complaints in France. "We have little by little arrived at such a caricature of parliamentary government, such a violation of the spirit of the constitution, that we see the deputies governing, administering, occupying a number of public offices with the title of temporary ministers, and combining in themselves different spheres of authority in a way which must prove fatal to

<sup>1</sup> The present President of the French Republic, one of the cleverest and most honest French politicians of the day.



order and to liberty.”<sup>1</sup> “Our Parliament has arrogated to itself a preponderance which oversteps all bounds ; it has become all-powerful. Elected to legislate, it administers, destroys ministers ; it forces its will on its subordinates ; it meddles in everything, whether it is the army, justice, industry, or banking affairs which are at stake ; in short, it outruns its mission in such a degree, it carries it through with so much contempt for the interests of the State and the rights of the citizens, that it might be compared with a conqueror exploiting a conquered land.”<sup>2</sup>

It is almost a matter of course that such a system must lead to parliamentary nepotism. The deputies take care to provide their relations and friends with snug berths, and stock the Government offices with their protégés. “They demand imperatively the favours which they think will profit their constituents, their friends, and their families, while they with virtuous indignation protest against the favours which their neighbours demand.”<sup>1</sup> This favouritism requires the maintenance and establishment of a quantity of more or less superfluous official posts, of which the deputies can dispose. The number of officials and functionaries in France amounted to 702,596 in 1906, 757,678 in 1909 ; while England, with a population of about the same size, has at most 305,530 ; and Germany, with double the population, has 714,860.

<sup>1</sup> Poincaré, *Questions et figures politiques*.

<sup>2</sup> “Lettres de Province,” *Temps*, Feb. 1, 1909.



And is it likely that members of Parliament will forget themselves, when they are in a position to bestow all kinds of favours on their friends and acquaintances? On 22nd November 1906, at a time when economy was the cry in every department, the deputies raised their salaries from 9000 to 15,000 francs, and thereby burdened the State with a new item of expenditure of 6,000,000. The increase was adopted, to use the *Journal des Debats*' expression, "out of hand in five minutes, in the hubbub always to be expected at the beginning of a meeting, without being entered in the agenda, without preliminary notice, without discussion, in the discreet obscurity which is better suited to burglars than to the representatives of a great democracy. The electors were without the slightest presentiment faced with a *fait accompli*, and avenged themselves by baptising the deputies with the nickname of 'Les Quinze Milles,' 'The Fifteen Thousands.'"

Poincaré has given a lively description of the state of mind of a political idealist who inadvertently gets into this milieu. The great Frenchman, a notary in a provincial town, was urged by his business friends to let himself be proposed as candidate, and at last consented. At once the chairman of the party's electoral committee came to see him. The candidate would have nothing to do with the committee, but his visitor convinced him that without its help it was

no use his standing. In return for the committee's help he must promise a railway, a garrison in the district's two chief towns, etc., as well as a quantity of other reforms, as to which the chairman of the committee himself remarked that they were perhaps a little chimerical, but if the candidate did not adopt them for his programme, the opposing candidate would do so, and that was why the committee had to support them. The candidate said that the programme submitted to him was too general, too ambiguous, but was told in answer that it was quite excellent, it aroused the hopes of the constituents. At last he consented, and was elected, sold his notary practice and went to Paris. He was obliged to attach himself to a group. He found that the groups were not distinguished by their programmes, but that there were eleven ministries, and in the event of a ministerial crisis the groups must be at their post in order that they might all be represented. The new deputy grumbled at the importunate requests of his constituents for subscriptions and distinctions, but gradually became accustomed to them, danced attendance on the ministers in the morning and attended the Chamber in the afternoon, got appointed on a Commission, made himself known as an orator, and at the next ministerial crisis was invited to become a member of the new Cabinet. He was offered the portfolio of Marine, although he had never set foot in a ship; when he refused,

he was offered the portfolio of Public Works; this he accepted. In the afternoon the ministers-to-be assembled to draw up a programme of government. Each minister regarded himself as a delegate for his own group, and made it his object to keep out everything which might displease his group as well as everything that might endanger the unity of the Cabinet. The undertaking was successfully carried out. When the new minister entered his office for the first time, he found twenty young men waiting for him there. Each of them wanted to be a parliamentary secretary, and was provided for the purpose with the warmest recommendations from friends, acquaintances, or influential constituents. The new minister was obliged to imitate his colleagues, and to appoint a parliamentary secretary, an assistant parliamentary secretary, a permanent secretary, an assistant secretary, a deputy assistant secretary, and fifteen attachés. Next the deputies, those belonging to the Opposition included, began to make themselves felt. They recommended persons and associations, and threatened to ask questions if their wishes were not complied with. He tried to abolish some superfluous posts in his department. At once protests rained in upon him. Deputies, senators, mayors, the whole population saw the destruction of France in the abolition of the tiniest little billet. He was asked to promote certain officials and to pass over others; lists were laid before him of people whom



he was to nominate, and others whom he was not to nominate. The main business of the Cabinet was to discuss the parliamentary situation, how this question was to be forestalled and that answered, who should introduce a vote of confidence and how it should run, how a bill could be skilfully altered so as to secure a majority. The weightiest questions were handled only from a parliamentary point of view, the result being an end to consistency in politics, because individual ministers strove independently to win popularity, and worked in secret against each other and against the premier. And so the ministry went out, and the ex-minister returned a disillusioned man to the back benches, determined at the expiration of the parliament to resign the honour of belonging to the French Legislature.

Poincaré, who has been a member of Parliament for over twenty years, and many times a Minister, must know the facts thoroughly. When individuals with sensitive natures, at the end of a parliament, throw up their seat in parliament in disillusionment, they usually explain their action by an account of their experiences which tallies more or less with Poincaré's little history.

Everything is gradually becoming saturated with politics. Larger and larger tracts of public life are being dragged into its corrupting atmosphere, where only "political" and "parliamentary" considerations play a part, not considerations of competence, cleverness, and honour. From time



to time a country is startled by some unusually big scandal or other, like the Duez affair in France—on the occasion of which the Minister of Justice publicly in the Chamber expressed his concern that the gangrene had spread to French justice—or like the Alberti swindle in Denmark. Affairs of this sort make a little stir; then they are forgotten, and everything goes on in its usual way, while the gangrene spreads steadily and surely throughout the State and society. The state of affairs in Portugal, which produced the fall of the monarchy, the so-called “Rotation System,” is described in the *Kölnische Zeitung* (1907, No. 951) as follows: “The two great political parties, which since 1893 have succeeded each other in the government, the Progressives or the Liberals and the Regenerators or the Conservatives, did not represent any fundamental principles but pure interest-groups of business folk, who, in their search after concessions and prerogatives, happened to light on politicians who understood them, while the politicians, on their side, when they were at the helm, knew how to take care of themselves and their place-hunting clients. A *Times* special correspondent, who has recently investigated the political position in Portugal, quotes as an example a specially fortunate politician who held no less than eleven remunerative sinecures; another got his name inscribed in the list of labourers engaged on a Government building, and was thus able to

add a hodman's humble wages to his other income. A Cabinet Minister's daughters were appointed, at a wage of £120 each, to examine women's luggage at the customs house, in which they never set foot. Robbery and debt were universal. The burdens of the State finances fell for the most part on the weak backs, but the rise in the taxes could not keep pace with the increase in the debt. Both parties were thoroughly of one mind in regarding the State as a dish, of which each might take as large a help as he wished as it came round to him. The predominant party were polite enough to make it a rule that no party should permanently occupy the Right benches, and when one of the parties had had enough, the Cabinet retired, not in consequence of a division, but in virtue of an agreement behind the scenes with the opposite party ; and then it was stated in the news agency telegrams that the Cabinet had lost its popularity and had had to resign. Thereupon an election was held, and, precisely as in the neighbouring country, Spain, produced a splendid majority for the new Government, which had in anticipation settled the distribution of places among their friends and opponents."

Corruption appears in different guises in the different parliamentary countries, but the outlines are the same. The ex-minister Nasi was condemned in Italy for embezzlement and abuse of authority ; but the trial showed that the Nasi affair did not represent a phenomenon, but a system.

Nasi's Sicilian constituents continued to elect him enthusiastically time after time, although he, as an ex-convict, could not sit in the Chamber. Why should they not show their gratitude to their representative? He had only done what everybody else did, and he had taken famous care of the private interests of his constituency.

America is the country of gigantic dimensions. Parliamentary corruption has assumed forms to correspond. Two great parties have monopolised politics, and each of them exults when a new giant scandal hovers over the heads of their opponents. Neither party lacks opportunities of exultation. The ordinary forms of parliamentary corruption, bribery, and abuse of authority by an official for his own benefit or that of his friends is expressed by a special technical word, "graft." "Graft" is met with in town, State, and Federal government, and it has gradually brought the term "politician" into complete discredit. "Politician," writes the British Ambassador at Washington, Bryce, "is a term of reproach, not merely among the 'superfine philosophers' of New England colleges, but among the better sort of citizens over the whole Union." An American politician formulated in 1832 the famous political doctrine,<sup>1</sup> "To the victor belong

<sup>1</sup> *Cp.* the Danish political formula, borrowed from another zoological sphere, "Our own dogs shall gnaw our own bone," a mode of expression which seems to combine brutality and some recognition of the shabbiness of the doctrine.



the spoils." How this proposition is carried out in practice is explained by Bryce: "Nobody supposes that merit has anything to do with promotion or believes the pretext alleged for an appointment. Politics has been turned into the art of distributing salaries so as to secure the maximum of support from friends with the minimum of offence to opponents. To this art able men have been forced to apply their minds; on this Presidents and Ministers have spent those hours which were demanded by the real problems of the country."

Both the electors and the administrators are tyrannised over by the political "machines," and their leaders, the whips, are called in America "bosses." A city boss is, according to Bryce, "often of foreign birth and humble origin; he has grown up in an atmosphere of oaths and cock-tails; ideas of honour and purity are as strange to him as ideas about the nature of the currency and the incidence of taxation; politics is merely a means for getting and distributing places." The shameless régime of corruption of Tammany Hall in New York is well known, but it is by no means an exceptional feature. Occasionally a boss finds himself in prison, which is no obstacle to his again exercising his old influence when he is free again. The Tammany Hall boss was for a long time a man named C. When public opinion at last succeeded in forcing him into a kind of voluntary exile, it was regarded as a great moral victory.



After some time he came to New York on a passing visit, and the opportunity was taken of giving a banquet in his honour, in which nearly all the leading elements in the Democratic party took part.

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu painted as early as 1885 the reverse side of democracy in clear and striking colours: "The wider the circle has become from which politicians and State functionaries of all kinds are recruited, the lower seems their intellectual level to have sunk. This deterioration in the personnel of government has been yet more common and more striking from a moral point of view. Instead of becoming steadily more refined, politics has tended to become more corrupt, more debased, and to soil the hands which take part in it and the men who get their living by it. Political battles have become too bitter and too vulgar not to have inspired aversion in the noblest and most upright natures by their violence and their intrigues. The élite of the nation, far from feeling themselves more and more attracted to politics, are already showing a tendency in more than one country to have nothing to do with it. Politics is becoming more and more a trade for the men who have not the power of getting on in other walks of life, or for adventurers who wish to make their fortunes quickly. It is an industry in which a man, to prosper, requires less intelligence and knowledge than boldness and the

capacity for intrigue. It has already become in some States one of the most ignominious of careers. Politics, to the majority of those who devote themselves to it, is merely the art of feathering one's nest at the expense of the community. A writer who is as acute as he is witty has remarked that parties are syndicates for exploitation, to which the nation is obliged to entrust the direction of the State (Molinari, *L'Évolution politique et la Révolution*, 1884). That is quite true, and the wider the circle of political life extends, the lower down in society do the parties go to recruit their personnel, the more shameless are the forms this exploitation takes."

With the extension of the franchise and the flood of democracy over the political scene, Europe is threatened with the revival of most of the abuses which Liberalism boasted that she had abolished for ever. There is some risk of our seeing the worst faults of the ancient régime—favouritism, nepotism, bribery, stock-rigging, State mendicity, plundering of the State treasury, traffic in posts and favours; in short, the whole string of abominations which are proper to absolute monarchies—revive under the mask of democracy and the cloak of liberty. The only difference is that the abuses no longer go to maintain courtiers and lobbying aristocrats, but to satisfy the demands of the proletariat and to enrich their leaders.

The basis of parliamentarism is votes. Conse-

quently the important point for all parties is to catch as many votes as possible. When legitimate means do not suffice, recourse is had to illegitimate means, which can be divided into two categories: deception and violence. To the first category belongs what Tarde calls "social brigandage" (*brigandage social*). Men who lay claim to a reputation for honour in private life find it quite right and fitting in an election campaign to resort to election lies, perfidies, and shrewd suppressions of the truth in order to damage their opponents, and, on the other hand, to promise the electors all sorts of plums which they themselves know to be unattainable, or which they have no intention of working to procure. In the second category can be placed the different kinds of electoral pressure.

Electoral pressure cannot, like "social brigandage," be exercised by every party, but only by strictly disciplined trade parties, and—first and foremost—by majority parties, which enjoy the support of the Government. French parliamentarism is no stranger to the idea of "official candidature," *i.e.* candidatures which are supported by the Government through the prefects and sub-prefects by all the means of enticing and intimidating the electors which these officials possess. A deputy on the opposition benches, who resigned his seat in 1910 at the end of the Parliament, explained his action, *inter alia*, by stating that the peasants in his constituency, because they had



voted for him, had not received the seventy-five centimes which the law gave to the fathers of families whose only son was serving with the colours, and that all favours from the State were denied to them, while the full rigour of the law was directed against them on the slightest provocation. Before the 1910 elections the Premier Briand abolished ministerial tours round the constituencies in support of the official candidates. But they were only one means of exercising pressure, and they were only abandoned just for that one occasion. A bill for ensuring secrecy in the ballot had long wandered backwards and forwards between the Chambers. In order to convince the electors of their goodwill, the majority hastily adopted a bill against "electoral corruption," a bill which in practice was calculated only to hit the extremely rare cases of direct purchase of votes. The Chamber had had the choice between two drafts, one drawn up by the Suffrage Commission, which included provisions striking at the system of official candidatures, and one drawn up by the Senate, which did not. The Chamber chose the latter.

In the Spanish Peninsula and in the Balkan States the possibility of the Government suffering a defeat at the elections is practically excluded. In Spain the "cooking of the elections" goes on quite unconstrainedly.<sup>1</sup> Nobody is excited by a

<sup>1</sup> The Government candidate is described by the new-fangled word "encasillado." I owe the following explanation of the



newspaper announcement that such and such an influential politician demands of the Government so many nominations to the Senate or the Chamber for his friends ; and if anybody does protest, it is not from indignation at this sophistication of the representative system, but only because the distribution of the nominations is not to his fancy.

In Hungary the non-Magyar nationalities had only 23 representatives before the elections of 1910. This number was reduced at the last election to 7 ; while the Magyars, who constitute the smaller half of the population ( $45\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.) won 347 seats. Notwithstanding the peculiar nature of electoral legislation in Hungary, this result evoked general astonishment. The *Times* published the following telegram from Vienna, dated 10th June :—

“The Hungarian Premier, Count Khuen Heder-vary, states to-day through the *Budapesti Hirnap* that all accounts of the employment of troops on behalf of Government candidates during the recent general election are absolutely unfounded, and that the troops did nothing but maintain order and protect life and property. The *Reichspost* and the *Neue Freie Presse* publish, on the other hand, a signed statement by the Scottish publicist, Mr Seton Watson, who was present on election day word to a Spaniard : in the ministerial offices each constituency has its own special compartment (“casillo”); the name of the candidate whose election is desired is introduced beforehand into the appropriate “casillo,” and the candidate is thus “encasillado,” “put into the compartment.”

at Szakolcza in the Nyitra county, showing that the whole town was surrounded by a cordon of troops through which none but supporters of the Government candidate were allowed to pass, and that 4000 Slovaks, including many hundred electors, were confined in a dusty open space outside the town for many hours. Several hundred Slovak electors, who were at last admitted to the interior of the town and kept waiting between lines of soldiers two hours in the sun, were eventually driven back by gendarmes without having been allowed to vote. In view of the exasperation thus caused, the Slovak candidate finally withdrew his candidature, in order to avoid bloodshed."

Professor Jorga relates in his above-mentioned treatise, *Les dernières Elections en Hongrie et les Roumains*, corresponding and, in certain details, more impressive episodes from the constituencies for which Roumanian candidates were standing. In the *Times* for 23rd August 1910, the following appears from the paper's correspondent in Budapest: "The accounts of the violence, bribery, intimidation, and subterfuges employed during the election last May, both by the Government and by the Opposition, are, despite denials, true in the main. M. V., one of the most brilliant recruits of the 'Party of National Labour,' admitted frankly in the debate on the address that manifold abuses had occurred, but he said: 'Let us not forget that we are Magyars, and that electoral abuses are of

old standing in our history. For centuries all Magyar parties have thus erred.' ”

Prussia has public ballot. The opposition accuses the dominant, Conservative Agrarians of employing election terrorism against the persons who are economically dependent on them. The fact is that the Conservatives are anxious to preserve public ballot at any price. The negotiations about the Government's Electoral Reform Bill in 1910 resulted in a compromise between the Conservatives and the Centre, in pursuance of which secret ballot was to be introduced, but only in connection with the indirect ballot, and, it must be noticed, only the elections of delegates were to be secret, while the definitive elections were to be public. Would the electors really be incorruptible? In defence of public ballot it was alleged that it was unmanly and detrimental to the feeling of responsibility that a man should not dare to let his vote be known. Arguments of that kind, for a party which is notably recruited from economically independent circles, are rather cheap. Is it more manly for the petty tradesman and peasant to vote publicly against his convictions—as he of course does when his economic existence is at stake,—than to vote secretly according to his convictions? But the manliness argument is suggestive, and therefore current coin in politics. The Government considered the arguments brought forward in defence of secret ballot less convincing, because, as



the Imperial Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said, "our whole life is made up of dependencies." But is the fact that mankind is in the nature of things un-free in many spheres, any reason for fostering an artificial un-freedom when it *could* be abolished? Of course public ballot has the advantage for the Government that they can tell whether the public officials in the frontier provinces vote for non-German candidates. In January 1910 the Government was questioned in the German Reichstag and in the Prussian Landtag about a case in Kattowitz, where officials had been transferred because at the local elections they had voted for Polish candidates. In the Reichstag the question was answered by the Imperial Chancellor himself as follows: "One thing I grant to you, officials shall only be restricted in the exercise of their political rights, and in particular in their electoral freedom, in cases in which the interests of the State unconditionally require it. . . . When an official, as happened at Kattowitz, by his vote shows that he considers the Government's Polish policy a mistaken one, that his convictions do not allow him to support it, that official shows that he is not in his right place in a district like Kattowitz, which is a scene of national conflict." So an official is to be restricted in the exercise of the franchise at points at which the interests of the State unconditionally require it. But who settles where this state of affairs exists? The Government



of the day. Do not the interests of the State require that an official should not vote for Social-Democrats? The Free-thinkers, too, often work hand in hand with the Social-Democrats. Might it not also be considered incompatible with the interests of the State that an official should vote for a Free-thinking candidate? When once the door is opened to arbitrary action, where is the line to be drawn? The succeeding Government may have different ideas of what the State unconditionally requires, from those of the present one. To-day orders are given to officials as to what candidates they *must not* vote for; to-morrow perhaps they will be told what candidates they *must* vote for. In both cases the freedom of the franchise is illusory.<sup>1</sup>

In Denmark, on the other hand, where the voting is secret, certain limits have been put to the pressure on electors. However, it happened during the electoral campaign of 1910 that an officer took part in the agitations for a candidate of the Right against a Social-Democrat. The Minister for War in the Radical Government of the day explained to the officer that by working against a party which was allied with the Government party he had shown a lack of tact, loyalty,

<sup>1</sup> If indeed the principle that State employees must not by their votes encourage a policy which the Government consider to be detrimental to the public welfare, is to be asserted, the only method of satisfying the claims of justice is to deprive all State employees of the franchise by statute.

and discipline; the Ministry did not wish to put any difficulties in the way of the exercise of his rights as a citizen, but it could not help taking notice of the way in which he used those rights. The Minister for War described this reminder as a "prescription of liberty,"—another of the ornamental flowers of political speech. When the case came under discussion in the Opposition press, a Radical candidate, an official in State employment, announced that he, under the Ministry of the Right in 1898, had received a similar reminder. A merry battle now began in the press, the newspapers of the Right trying to convey the impression that the case of 1910 was electoral pressure while the case of 1898 was not, while the Radical and Social-Democratic organs asserted the contrary. The truth, of course, is that every political party which is in power has recourse to all the abuses open to it without arousing too unanimous a protest from public opinion. Electoral pressure happens to be one of the points in the rich repertoire of political abuses on which people in Denmark are most sensitive.

The English Parliament also is in our day not a little altered from what it was nearly half a century ago. But its development does not proceed on parallel lines with that of Continental parliaments, even though Continental and English parliamentarisms naturally exert an influence on one another. The English Constitution shows in

its historical formation from the Middle Ages to our time no decided break with the past at any point. Its elastic framework allows it to reform itself step by step and steadily, so that it in a certain degree keeps pace with the claims of development. English popular government is in a state of continuous organic development.

Sidney Low, in his book *The Governance of England*, has given a clear picture of the latest phase in English parliamentary history. He shows how the Government has, in the procedure of the Lower House, the means to hand of stifling private bills and depriving the Opposition of opportunities of discussion. In 1893 a bill of great scope, full of contentious details, was forced through by closure by compartments in the shape desired by the Government. The bill was dealt with in such a way, that it was inconceivable that all the members of the majority—not to mention the Opposition—had ever had a preliminary glimpse at the bill; more than two-thirds of its clauses had not been so much as drafted in Committee. The House is after all “scarcely a legislating Chamber; it is a machine for discussing the legislative projects of Ministers, and only one among the various instruments by which political discussion is in these days carried on.” The Ministerial members of the Lower House outside the Ministry are not in a much better position than their opponents; they are not consulted, do not see the bills



before they come from the printers, and when they receive them they know that they are expected to support them by their votes. The Lower House no longer controls the Executive; the Executive controls the Lower House. In modern practice a Cabinet has scarcely ever been known to fall on the score of its administrative acts. The real guarantee against too great misuse of Ministerial power is public opinion, which would be almost as effective without the help of the Lower House. The right of Parliament to call attention to abuses and to demand their discontinuation is closely restricted by the facts that the Speaker decides how far a question may be carried, and that the Minister, if he finds a question uncomfortable, can shirk answering it by an appeal to State interests or simply without giving any reason whatever for doing so.

While Continental "cooking of elections" offends English parliamentary ethics, the English Cabinet can order a parliamentary election when it suits them, and without any other consideration than the interests of their party; and this is in reality just as much an abuse of popular government. The threat of dissolution can be employed if the Ministerialists show signs of want of discipline, or the Opposition is too obstructive. An election means to every member a struggle, expense, and the danger of losing his seat. Even the rank and file of the Opposition are not keen for an appeal to



the country ; the party may perhaps come out victorious, but they themselves stand to gain but little, while they are safe to be put to a great deal of trouble and expense. So the Ministry can often quell tendencies to revolt in their own party's ranks, and put a damper on their opponents by threats of an election.

Recognition of the altered position of the English Lower House has often found expression with politicians. Lord Salisbury, in a speech at Edinburgh on 30th October 1894, said : "There is an enormous change in the House of Commons as I recollect it, and the evolution is going on still ; and we have reached this point, that discussion of a Bill is possible in the Cabinet, but for any effective or useful purpose it is rapidly becoming an impossibility in the House of Commons." Ten years later Lawson Walton said in the Lower House that the constitution had undergone a serious change. It had ceased to be government by Parliament ; it had become government by Cabinet ; and an even later development they were told had taken place, and that it was now government by Prime Minister in Cabinet, little distinguishable from the autocracies into which the democracies of the past had degenerated. Lord Hugh Cecil, Lord Salisbury's son, on the other hand, commended the change which had taken place : "Why is it that nobody cares outside these walls about the rights of private members ? Because

there is a deep-seated feeling that the House is an institution which has ceased to have much authority or much repute, and that when a better institution, the Cabinet, encroaches upon the rights of a worse one, it is a matter of small concern to the country." Bernard Holland remarks that language of this sort had scarcely been heard in the citadel of the people at Westminster since the time of Charles I. The Lower House is in the course of becoming merely an assembly for the registration of the decisions of a secret Committee.

Where manhood suffrage exists, Parliament should present in every case a numerically exact picture of the political currents in the population. This picture is marred, however, in the first place by electoral pressure. To this it must be added that every division into constituencies becomes obsolete with the changes in the distribution of the population, and this, as experience shows, always results in the majority obtaining more seats than the number of their electors entitles them to. And it is a matter of course in crowd-psychology that the majority will always resist to the uttermost a just redistribution of constituencies by which they themselves would lose. Figures prove that the majority in the French Chamber has never since 1875 corresponded with the majority of the electors. In 1906 the elected deputies numbered

,209,606 votes in all, while 6,383,852 recorded votes had to go without representation. In Belgium, where proportional representation has been introduced, the minority parties complain that this system has become a tool in the hands of the majority to the prejudice of the minorities. It is clear, therefore, that even the method of proportional representation, which was to be the palladium against all the injustices resulting from the rule of the majority, can be abused, and the dominant party will, with the certainty of primitive instinct, manage to find out the way of abusing it most effectively. Every attempt at improvement seems to be bound to suffer shipwreck on the fact that Parliament is a crowd, whose individual members each for himself represent still larger and more heterogeneous crowds. The politician stands for the concrete expression of crowd-morality, and a man cannot in principle—not to say officially—allow might to go before right in his party's interests without being led, sooner or later, to apply the same principle where his personal interests are involved.

The result of all this development is, that a gulf grows up between the population and its representatives. "Only the deaf and blind are unaware of the real attitude of public opinion towards the members of Parliament," says the *Temps*, in the provincial letter quoted above (1st February 1909). "If the observations which I have noted down in



this series of letters are exact (many readers have written to me saying that I have not spoken anything like the whole truth!), is it not true that the deputies in our Provinces have lost the moral influence which ought to attach to their position? Is it not true that the power they have usurped and guard so jealously in the departments and arrondissements, they owe to their care for private interests and the egoism they have fostered? Yes, they are men who portion out justice and favour, these parliamentarians, and they do not object to the rôle. For this reason they are flattered and feared. But they are not loved, and people long for their fall. Who can be surprised? They have debased popular government, the better to subject the lives of the citizens to their own selfishness, they have only governed by exciting base instincts, by opening a passage to greed, so that the nation reaps no benefit from the laws of progress and equality which the Republic has introduced into the social organisation."

In such circumstances it is no wonder that a multitude of electors omit to vote. Must it not inevitably be a matter of indifference to them by whom they are misgoverned? The adherents of the principle of compulsory voting do not take into consideration the significance in the number of uncast votes at an election, as showing the gulf separating the population and its representatives. A rise in the percentage of abstentions from the



poll from election to election is convincing evidence that the population is sensible of the decadence in politics, and should give politicians grounds for the most serious reflection. Blank ballot papers, where compulsory suffrage is in force, hardly supply so good a corrective, because the use of blank ballot papers requires a clearness of view as to their own standpoint which many ordinary electors cannot be presupposed to have.

Electors and popular representatives are losing touch with each other more and more in countries which are advanced in a parliamentary sense. It is true that the parties undergo some alteration in the course of time, but at a rate which is very far from keeping pace with the alterations in social conditions. And fossil remains of the parties' pristine social views adhere to them. Let us suppose that once upon a time in a country one party was formed with a Conservative individualistic programme, responding to the interests of the mercantile class, and another party with a progressive democratic and agrarian programme. For a considerable time these two parties may succeed in holding their constituencies of merchants and countrymen respectively together. But when the mercantile class begins to trend away from conservatism or from individualism, or from both, when the Agrarians cease to be at once progressive and democratic, what then? Is temperamental, or social-theoretical, or trade-community of interests

to form the basis for the parties? At any rate, a patchwork of disconnected views and interests, which has arisen under certain historical conditions, cannot continue to exist when those conditions pass away. The parties among the electors will split, new combinations will be formed of fragments of parties from different sides. But this natural development is retarded and complicated by traditions, by the suggestion of dogmas, as well as by election committees, bosses, and similar institutions, which intervene between the electors and the popular representatives, and exercise their tyrannising influence on both sides. All kinds of irregular influences prevent the demarcation of parties among the electors from following the lines which natural development would take. What does it matter that there are thousands of unorganised electors who combine Progressivism and Liberalism with trade interests, when a Progressive-Liberal trade party does not exist, and the politicians will not have one? The electors in question will have to train their interests at one point or another before they can find a niche in the platform of a party into which they will fit *tant bien que mal*. The politicians shape the party splits and reconstructions with an eye to their own tactics, and to the retention of their seats, and care nothing about satisfying the demand of new party formations or new views of society which develop, in the course of things, among the electors.

Politicians often are not cognisant of these factors among the electors. They go on fighting the same fight over dead dogmas, because that is their métier, and because the electors have no means of making good their claims in the teeth of the politicians. A large part, perhaps the largest part, of the electorate does not see clearly that the policies which they have cheered for the last twenty to thirty years can no longer bear them any real fruit; the old suggestions are still at work, the old phrases are the bugle-calls which make the veteran's heart beat. But while the ghosts continue to dance their *danse macabre* in the parliamentary chambers, the real conflicts, the conflicts which mean something to society, remove to other battle-fields, new fulcra are formed outside the sphere of politics.

Parliamentarism is confronted with a new growth—syndicalism, the revolutionary movement which is concentrated in the French “Confédération Générale du Travail” (C.G.T.). For parliamentary action syndicalism substitutes “direct action” (by means of strikes, measures of violence, “sabotage,” *i.e.* destruction of machinery, etc.), for the tyranny of politicians it substitutes revolutionary tyranny. Parliament is sneered at, and abused at syndicalist gatherings, just as régimes of absolutism have been sneered at and abused in their time by the partisans of the sovereignty of the people; here the suggestion exercised



by parliamentarism finds its first checkmate. "Revolutionary syndicalism," writes the French Professor G. Blondel, "believes in the supreme merit of trades unions. This is the necessary result of human development, the justification for whose existence is to be found in the mechanism of production which forms similar interests into groups. It is the triumph of the natural instincts of mankind. All other unions are negligible compared with trades unions. This is the logical conclusion to the efforts of those who are bent on putting an end to the exploitation of man by man. Trades unions embrace all the victims of exploitation without regard to political and religious convictions, they point the way to a far higher ideal than that of the civil State, in which the liberty, so-called, of each individual is circumscribed by the liberty of his neighbour. This programme may seem perhaps hardly definite enough; but that is no reason why weight should not be attached to it. Syndicalists are sanguine people. They have their own kind of dogmas; they have complete confidence in the supreme wisdom of the working-man. One of them has said that on the day of the revolution all will come right. So soon as the working-men have got the means of production into their hands, they will reform the whole ground-principle of manufacture, they will produce more and work less. The peasants will exchange their provisions



for the manufactured products of the towns, and the possibilities of enjoyment will be multiplied. We shall have the Golden Age. How, then, is this ideal to be realised? Only by a general strike. In reality, revolutionary syndicalism proves to be a philosophy of strikes."

Of the 900,000 persons who (in 1909) belonged to French trades unions, and who accounted in all for a tenth part of the French labour world, scarcely 300,000—in 2500 trades unions—belonged to the revolutionary C.G.T.; the remaining 600,000—in 3000 trades unions—stood outside it. But even inside the C.G.T. there were scarcely 100,000 who endorsed the revolutionary programme. "Thus here, as so often in the labour movements of every country, it is seen that a noisy minority claims to speak for the whole labouring class." But even if the danger be not so imminent as one is sometimes inclined to fear, yet it *is* there. One of the syndicalist leaders succeeded in plunging Paris into darkness one evening by way of proving his power to the community. The more parliamentarism is discredited, the more will syndicalism grow, and syndicalism is the battle of the classes, brutal and confessed. It is so little trammelled by all the traditional ideas of society that it can afford to be honest. Accordingly, there are to be found in its criticism of the existing state of things a score of striking points which civil society may well take to heart. But, of course, that does not

prevent the positive doctrinal system of syndicalism from being just as naïve as its realisation would be prejudicial to development. Syndicalism has only one object; it is determined to crush capitalism and the State which is built up on capitalism, and does not consider that culture must be more or less implicated in its fall. Parliamentarism has shown itself to be incapable of solving the problem, which is one of the weightiest of our times, the regulation of the relations between capital and labour, so syndicalism takes the matter in hand, and tries to solve it from its one-sided proletariat point of view. The great collision between capitalism and syndicalism is preparing, and the broad intermediate stratum, whose members are neither capitalists nor proletarians, the fruitful social stratum, which produces intellectual values and therewith the possibilities of progress, stands to pay the reckoning. Anarchy stands on the other side of syndicalism as a memento. It cannot be discussed with a shrug, and a "they are a lunatics." A phenomenon like anarchy is not a casual outcrop of a passing craze, it is a symptom of malady of the most serious kind, and symptoms of malady may allow themselves to be suppressed for a time by the use of powerful drugs, but the malady itself is not healed thereby; it only gets the opportunity of prosecuting all the more freely its devastating work.

But the parliamentarians go on sitting with eyes

and ears closed, and enacting laws which are shaped to fit the last of party dogmas, with a supreme indifference to all knowledge of the subject, without bothering themselves about what the laws cost, or what they are worth, provided only they are the planks in their platform.

Continental parliamentarism leads to Chamber-despotism, English parliamentarism to Premier-despotism.<sup>1</sup> Each kind of despotism has the advantage over monarchical despotism that the wielders of power change and can be overthrown without a revolution by public opinion, when this is strong enough. At this point, then, the question arises: What part does public opinion, the unofficial crowd-morality, play in the shaping of home politics under parliamentarism?

The significance of public opinion seems to be less in home politics than it is in interstate politics. The reason for this is that the crowd, whose rôle is that of a reagent in interstate politics, itself plays too personal a part in home politics. Just as the nation is always hampered where interstate relations in which it plays a part itself are in

<sup>1</sup> The battle against the Upper House in England is waged by the belligerents themselves as a battle for the development of popular liberty, but its result would be in reality the removal of the last restraint on the new kind of despotism. Moreover, the development in England may be already about to break out on new lines. The latest franchise movements have shown that the smaller parties in special cases may be dangerous to the power of the Cabinet.



question, so is the party hampered in home politics. And there is no point in home politics on which the interests of every party do not in some way or other impinge. The crowd stands in the midst of the storm, it cannot range itself outside itself and judge the circumstances dispassionately. Only those who belong to no party can form a comparatively untrammelled judgment in politics, and they are too few and too much scattered to be able to create a public opinion. Even in countries in which the population more or less despises the politicians, it is nevertheless party-bound in all its members and party-coloured in its judgments.

So it is extraordinarily difficult to define precisely the influence of public opinion on home political relations. Fellow-partisans among the politicians will always be ready to shield each other in defiance of morality, if necessary up to the threshold of the criminal courts. Among the electors, who are not brought daily into such close contact with the actual battle, the general consciousness of culture will keep alive the rudiments of a kind of public opinion running athwart the current of party interests; but it has in every case obstinate suggestions to fight against, and can in general only operate as an undefinable undercurrent. In cases in which the abuses of the majority evoke indignant protests, the party hatred of the minorities will usually be found to be quite as genuine a constituent of the protest-movement as the social



interest which is the motto and foundation of the protest.

Moreover, home politics present so relatively narrow a field, that the rôle of public opinion as an agent of culture can be better assumed by the individual. A personality can at times, by virtue of his character and general superiority, arrive at forming a public opinion on a definite question, and thereby at forcing the adoption of a moral standpoint, despite the lust of power of parties and party leaders.

## CHAPTER IX

### FUTURE PROSPECTS

IF we wish to investigate the possibility of an improvement in existing political circumstances, we must first know where the defect in the whole system lies. A sound politics must be one which aims at a just balance of power, i.e. aims at permitting all the energies of society to reap their reward, and at minimising the waste of power. But in order that this balance may be realised the parties must meet on common ground. And here we clearly meet a fundamental defect in the parliamentary system, as it has unfolded itself in modern States. One party attaches chief weight to temperamental considerations, a second to social-theoretical, a third is perhaps preponderantly a trade party. How are such heterogeneous parties to combine for any effective purpose? Where is the neutral ground on which they can counter-balance each other? It is all a mere chance what interests will obtain a hearing, what find no spokesman, in so heterogeneous a system of popular representation. So the question really is: Can a

system of popular representation built to one common norm be conceived?

Trade interests are the most material element in politics, but precisely for that reason they are the element which will always count for most in politics. Every other group-division will be intersected again and again by trade considerations. Individuals may be Conservatives, Progressives, Liberals, or Democrats in their views of life and cast of thought, they may have national interests or religious interests, but they are first and foremost tradesmen, labourers, teachers, etc. We may be glad of it or deplore it, according to our way of looking at life, but we must bow to the fact that material interests determine the attitude of the individual towards politics more effectively than any other interests. For the State, too, material interests undoubtedly carry most weight. The prosperity of the different branches of industry conditions the economical situation of the State, and therewith its power of action, both internal and external.

That form of popular representation, then, which was based on trade groups would be the most natural and the most rational. Under such a system, and such a system only, would the different parties be able to meet on common ground. The economical interest would be the common denominator. History also teaches that wherever a representative constitution has de-

veloped in a natural way and has not been built up on abstract theories, its basis has been corporate.

This is what Adolphe Prins in his day emphasised so strongly. In the primitive rural democracies the political unit was not the individual, but the hearth, the family. Urban democracy everywhere, in Greco-Roman antiquity as in the German Middle Ages, has developed corporately; the individual does not exist, has no root outside a social group; excluded from his group he stands outside society, is an "outlaw," an "Ishmael." The town constitution is built up on guilds, crafts, and corporations of every kind. Every corporation is a social force and a sociable institution, in which the strong protects and helps the weak. Everywhere, from Hanseatic patricians and university doctors down to draymen, grave-diggers, and beggars, natural social groupings are to be found. Communities owed to their corporate basis their success in the struggle against feudalism. The system spread; parliaments, chambers of deputies, States-generals, cortes, etc., were established on a corporate basis; all these representative systems were federations with common social interests. No sanctity attaches to mere numbers, in the Middle Ages any more than in olden times. In Athens, politics was the monopoly of a minority; in Rome, classes, centuries, and tribes were corporate forms. The representative constitution of the



Middle Ages was social and sociable in essence. In England the constitution has developed evenly and uninterruptedly from these rudiments in the Middle Ages, modifications being introduced as required by the changes in the times; for this reason the English constitution works better at the present day than Continental constitutions. For on the Continent the strength of the monarchy was as a rule too great for the old corporate representative systems; and when the French Revolution was called in to create a new popular government, it did not graft it on to the old, but broke off all connection with the past and built the new system of popular power on Rousseau's metaphysical theories.

The conception of the "sovereignty of the people" is Rousseau's fatal legacy to the modern world. "Each one of us," says Rousseau, "entrusts his person and his whole power to the common management of the general will, and we as a connected whole regard each member as an indivisible part of that whole." This "general will" is "the sovereign," and the sovereign, consisting as it does only of the individuals who compose it, can have no interest which is opposed to theirs; consequently, there is no need for the sovereign power to give its subjects guarantees, because it is impossible for the whole to wish to damage its parts. The sovereign cannot impose

any burden on its subjects which is unprofitable to the community ; it cannot even wish to do so, "for under the law of reason, no less than under the law of nature, nothing happens without a cause." On the other hand, the sovereign must be in a position to impose its will by force on the individuals whose private wills may conflict with its own. The State is absolute lord over the possessions and persons of all its members. When the State is established by the Social Contract, the votes of the greatest number always bind all the rest. "When a man proposes a law in a popular assembly, he does not by doing so ask the citizens whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or does not accord with the general will, which is theirs ; everyone by giving his vote expresses his opinion of it, and by counting the votes the general will is found. ( So if an opinion which is opposed to my own carries the day, it only shows that I have been mistaken, and that what I thought was the general will, was not. If my private opinion had carried the day, I should have done something which I did not wish to do, and should thus have been no free agent."

Sumner Maine has proved that while several of Rousseau's ideas trace their origin to Hobbes and the French economists, and the conceptions "natural law" and "natural rights" belong to jurisprudence and originate in the systems of

Roman jurists, "the despotic sovereign of the *Contrat social*, the all-powerful community, is an inverted copy of the King of France, invested with an authority claimed for him by his courtiers and by the more courtly of his lawyers, but denied to him by all the highest minds in the country, and especially by the great luminaries of the French Parliaments. . . . The mass of natural rights absorbed by the sovereign community through the Social Contract is, again, nothing more than the old divine right of kings in a new dress."

Thus Louis XV.'s despotism crystallises itself into the sovereignty of the people, which Rousseau's heirs set upon the empty throne. The sovereignty of the people allied itself with the representative system borrowed from England, which Rousseau abominated, but which had to be adopted, because Rousseau's popular assembly, in which the whole people voted personally, was only possible in practice in an urban constitution. Continental parliamentarism was reared on this basis. Rousseau was a zealous individualist; wishing to save the individual from bondage of every kind, he saw no other way of escape than to let him be absorbed into the whole, to let him surrender his will to the general will. (He asserted that man did not become really free till he had surrendered his freedom. The paradox contains some measure of truth, but it makes all the difference in what way a man



surrenders his freedom.<sup>1</sup> If a man surrenders it for the benefit of this unreal despotism of the sovereign people, it might with greater justice be said that he does not become un-free in all seriousness until he seeks salvation from unfreedom. The sovereign people is a monstrosity, because it has no articulation; because it eliminates all natural groupings and thereby becomes a body without limbs and joints. The sovereign people is a chimera which, when the time comes for it to materialise, is immediately transformed into the impersonal, mathematical bulk of King Mob. Politics becomes "a battle in the dark, which ends in the majority crushing the minority by the crass and dumb brutality of numbers" (Ch. Benoist). The situation resulting from Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the people has been aptly described as "Atomism." The individuals are loosened—in their political activities—from all organic coherence, and are placed side by side as homogeneous, equilibrated atoms.<sup>2</sup> But an organic, living web cannot be made by pasting

<sup>1</sup> Regarded from a purely *historical* point of view, there can be, of course, no question of a man giving up his "freedom," as he has never possessed it. The whole theory of the Contract, which is bound up with the doctrine of natural law, is absolutely unhistorical, and has now practically no adherents.

<sup>2</sup> "Let us assume that the State is composed of 10,000 citizens. . . . The sovereign stands to the subject in the proportion of 10,000 to 1, *i.e.* every member of the State, for his part, has only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is entirely subject to it" (*Contrat soc.*, iii. 1).



atoms together. The sovereignty falls to the "half plus 1." If two units drop off, so that what was previously the half plus 1 becomes the half minus 1, the whole thing is turned upside down; the sovereignty shifts, and a new majority sets to work to undo what its predecessors have done. Rousseau, from the extreme of individualism, was carried over to the extreme of collectivism, which is simply no longer collectivism at all, but a masked anarchy. "The disease of the modern State is—to use no useless circumlocution—anarchy, which lurks at the street-corners: an insidious, creeping anarchy, which permeates it from the very day of its birth. In reality this creeping anarchy is perhaps the most dangerous of anarchies; the other anarchy makes more noise, but has less effect, and, what is more, it originates in the former: anarchy *in* society breeds anarchy *against* society" (Ch. Benoist).

If the State, despite everything, preserves its coherence, it is because the social forces, in virtue of the strength of their living values, succeed in bursting the husks of metaphysical theories. Trade-groupings, the modern substitute for the rank-groupings of former times, force their way into the system and reform it little by little. But the unfortunate part of it is, that the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people does not allow these forces to organise themselves. In one country a party takes special interest in agricultural matters,

in another country trade matters have their champions in Parliament, in a third perhaps the Church has a strong party at its back, etc. But the trade interests are commonly masked by agitatorial phrases about ideal, social, or patriotic considerations, which catch many stray votes, so that the relative internal strength of the groups affords no standard of comparison for the significance of trade interests in the economy of the State. There is no concrete organisation of social factors, everything is arranged haphazard. Certain interests, such as public education, literature, science, art, are in most States more or less handed over to the mercy of casual party-groups; they have no special and obvious spokesmen. And yet public education, for instance, is a matter of such paramount importance to the whole of society, that it might well claim to be represented by experts. As things stand, chance may bring a teacher into Parliament from an isolated constituency, but it may also happen that that constituency returns a shoemaker. And what sense is there in allowing questions which concern the status of science to be settled by a Parliament in which perhaps not a single scientist sits?

But it can scarcely be doubted that efforts are being made to give economical interests more systematic weight in politics, and that the course of development is tending towards an organisation on a trade basis. The history of the past few years

if full of finger-posts pointing in this direction. When a Socialist deputy, during the debate on the Post Office strike in the French Chamber (1909), was attacked by the Radicals because he had been elected with the help of "reactionary" votes, he answered: "The priests used to be the general target for abuse. I talked to the people about their economic interests. I did not bother them about politics, and that is why I was elected." In German Chancellor-politics, that kaleidoscope of party combinations, every sort of coalition is possible between parties with antiquated programmes, even between such hardened antagonists as Conservatives and Liberals; but every coalition will dissolve the moment the parties are brought into direct antagonism by a question of finance. The question of the distribution of five hundred million marks belonging to the Imperial Treasury crystallised the material economic elements which are to be found in the dogmas of every party. Liberalism and Conservatism assumed the rôle of representatives, each of their own vital interests, *i.e.* industry and trade, and agriculture, and as each group did its best to shift the burden of payment on to the other, the "block" melted away. That is to say, that it melted away the moment that it was no longer Conservatism and Liberalism, but rural and urban interests which were arrayed against each other. The Conservative party in Germany has long had its solid trade organisation



in the shape of the "Landlords' League." On the opposite wing the trade group of Labour is solidly organised in a Social Democracy. During the campaign for the reform of the Imperial finance, Liberalism was described again and again as the "natural representatives of finance and floating capital"; and on 12th June 1909, over six thousand representatives of industry, handicraft, trade, and the world of finance collected in the Schumann Circus in Berlin and established, as a counterweight to the Junkers' "Landlords' League," a "Hanseatic League for Manufacture, Trade, and Industry" for the protection of the interests of those trade groups, and with the express object of bringing forward members of those groups as candidates for the Reichstag and the Landtags. Accordingly there are at present in the political life of Germany three great trade organisations armed to do battle with each other: the "Landlords' League," the "Hanseatic League," and Social Democracy. This is perhaps the most distinct finger-post indicating the course of politics in the future which any country has yet produced. In Denmark the battle rages between two parties, which represent well-defined trade interests: "The Left," which is an agrarian party, and Social Democracy, which is a labour party. The "Right" and the "Radicals," which, each for itself, represent combined dogmas, are more and more losing their influence, because the Right are being called to



heel by the Left, and the Radicals are becoming tools in the hands of the Social Democrats. Perhaps the two parties might come to the front again, if they could reform themselves, in accordance with the spirit of the times, into trade parties, the Right becoming representatives of commerce and industry, the Radicals of Free Trade.

The growth of Socialism in every country can be explained quite naturally by the fact that Socialism has consistently followed the course of historical development towards the preponderance of trade interests over the old-fashioned dogmas. It has deliberately trimmed its political sails to the breath of professional interests. It has organised its labour crowds for a one-sided battle on behalf of labour interests—one-sided because the other strata of society have not reformed their policies on the same basis, but have continued to tilt against the same old windmills. Not much hope for the future lies in combined anti-Socialist movements, because movements towards a purely negative goal must in the long run lack vitality. It is not uncommon to find in civic circles a resigned conviction that we are hurrying with great strides towards a Socialistic form of compulsory government of one sort or another. But if civic society is sound at core, if the corruption of democratic government has not attacked its very marrow, it will react of itself. It will be forced in self-defence to organise the civic forces of society, and these civic organisations

will be obliged to enlist politics in their service, as Social Democracy long ago has done. The combatants will then fight on an equal footing, and the step from numerical representation of numbers to representation of interests will have been taken.

No less than twenty-six years ago the idea of a corporate representation was suggested quite clearly by Adolphe Prins. "In our times," wrote Prins, "the representation of principles has been our one idea; we have treated the franchise as an abstraction. The only ties which bind it to the world of to-day are the artificial ties represented by the constituencies dotted about the map. But society possesses something more than fancy divisions and artificial boundaries; it possesses an organic articulation, natural stratifications—that is to say, community of interests, rural and urban groups, industrial and economic groups, art and science groups, etc. . . . They are in the background at the moment, they require looking for; but they exist, they are as old as mankind, they constitute mankind itself in its daily work, and no revolution can annihilate them. Very well, these groups are the frames of the franchise. Difficult as is the problem of representation, when society is regarded in its metaphysical singleness and with an eye to the individuals only, the solution of the problem is correspondingly easy when the cardinal point round which the whole revolves is seen to be the realities,

*i.e.* the collectivities which have been, as it were, spontaneously generated in the womb of a nation.

“In the first place, significance only attaches to the voting when the elector has an interest in casting his vote. In that case he does not abstain from voting and is impervious to bribes. In our days abstinence and corruption at elections are natural and inevitable. A citizen may allow himself to be induced to vote against a principle, but he will not vote against his interest. The whole point is to prevent this interest from being unworthy and trivial, as it will be when the vote is given for a bribe, and to make it a legitimate interest, as it will be when the electors are grouped according to their social activities. There are many degrees of political maturity; property may be insecure or tainted, even rational motives change their colour according to the parties which own them, and do not always unite men under the same banner. Only the great social interests unite men indissolubly in the same way and survive for centuries as the unalterable factors in every civilisation. . . . Lastly, a system of this sort leaves nothing to chance. There is no room in it for those absurd electoral colleges in which the electors are collected higgledy-piggledy, so that they may suddenly, just for a day, desert their ordinary habits, their engagements, and their businesses and join with other citizens, whom they do not know, in voting for



a candidate, whom also they do not know. . . . That is a caricature of parliamentary government. It is essential to parliamentary government that the parliaments answer to the demands of society which are themselves the fountains of national life. The representative form of government is the heir to all the forces which ancient political institutions distributed over numberless corporations. If it is based on the crowd alone, it is not faithful to its historical mission. . . .

“If all the citizens in a country are thus classified, and exercise their rights in their respective classes, we get manhood suffrage, inasmuch as everybody votes; but it is manhood suffrage without the violent shocks to which it is exposed when it has no *point d'appui*, without the injustice which results from an equi-value of votes, without the oppression to which the independent thinker is exposed by the sovereignty of mere numbers. Each association is allotted a number of deputies which corresponds to the social, not the numerical, significance of that association.”

What, then, will be gained by the reform of parliaments in a corporate sense?

1. While every trade group obtains its relative representation, it will be possible to prevent any one such group from attaining, by the chances of parliamentary existence, an over-great, unjust, and socially hurtful preponderance.



2. The matters at issue will be realities, not abstract and one-sided party doctrines ; much waste of energy will thus be avoided.

3. Meaningless phrases will lose much of their suggestive force when the electors are organised according to their trade interests and can join in shaping the policy of their interest-group towards the appropriate goal. "Social brigandage" will thus be reduced to a minimum.

4. Professional politicians will be to a great extent replaced by experts, because the trade groups, being conceived according to their material interests, will propose men from their own ranks as candidates. Even if there are several parties within the trade group, an expert in the sphere of that trade will be elected, whichever party happens to preponderate.

Add to this that the most contentious suffrage questions will vanish of themselves under such an arrangement. Should the suffrage be general or restricted ? One side asserts that in a constitution which imposes on all equal duties to the State, all must have equal rights ; the other side maintains that equal manhood suffrage gives the great labouring population, which has common interests and therefore hangs together, a preponderance which is unjust and harmful, because the social significance of the labouring classes does not correspond to their numerical strength. The supporters of equal manhood suffrage undoubtedly have logic

on their side ; equal manhood suffrage is a corollary to democracy, to the "sovereignty of the people" theory. If the suffrage is wholly or partially withheld from the broadest strata of society on opportunist grounds, there can be no doubt that it is withheld illogically, and as the logic of things is bound to prevail in the long run, the claims of manhood suffrage will have to be conceded sooner or later, if the "sovereignty of the people" standpoint is maintained. If in practice the natural corollary to the sovereignty of the people leads to a mob rule which is detrimental to the State and society, the fault must lie in the system. We say A, but we decline to say B, because we see what it will lead to. Accordingly we evolve all kinds of restrictions ; plural voting, class suffrage, indirect suffrage, and other ingenious devices are invented to secure to property, education, permanent residence, etc., a preponderance whose artificial character is simply a result of the fact that the choice of the point at which the line is to be drawn is quite arbitrary. Is a man with £250 a year to have two votes, or must he have £300 a year ? Is a man to reside one or two years in a place before he gets a vote ? It is obvious that all limits are arbitrary, and that it depends on the views of the legislators whom the clauses of the electoral laws shall exclude, whom they shall include, who shall have one vote, who two, three, or four. That neither property nor examinations

by themselves are an index of any superiority of political insight, has been asserted often enough. But while it is certain that practical criteria for determining who possesses the political insight desirable in an elector cannot be devised, and that all artificial limits only operate to the benefit of class politics, it is no less certain that all such limits offend against the principle of the sovereignty of the people.<sup>1</sup> In the trade-group system, on the contrary, the whole controversial question disappears. For it is on the one hand obvious that every trade will assert itself by collecting all that trade's votes without exception, and on the other hand the position and significance in the State and society of the different trades can only be correctly appreciated if every vote is cast. While compliance with the logical claim for equal manhood suffrage under the sovereignty of the people may well lead to a preponderance of the lower classes, which is dangerous to society, no just balance of values will be attained under a system of trade-group representation until the suffrage is extended to all individuals who are active in the service of society. Thus logic and the best interests of society coincide, which is a fresh proof that the corporate method of representa-

<sup>1</sup> The question of an age-limit for the exercise of the suffrage lies outside this treatise; an age-limit must be set in every representative system, and it must in the nature of things be an arbitrary one.



tion, in addition to being the historical method, is also the most natural.'

This line of argument can be applied no less effectively to another of the burning problems of the time: women's suffrage. Where trade representation exists, it follows as a matter of course that every woman engaged in trade will have the same right of voting in her group as her male colleagues, and her collaboration will be of such obvious importance to the group that scarcely a single voice will be raised against it.<sup>1</sup>

One objection which is always made to the corporate system is this: politics, which is already marked by a crude materialism, would become ten thousand times worse when every ideal factor is lost, and the battle rages exclusively about material

<sup>1</sup> The position is more difficult when men and women who are not engaged in trade are concerned. The housewife may be of significance to her husband's trade activities in so many ways that perhaps the grant to married women not engaged in trade of the right to vote in their husbands' group might be defended. There is something to be said for allowing old people, who have retired, to continue to be reckoned as members of the trade group to which they formerly belonged, and in which they still retain an interest. The "Free Trade" group might be extended by a liberal interpretation of the word "trade" even to such people of means as, without following any business, exhibited their interest in society, *e.g.* by philanthropic activity. The Free Trade group must always be so few in number, relatively to its social significance, that it may claim all the accretions which can reasonably be given it. Only those individuals would be entirely deprived of the suffrage who did not serve society by any sort of positive work, and who would thus have no right to claim to make their influence felt in political matters.



interests. The answer to this objection is, that the belief in the significance of ideal considerations in modern democratic politics rests to a preponderating extent on an illusion evoked by word-suggestion. When ideal values are exploited for party objects, they cease in reality to be ideal, and when further they are exploited by professional politicians in their personal interests, belief in their existence may be positively harmful, because it gives the citizens a false feeling of security. Is there really anybody who believes that national interests are safer in the hands of party and professional politicians than in the hands of trade politicians, who may very well be conscious of the fact that the progress of their trade to a certain extent is dependent on that of the nation ; or that for instance the interests of popular education are better safeguarded by party men than by trade politicians, who know by experience what education and professional knowledge signify in business life ?

The corporation has this in common with the family on the one side and the nation on the other, that it is a natural grouping in contradistinction to the party, which is an artificial association. The corporate spirit accordingly is in itself more sociable, more ideal, if you will, than the party spirit. It is to social ethics that we must look to evoke aspirations towards the ideal and to give these aspirations a vogue such that public opinion will see to it that they have full scope and will compel

politics to busy itself with them, at the same time indicating in what direction the solution of these questions is to be sought. Where social ethics works thus independently, but hand in hand with politics, like one allied power with another, progress will be more rapid than where social ethics is swallowed up in an all-dominating politics. It is no mere chance that Prussia, despite the oppressive preponderance of one single trade group, has progressed further along the path of social reforms than the Promised Land of "politicians," France.

In cases in which certain trades already play a preponderant rôle in political life, the claims of justice will be satisfied if they are all represented and all given a fair chance. Political morality stands only to gain by a substitution of order for chance and arbitrariness, by the securing to expert knowledge of a rather greater place than it now has, and by the corresponding decrease of charlatanism, by a general improvement in the quality of the personnel of popular representation. And the very fact that the brutality of the battle of material interests can no longer be masked by hypocritical phrases about social weal and ideality will make it easier for public opinion to make a stand and to make its influence felt. The same imponderabilia, which in interstate politics operate to soften antagonisms, will find scope of action in home politics also when these are regulated on clear lines.

A counterweight to the one-sidedness of trade

interests might be secured through a special representation of the binding forces in the nation, of the common interests of the nation in its outward relations, *e.g.* through an upper chamber, for instance, elected on a territorial basis, not by a chance division into constituencies, but in accordance with the country's natural historical-geographical divisions (counties, departments, etc.). Thus the country and the people would be represented by a division in two directions, lengthwise and crosswise, as it were.

Every time the idea of a corporate popular representation has been mooted, it has been dismissed by the stalwarts of parliamentarism as impracticable. I have never seen any plausible proof of this impracticability. May not the difficulty lie in the fact that those who have won to the fleshpots of power, or hope in their turn to win to them, will not willingly cede their place? But if the current of development is setting in the direction of a trade-group representation, that system will come, despite the politicians. When the old gods are thoroughly discredited, the way will lie open for the new.

## CHAPTER X

### SOCIAL ETHICS : INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIV- ISM—SOCIALITY AND SOCIABILITY—CIVILISA- TION AND CULTURE

“La souveraine habilité consiste à bien connaître le prix des choses.”—LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

THE human community is the offspring of the dualism between the predatory instinct and the social instinct, between war and association. The contrast between politics and ethics corresponds to a certain extent to this dualism. But just as no epoch's conception of morality has succeeded in entirely escaping the influence of that epoch's political world-view, so politics, on its side, has been consistently influenced to some extent by ethics. Power has been obliged to enlist the services of moral law in order to secure its position, and the domain of law has grown gradually wider. However platonic be the attitude of power towards morality, politics always collaborates—be it only for appearance's sake—with the moral conception of law. The whole development of the human race rests upon this interaction between politics



and ethics, and upon the growth of the latter at the expense of the former.

It is indeed a heroic task which lies before social ethics: the reform of politics, of official crowd-morality, to the pattern of individual moralities. But some measure of success has already been attained, as we have seen in the sphere of interstate politics; and the same holds true of home politics. We no longer execute a political opponent who is a nuisance to us, nor do we clap him into the Bastille; not because the parties who happen to be at the top are one whit less tyrannical than the autocrats of olden times, but because the consciousness of law has become stronger in the course of time. Social ethics has carried some of the outworks of politics. In home politics also public opinion acts as a battering-ram. All the observations and deliberations, all the results of the thoughts and researches of individuals, are diffused in our day all over the world by books and newspapers in a concentrated and popular form. Mutilated fragments, disconnected scraps, are circulated from mouth to mouth. All these tiny atoms are gradually precipitated and add layer after layer to public opinion. The suggestion of novelty may produce both ridiculous and harmful currents of fashion, for instance, humanitarian ideas may lead to namby-pamby, demoralising pedagogics, and to an exaggerated indulgence to wrong-doers which impairs the legal protection of the

peaceable and honest citizen, and to some extent dulls his sense of justice; but these are only the extravagances of public opinion. Public opinion operates by fits and starts, and oscillates capriciously between different suggestions; but if its action be considered in large sections extending over considerable periods of time, its rôle as mediator between individual morality and crowd-morality cannot fail to be recognised.

In this connection enormous significance attaches to press suggestion. On the whole, it cannot be said that the daily Press regards it as its chief duty to instruct public opinion. It applies itself chiefly to two things: to satisfying the crowds' insatiable appetite for novelty, and to working in the service of a party or a sect, partly by direct agitation, partly by presenting neutral actions and relations in a one-sided and distorted party-light. But it must at the same time keep a keen eye on public opinion, if it is to retain its public, and it must adapt its bias accordingly. In doing so it contributes in its turn to the crystallisation and universalisation of public opinion. Despite its journeyman service for its party, despite its sensationalism, with which it helps to foster criminal instincts in suggestible individuals, despite its quackish tendency "to present ignorance in the form of knowledge," as an English apophthegm puts it, yet the daily Press is a powerful factor in the service of public opinion. And it is, on the

other side, a significant testimony to the advance in social ethics that the Government or dominant parties of no culture-State have dared to attempt a permanent repression of the Press. A war of extermination against liberty of speech is no longer conceivable.

Social ethics must first and foremost take up a definite attitude towards the question Individualism *versus* Collectivism. That is the fundamental social problem. Individualism allows the individual to concentrate his activities on himself. It is right for everybody to try to win for himself the greatest possible measure of liberty, power, and property, at any rate so large a quantity of these blessings as his individual nature tells him is requisite for the attainment of the greatest possible happiness. The individual's world is himself. The State must only impose such limitations on the spheres of action of the individuals as are necessary in their own interests; it is reduced to playing the rôle of policeman. And society, the aggregate of free associations between men, loses consistency when tested by the individualistic conception. Carried to its extreme conclusion, individualism becomes partly anarchy, partly the theory of the super-man, which itself is a form of anarchy. Individualism in its less *outré* forms expresses itself as a sentimental cult of the ego. It creates a respect for silly idiosyncrasies which must be harmful from the point of view of popular



pedagogics; individual oddities and tricks are mistaken for profundity and mental superiority, and every *individual* is presumptuous enough to regard himself as an *individuality*. The individualistic bent of mind expresses itself in an empty, noisy lyric poetry, "art for art's sake," a word-idolatry, which obliterates the distinction between the active personalities, who give birth to ideas, and the phrase-makers, who only elaborate the ideas of others.

Collectivism for its part regards the individual merely as a member of a whole. While the ancient conception of life was collectivist in its essence, modern collectivism has assumed a character which makes it the antithesis of individualism. In order that everybody may be assured of his share of the blessings of life, the narrowest limits must be prescribed to the individual's liberty. In order that no individual may have occasion to envy another, the blessings of life must be distributed in such a way that everybody is rewarded according to his deserts, calculated mathematically by a universal table; and as the weak and incapable, who produce less than the strong and capable, cannot help their inferiority, the deserts of the former are in reality as great as those of the latter, wherefore their reward must also be as great. And this brings us, by way of socialism, to the most extreme form of collectivism, communism. The State becomes the great regulator, a machine which automatically dis-



tributes work and wages. This trend is not lyrical, it is crassly materialistic, its logical result being that it acts psychologically only through hunger and sexual desire ; but it has this in common with its antithesis, individualism, that it tends to leave the free associations of society out of account ; they do not fit in to the mechanism of the State-order. It forgets that a machine always turns out precisely the same product without variation, and therefore without improvement ; that only private initiative can create the new, that all progress is due to dissimilarity. Finally, it forgets the intellectual values, which cannot be regulated in the same way as material work and material enjoyment, but which are nevertheless what makes the world go round. Individualism is founded upon an Utopianism, namely, the isolated individual, who does not exist. Collectivism is founded upon another Utopianism, namely, equality, which also does not exist, and which—fortunately—never can be enforced.

Each part has stared itself blind at its half-fraction of the truth. Of course, society (in the widest sense, including the State) only exists for the sake of the individuals, because without individuals there would be no society ; but it does not exist for the sake of the single individual. The individual, on his side, does not exist only for his own sake, but also for the sake of all the other individuals—in other words, for the sake of society. It is an established fact that man is a social animal.

It is the social feeling which—together with the instinct of self-preservation — prompts a man to work. The refinement of cruelty in the labours of Sisyphus and the Danaids lies in the fact that they do not produce any values. If the prisoners who in the Asiatic treadmills, day in and day out, laboriously turn a wheel which does not drive any machine, were offered the option of turning another wheel which ground corn, for instance, not one would refuse the offer. The refinement of the punishment lies in the humiliating feeling produced by the carrying out of a labour which creates no values. And by values I mean social values. If an artist knew beforehand that the work of art on which he was working would be destroyed as soon as it was finished, without anybody else getting a look at it, he would lose all inclination to work. The work of art might very well have a significance for himself, for his own development as an artist, but it would not acquire a social value, and that is the crucial point. The variety which is often found in creative individuals is nothing else than a —perhaps more or less exaggerated—consciousness of their own power of producing social values.

It is clear that the greater the possibilities of development which society offers to the individual, the greater are the values which the individual can offer to society. The emancipation of the peasants from villenage in Denmark considerably increased their powers of production. But this is

especially true of mental values. Science, art, and literature demand liberty and a certain freedom of scope if they are to prosper. The man whose daily work consists in striking a hammer on an anvil, can carry out his work satisfactorily if he only has a roof over his head and means of satisfying his hunger and sexual desires. If society can offer him in addition a secure future and a certain stock of information of public utility, it will pay society to do so, because the man is thereby enabled to bring up his children better and perhaps to exercise an influence for good on his circle of acquaintance. Merchants and manufacturers have wider claims; the enervating effects of responsibility and risk require a counterbalance corresponding to each man's disposition, such as travel, or a certain æsthetic *milieu* in his home, etc. Finally, the claims of mental-workers to participation in the blessings of life are more strongly individualised, because the execution of a valuable work of the intellect demands a real individuality. Of course, social ethics must prescribe definite limits to the demands which individuals, in virtue of the nature and value of their work, regard themselves as justified in putting forward. If the individual himself were alone to define them, the demands would be in the vast majority of cases screwed up beyond all reason; he would not be in a position to distinguish between what was really significant for his power of work, and what he, impelled by his greed,



mistakenly invested with such significance. The question of the just distribution of the blessings of life—which include not only the purely material blessings, but also power and authority—must become an ever more burning one. National economy, social ethics, and individual ethics must collaborate in its solution, and their object must be to bring about a logical relation between the social value of the work and the worker's command of the blessings of life: each individual must command so great a quantity of the blessings of life as he is in a position to convert into social values by his personal work, but no more. Of course, this end must remain Utopian for an incalculable time, perhaps for all time; but man does not set up ideals because he expects their complete realisation, but in order to indicate a direction in which his efforts must be made. Though the ideal be unattainable, yet we may be able to come one or two strides nearer to it than we are at present.

The way for all social reforms is the same. Public opinion is prepared little by little, so that the new thoughts infect larger and larger crowds. At last the phalanx supporting the demands for reform will be so great that politics cannot help taking notice of them. Not every novelty which influences the crowds is good and right, for suggestion can be employed for any ends. Fatal mistakes may be committed in the social as well as the political sphere; but society has a long life,



and time to make good what is wrong, when the injuriousness of the consequences is clearly seen. Society learns by its mistakes, even though its schooling costs it dear; the main point is that individualism and collectivism should come to be equally strong currents which are able to balance each other.

Social ethics, however, is something else, something more than a forcing-house to ripen ideas for politics. For it embraces not only *sociality*, by which word I understand the striving after improved social conditions, but also *sociability*, the development of human sympathy and social feeling. But in this last sphere also the crowds are at a lower stage of development than the individuals. The suspicion that a State had on any occasion offered a neighbouring State its help gratis out of sheer human kindness would be an insult to the leading politicians of the State in question; while an insinuation that they had cheated the neighbouring State would be more likely, despite indignant official denials, to be considered a compliment to their intelligence. Press polemics between countries and peoples, with its naïve self-glorification and abusive vapourings, reminds one of the wrangling of naughty boys. And sociability is just as little current coin in home politics as in interstate politics. A political party would consider it the climax of absurdity if it were expected to render a service

without being paid full value for it. The shabbiest bargaining is good business morality in politics. Here again public opinion mediates between official crowd morality and individual morality. The public opinion of one nation can enthusiastically applaud another, without there being any *arrière pensée* behind the applause. The motive of the enthusiasm may not be so lofty, but the main point in this connection is that in all *entente* festivities, when the "hurra" suggestion is eliminated, there remains a germ of real sociability behind. It is undoubtedly more difficult to lay a finger on the sociabilising influence of public opinion on parties, but, latent though it is, it undoubtedly exists.

Sociability is the germ of every development of crowd-morality. Consequently, every culture also is sociable in its essence. Culture, in fact, is nothing else than the moral growth of the crowds, the gradual triumph of associations over war. The people which is individualised into a nation endeavours by means of literature, art, and science to learn to know itself, to find the connecting elements in itself. As the intellectual values of foreign peoples also are made accessible to the crowds, their horizon is gradually extended to an apprehension of cosmic humanity, and thereby new ground is ever being conquered for sociability.

Just as culture takes different shapes in different nations, so it assumes different shapes in different

epochs. We are not concerned with national cultures only; the cultures of an epoch combine, despite local variations, into a larger temporary whole which is called "style." Style is the outward expression of the intellectual life of an epoch, it is the mark of unity of the time. Style is the connection of the kindred factors in different intellectual tendencies, it is the point of intersection of their forces. Style is rest and harmony. To this is due the soothing and elevating effect on the intelligent observer of every work of art conceived in a pure style.

A peculiarity of our epoch is that it has no style. In architecture all spontaneous creation of style ceased with the passing away of the Empire. The cabinet-making art produced one last kind of heroic style, the style of the 1840's ("Early Victorian style"), which was more or less a bourgeois revival of rococo. But when the style of the 'forties had passed away, nothing took its place. Music, the art of painting, literature produced many interesting personalities, but no style—only schools and tendencies. This really was something new in history. Europe had scarcely ever before, since history began, been so completely barren of style as from the middle of the nineteenth century till the present date. It is only in the most recent years that we have seen in the decorative and art industry an attempt at a kind of "iron style," which in its cold, brutal simplicity is not a bad



match for an epoch of machinery, but of which it is as yet too early to say whether it will get beyond the tentative stage and conquer the world.

The qualifications for a style are that there be something in common, some common denominator for the different schools of thought, a unity which succeeds in impressing a distinctive artistic and literary stamp on the times, as seen in the equipment of the home, social life, the conception of society, and the general way of looking at life. Style is an expression of agreement and finality in the popular consciousness. And that is just what modern times so pre-eminently lack. The theory of the sovereignty of the people, which harmonises with the modern attitude, has split the nations up into units. An atomic and anarchical epoch *must* be styleless. Life in our epoch, with its civilisation at artificial pressure, its nerve-racking hurry and the endless multiplicity of its various, ever-changing, importunate, and in-harmonious impressions, has played its part in blunting the feeling for the harmonious and in rendering mankind impervious to one consistent whole wave of culture.

Just as *culture* is to the crowds what ethical development is to individuals, so *civilisation*, the perfection of mechanics, the progress in the mastery of Nature, corresponds to the intellectual and professional perfection of the individual. Civilisation is not itself culture, it is only a means of culture.



Electric light, automobiles, and aeroplanes have nothing to do with culture beyond being, on the one hand, the results of a culture-factor, namely knowledge ; and on the other, like everything which simplifies the machinery of life and promotes human intercourse, a potential handmaid of culture. Nevertheless civilisation often operates in its earlier stages more as a solvent than a bond, in that it generates a longing for luxury which itself brings the predatory instinct into play. Hence come the contradictions noticeable in the conspicuously civilisatory periods of the nineteenth to twentieth century. The very progress which demands the development of the ethics of the crowds, operates at the same time restrictively upon it by increasing the means of procuring power and enjoyment. The predatory instinct and sociability are brought into sharp antagonism with each other.

It is important for us who live in the midst of the modern chaos to keep our heads, and not to allow ourselves to be led astray by the hostility to culture engendered by contrary suggestion and fostered by the "Real" politicians. All the talk about "over-culture" must be discounted. We see a nation deteriorate and its culture show signs of decay, and we conclude that culture has ruined the nation. But is that conclusion justified? Is it not conceivable that the culture shows signs of decay because the people have deteriorated for quite other reasons? Is it not natural to suppose

that nations, like individuals, have their span of life, a span which, as the example of the Chinese shows, may be very long, but has its limits? That nations and States grow up, receive and produce culture in their prime, to grow old subsequently and die? Death in that case is no result of culture, but an ordinance of Nature, which culture itself cannot defy. And if such is the case, there is no help for it. An old man does not become young again by shedding his culture. The ultimate issue of the battle of life is resignation. But the nation which dies after having accomplished its work of culture has not lived in vain, and deserves no abuse at the hands of history. Younger forces will seize the torch of culture and carry it further: *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit.*

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